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Agreement With U.S. on Chemical Weapons Issues

LD0305095790 Moscow TASS in English 0945 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 3 TASS—"The recent Soviet-American consultations focused on developing an agreement on mutual commitments by the Soviet Union and the United States before the enforcement of the international convention banning chemical arms," Major General Anatoliy Bolyatko, deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff, told TASS.

Bolyatko was commenting on the outcome of the 15th round of bilateral Soviet-American consultations to ban chemical arms, held within the Geneva conference on disarmament.

"The sides discussed when to begin destroying the bulk of their chemical stockpiles, acceptable ceilings and verification procedures," Bolyatko said.

The sides reached progress in discussing preparations for a bilateral agreement on mutual commitments the Soviet Union and the United States would implement before the enactment of the international convention banning chemical arms, he said.

The progress in negotiations and the sides' determination to seek acceptable solutions promise an early agreement, he believes.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker are expected to discuss signing the agreement during their meeting in Moscow in May, Bolyatko said.

"The agreement can be prepared by May 30," he said.

Bogachev on U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons Policy

LD0305210290 Moscow TASS in English 2030 GMT 3 May 90

[By Vladimir Bogachev, TASS analyst on military affairs]

[Text] Moscow May 3 TASS—Speaking to journalists in the White House, U.S. President George Bush said that the United States abandoned plans to modernise U.S. land-based Lance nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery in Western Europe.

At the same time U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in Brussels declared the U.S. readiness to begin talks with the USSR on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe right after an agreement on conventional forces is achieved in Vienna.

The Soviet Union welcomes Washington's decision to accept, at long last, the Soviet proposal on talks on nuclear tactical weapons. True, it is quite possible to begin such negotiations without waiting for the end of the Vienna forum on conventional weapons.

The world was recently worried over press reports about the Pentagon's plans to replace 88 land-based Lance nuclear missiles in Western Europe with an oprational range of 112 kilometers with 389 air-to-ground nuclear missiles with a range of over 400 kilometers by the end of 1991.

There was an impression that the United States was reviving plans to modernise nuclear weapons in Europe in a new and more dangerous form.

The London-based GUARDIAN newspaper reported just on Wednesday that the U.S. Air Force began to prepare its bases in Britain and other European countries to receive new air-to-ground missiles.

According to Western press reports, it is planned to arm the F-15, F-16 and F-111 jets with new missiles.

Whereas Lance missiles in West Germany can now hit targets in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, new U.S. air-to-ground missiles, taking into account the operational range of the F-111 plane—2,000 kilometers (if these planes are armed with new missiles) will be able to hit targets on the Volga, Transcaucasia and the Kola Peninsula.

Thus, the hitting range of new U.S. missiles in Europe will be longer than that of Pershing-2 missiles which are to be destroyed under the Soviet-American INF Treaty.

Let us hope that, accepting, in principle, the Soviet proposal on talks on tactical nuclear weapons and suspending the modernisation of Lance missiles and nuclear artillery, Washington does not intend at the same time to give a go-ahead for the deployment of more dangerous air-based nuclear missiles in Western Europe.

Military Commentator on Geneva Arms Talks

LD0305203790 Moscow World Service in Russian 1100 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] The 13th round of Soviet-U.S. talks on reducing strategic offensive armaments is under way in Geneva. The most acute issue concerns cruise missiles. Here is Radio Moscow's military commentator Vadim Solovyev:

[Solovyev] The strategic offensive triads are well known. They include first ICBMs, second ballistic missiles installed aboard submarines and third strategic bombers. During the talks in Geneva the sides had agreed to limit the number of means of delivery—that is the number of intercontinental missiles, submarines and aircraft—to 1,600 units, and the number of nuclear warheads carried by them to 6,000. It seems that a solution had been found to the problem of reducing strategic offensive armaments. Only the details remained to be agreed. It was indeed in this connection that the acute character of the problem of cruise missiles became discernible.

What then are cruise missiles? Are they strategic or tactical weapons? Let us try to sort this out. Cruise missiles with nuclear fitments and a range of 1,000-2,000 kilometers are capable of inflicting great loss on the opposite side. This means that they are strategic offensive weapons. However cruise missiles with a range of a few hundred kilometers are used to perform localized tasks on the battlefield, for instance in naval combat. These missiles are, of course, tactical ones. I rather think that this was the logic behind the reasoning of the American and Soviet experts which was the basis of the Vladivostok agreements of 1974. During the summit meeting at that time an understanding was registered that long-range missiles, that is strategic systems, include all missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers, irrespective of whether they are or are not fitted with nuclear warheads. This provision was juridically enshrined in the SALT II treaty and everything was utterly clear.

Why then has an acute situation arisen with regard to cruise missiles? Here is what Colonel (Stanislav Shemyagin), deputy representative of the USSR at the Soviet-U.S. Special Commission, says:

[Begin Shemyagin recording] Displaying a kind of double standard the U.S. side has been insisting for some reason on fixing the range for sea-based crise missiles at 300 kilometers. For air-based crise missiles they are posing the issue in such a way that this range should be increased in contrast to 600 kilometers. This is a double standard. In the sphere where it is advantageous to the U.S. side the range for separating strategic from nonstrategic weapons is being increased and where it is not advantageous the range is being lowered. [end recording]

[Solovyev] Leaving the theme of air-based cruise missiles for seperate discussion, let us analyze the differences in respect of sea-based cruise missiles. The acute nature of the matter is increased by the fact that this class of missiles has, as it were, fallen outside the strategic triad. Nevertheless, sea-based cruise missiles can be used as strategic weapons. For this reason during the summit meeting in Washington in 1987 the sides agreed outside the framework of the strategic triad—that is, in addition to the levels of 1,600 delivery systems and 6,000 warheads fitted to them, to seek conditions for limiting sea-based cruise missiles. In this respect it was proposed that a maximum figure would be set for these missiles on each side and also that verification measures would be established right up to onsite inspections. Disarmament expert Colonel (Stanilav Shemyagin) explains to what extent the U.S. position accords with the understanding that was set down in the Soviet-U.S. summit-level statement.

[Begin (Shemyagin) recording] At the present time the U.S. side is not agreeing to the establishment of a strictly determined level for sea-based cruise missiles and completely rejects any forms of verification [kontrol] on the basis of cooperation. It is proposing that everything be reduced to just an exchange of statements on the planned quantities of such missiles for each five-year period—in the end neither limits nor verification and a totally undetermined and unpredictable state in respect of actions to build up this new class of strategic armaments. Surely one cannot in this respect speak of the achievement of the goal of the talks that the sides had agreed on—namely, halting the arms race on earth and averting it in space? Of course not! A significant group of U.S. strategic offensive armaments would have fallen outside the sphere of the treaty's operation and the channel for the arms race in this class of strategic offensive weapons would not have been shut off. Well-known plans provide for the United States to fit out about 200 surface ships and submarines with sea-based cruise missiles. It is planned for these purposes to supply 3,400 cruise missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers. [end recording]

[Solovyev] The U.S. position is oriented to obtaining one-sided advantages. Everything is being reduced to just a declaration of its intention in the sphere of developing sea-based cruise missiles. It is apparent that contrary to previous understandings the U.S. Administration is attempting to secure a component of strategic offensive armaments that will not be monitored. Will there be any gain from this? The most likely thing is that an imbalance will arise in the strategic relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. All this will create new problems.

Dzasokhov Wants United Germany in NATO-Pact

LD0305195490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 3 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] A press conference given by members of the Supreme Soviet's Foreign Affairs Committee, at which USSR People's Deputies Arbatov, Borovik, Burlatskiy, and Dzasokhov answered questions from Soviet and foreign journalists, took place in the Kremlin today:

[Correspondent V. Stepanyuk] The question dealt primarily with contacts between Soviet parliamentarians and their foreign counterparts, the upcoming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, disarmament negotiations, events in Lithuania and, naturally, the processes occurring in the countries of East Europe.

In particular, answering a question from your "Vremya" program correspondent on problems connected with the unification of the two Germanys, Aleksandr Sergeyevich Dzasokhov, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, said:

[Begin Dzasokhov recording] Our foreign colleagues, including those in parliamentary circles, today consider that a united Germany should belong to NATO. But then we, for our part, can put the question like this: Why should a united Germany not belong to the Warsaw Pact? Evidently, we are dealing with a search for common points of contact. It is perfectly logical today to think about the future united Germany having the status of dual membership, being a member of the NATO military-political alliance on the one hand and of the Warsaw Treaty Organization on the other, during the large transitional stage—and that transitional stage might not be all that large, in terms of time. This applies especially because the common desire of European states is orientated toward heading for the elimination of the military-political alliances and clearing the way to the establishment of a pan-European security system. Moreover, the unification of the two German states, which is developing so swiftly, must, or course, be harmonized with the pan-European processes and the major, positive changes which are being implemented in the international arena.

[Video shows the named participants at the press conference; Dzasikhov speaking] [end recording]

Solton Urges 'Militarily Neutral Germany'

LD0305152490 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 3 May 90

[Commentary by Yuriy Solton]

[Text] The NATO leadership is already including a single Germany in a discussion of its plans as a future member. This idea finds support in some European states and even in the government of the German Democratic Republic. But I don't think this is already a foregone conclusion. The emergency NATO session in Brussels also seems to indicate that even among the NATO members the response to that prospect is not uniform. There are still many questions which can hardly be answered in full by anyone now. Will a single Germany's membership in NATO undermine the Helsinki process of cooperation and confidence building in Europe? Will it affect the talks on reductions of conventional armed forces? What countermeasures will Moscow take to safeguard its security? The Soviet Union can't be expected to remain indifferent to such a step.

The Warsaw Treaty has already changed its military role compared to what it was two or three years ago, but NATO's development toward a political rather than military organization is still a mere theory. The armies of the NATO member countries, the military character of the bloc's activities is today's reality. That's clear for instance from the report by the British paper GUARDIAN on the U.S. Air Force preparing military bases in Britain and other West European countries for deploying nuclear missiles of the air-to-surface class. The missiles are to be carried by aircraft, writes the paper, that can penetrate Soviet air space. Adding the powerful united German state to NATO would greatly increase the bloc's strength. West Germany has an excellently equipped half a million strong army. The German Democratic Republic also has a force of 100,000 men. According to a preliminary agreement, the Soviet Union could leave only 195,000 men stationed in central Europe. No matter what assurances the NATO leadership gives Moscow, that situation can't fail to worry the Soviet people.

So quite naturally the Soviet Union is negative about the idea of including the future united Germany in NATO. Moscow finds the best way out would be to have a militarily neutral Germany with a limited military potential confined to needs of defense. Such a status could be established through a peace treaty or another adequate agreement.

I can't rule out other variants, but the main thing is to give reliable guarantees of security to all European states. The problem will be discussed at a meeting in Bonn on 5 May, held according to the two plus four formula by the foreign ministers of the two German states and the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and France. I agree, though, with PRAVDA observer Aleksandr Stepanov, who has voiced an opinion that eventually the question should be settled not under the two plus four formula, but two plus 33—that is by all the participants of the Helsinki process.

Petrovskiy Addresses Ministry 'Open Day'

PM0305134990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 May 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by G. Charodeyev: "In USSR Foreign Ministry: Informals Invited to Dialogue"]

[Text] For the first time the USSR Foreign Ministry has held an "open day" for traditional representatives of the Soviet public and also for informal associations and groups. USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V. Petrovskiy addressed it. He said in particular that in the civilian society toward which our country is striving politics and diplomacy cannot be the exclusive prerogative of the state. Foreign policy, like domestic policy, should be the quintessence of all ideas and moods filling society. Of course, even in a civilian society professional diplomacy is retained with its specific spheres of activity. But it is not enclosed within itself but is enriched through the intellectual potential of all society.

The participants in the meeting, who included representatives of the Soviet committee for the defense of peace, the Moscow Helsinki group, the Soviet "Ecology and Peace" association, the social inventions fund, and other informal public groups, asked numerous questions. Here are some of them:

[Question] When will a more "civilized" system be introduced for the entry and exit of representatives of informal organizations?

[Answer] "At present I would call the situation regarding trips abroad a strange one," said Yu. Reshetov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Administration for International Humanitarian Cooperation. "A specific example. An invitation arrived for a big event signed by French President F. Mitterrand. The Department of Visas and the Registration of Foreign Citizens nonetheless said that if Mitterrand had been the uncle of the invited person, there would have been no problems. But since the invitation came from an "outsider," it was necessary to bring a document from the public organization to which the invited person belonged and which could send him to Paris....

"I hope that a law on entry and exit will soon be adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet and that no motives will be needed for a person's trip abroad."

[Question] Understandably, the question of political prisoners in the Soviet Union is not within the direct competence of the Foreign Ministry. But nonetheless could the ministry staffers not help the public in, for instance, appealing to the USSR Prosecutor's Office to acquaint itself with the cases of convicted people?

[Answer] "We believe that is a very important matter," said Yu. Reshetov. "Americans have given us a list of 56 people whom they believe have been convicted in the USSR for political reasons. I want to tell you that 30 people have already been released. But we also gave the Americans a list with the names of 40 people in U.S. prisons. They are participants in antiwar demonstrations. And the sentences of some are up to 90 years. We are prepared," he said, "to embark on dialogue with representatives of the Soviet public on any question of interest to them...."

"Perestroyka," V. Petrovskiy stressed in conclusion, "has prompted unprecedented political activeness in our country, bringing to life various associations of citizens, whose numbers are constantly growing and which reflect a broad spectrum of public sentiments. Society is taking a close look at and analyzing its past, assessing the present critically, and seeking forms and methods for creating a qualitatively new future. The foreign policy sphere and the work of the Foreign Ministry have also become the subject of nationwide attention. This attention can only be welcomed."

United States & Canada

Bush Meets With Lithuania's Kazimiera Prunskiene

LD0305223690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2148 GMT 3 May 90

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin]

[Text] Washington, 3 May—On Thursday at the White House President George Bush of the United States received Kazimiera Prunskiene, the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. She is paying a private visit to the United States. As the president's press secretary, Marlin Fitzwater, stated on the eve of the meeting, the president was meeting Prunskiene as "a freely elected representative of the Lithuanian people", but not as the prime minister of Lithuania.

The meeting at the Oval Office of the White House lasted about 45 minutes.

According to a statement issued by the White House, K. Prunskiene informed the U.S. President in detail about the current situation in Lithuania. The U.S. President, the statement says, "yet again confirmed our longstanding policy of not recognizing the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR", and "expressed our firm support for the Lithuanian people's right to self-determination".

The statement also stresses that Bush "urgently called on all sides to enter into a dialogue in the spirit of good will...and stressed our wish to see a settlement of the situation in Lithuania by peaceful means and without threats". In the course of the meeting the head of the administration also stated that the United States is firmly devoted "to further progress in the area of reforms in the Soviet Union." The U.S. President also asked the chairman of the Council of Ministers of Lithuania to convey to Lithuania his personal words that he and the American people are "devoted to Lithuanian self-determination".

On the day before the meeting in the White House, K. Prunskiene spoke in the Congress Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. She was met in Congress with stormy applause. Prunskiene's speech was conducted in Lithuanian with a translation into English. In it the chairman of the Lithuanian Government set out in a general outline the goals for her trip to the United States and the aims of her forthcoming meeting with the U.S. President.

Asked to comment on the restrained and cautious position of the Bush administration with regard to recognition of Lithuania, she stated that she "cannot express dissatisfaction with regard to the president of a country who must take into account a multitude of interests," but she added that she "had not lost hope that President Bush would give Lithuania concrete aid." Prunskiene touched upon the forthcoming summit meeting between the Soviet and U.S. leaders, and went on to note that "the atmosphere of the meeting between President Gorbachev and President Bush in the United States will to a vast extent depend on the situation in Lithuania at the time of the summit meeting."

"The leaders of the democratic forces in the Soviet Union," she continued, "consider that the settlement of the Lithuanian issue also points the way to the determination of the USSR's future. If Lithuania is independent, then there will be hope for a democratic Russia."

Answering a question from one of the senators about the attitude of the Lithuanian leadership to the Resolution about Lithuania, which was approved by the Senate on Tuesday, which contains a call on the administration not to conclude any new trade agreements with the USSR while the "economic blockade" of Lithuania continues, the chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers said: "I think that this resolution is a very strong argument on our behalf, and I think that it will force the Soviet Union to agree to negotiations with Lithuania, if the Soviet Union is convinced that you will implement your refusal to endorse an U.S.-Soviet trade agreement." The Lithuanian premier firmly stated at the same time that she opposes the introduction by the United States of economic sanctions against the USSR. "I would not support long-term economic sanctions, such sanctions as would do harm to people, which would cause people to suffer," she said.

"We will continue to demand negotiations with the Soviet Union," K. Prunskiene stated. "We are ready to agree to compromises, but we will not cancel our declaration of independence." Earlier, during a meeting with members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, K. Prunskiene stressed that the Lithuanian leadership "hopes for international guarantees for the declaration of independence which we have made." "I want to stress that we believe that given such guarantees...the Soviet Union will commence negotiations."

"Political solutions are the real response in the longer term," she added.

The U.S. President himself, who held a press conference in the White House on Thursday, said that the situation in Lithuania is "an extremely complex problem." "If the United States could play a constructive role, then we of course, would implement it, but this is not the case," said Bush. "...It is impossible to raise the issue as follows: 'You must choose between Gorbachev or Landsbergis.' This is not the policy of the United States and this should not be our policy."

"The leaders of the democratic forces in the Soviet Union," she continued, "consider that a settlement of the Lithuanian issue also points the way to determination of the USSR's future. If Lithuania is independent, then there will be hope for a democratic Russia."

Answering a question from one of the senators about the attitude of the Lithuanian leadership to the resolution about Lithuania approved by the Senate on Tuesday, which contains a call on the administration not to conclude any new trade agreement with the USSR while the "economic blockade" of Lithuania continues, the chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers said: "I think that this resolution is a very strong argument on our behalf, and I think that it will force the Soviet Union to agree to negotiations with Lithuania, if the Soviet Union is convinced that you will implement your refusal to endorse an U.S.-Soviet trade agreement." The Lithuanian premier firmly stated at the same time that she opposes the introduction by the United States of economic sanctions against the USSR. "I would not support long-term economic sanctions, such sanctions as would do harm to people, which would cause people to suffer," she said.

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Prunskiene's Washington Visit Noted

LD0305122890 Moscow World Service in English 1100 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] The head of the Lithuanian government, Kazimiera Prunskiene, has arrived in Washington where, at today's meeting with U.S. President George Bush, she will seek his support for the position of the present Lithuanian leadership. Yet the White House has made it clear that no principled decisions should be expected in the course of Prunskiene's visit. At the same time it is said in Washington that the President has no intention of dictating any policy to Lithuania.

Washington advocates a dialogue between Moscow and Vilnius and a peaceful solution of the Lithuanian problem, which has emerged following the republic's parliament unilaterial decision to secede from the USSR.

U.S. Citizens in Vilnius Make Appeal

LD0305085890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] On 2 May a group of U.S. citizens presently lecturing at Vilnius University appealed to President George Bush. Here is the text of their appeal:

We, U.S. citizens, at present working in Lithuania occupied by the Soviets are witnessing brutal and uncivilized actions by the Soviet Army against the people of Lithuania and the lawful government. We, too, feel the consequences of these actions. As you know, communications with the outside world are being hampered, food and other essential goods are becoming scarce, and the supply of oil has stopped completely. The number of Soviet troops is increasing.

At present the new Lithuanian government is constantly and conscientiously striving for negotiations with Moscow in the desire to consolidate the political situation, and at the same time endeavoring to establish relations with other states in order to obtain the most essential goods.

Mr. President, during your election campaign in [words indistinct] you held in your hand the slogan: "I love Lithuanians", but your present actions in view of the very serious situation in Lithuania remind one of President Roosevelt's actions when Lithuania was desperately asking for help but was ignored by the United States. Churchill also did not hear them. Then these men created a triumvirate with Stalin, to decide the fate of Europe.

Mr. President, we are sure that you would like to be remembered as a president defending democracy. You have partly proved it already. You are ready not to recognize the annexation of Lithuania but only with carefully [words indistinct]. We ask you to turn your words into deeds. Lithuanians, Poles, Russians, Jews and people of other nationalities in Lithuania are waiting for a sign of a rapid and concrete help from you and from the U.S. Government. Congress has already made some steps towards de facto recognition of the Republic of Lithuania. And this really reflects the aspirations of the American people. This renders great moral assistance to the Lithuanian people. But the last word depends on you, Mr. President. You, too, represent the will of the American citizens. Here in Lithuania we would like to be proud to be Americans helping Lithuania, like other democratic nations.

We believe that you wish the same and will soon demonstrate that you defend the American ideals of the defenders of freedom and democracy.

Signed: With respect, doctors of philosophy Romas Buivydas from Boston, Dalia Katiliute from Chicago, Michael (?Schorer) from Washington, and Arvydas Zigas from Chicago.

Americans Said To Support Bush USSR Policy

90UF0057A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 10 Apr 90 p 3

["TASS Reports From: New York"]

[Text] New York, 9 April—The majority of Americans approve of the policy of the G. Bush administration in relation to the Soviet Union. A public opinion poll conducted by NEWSWEEK demonstrated this. The journal writes that two-thirds of those who took part in the poll believe that a policy supporting good relations with the USSR is more important for the United States than a defense of the separatist aspirations of Lithuania.

Commenting on the results of the poll, the journal notes that the President of the United States has resisted recent pressure from several members of Congress who have demanded Washington's "decisive support" for the actions of the Lithuanian Parliament.

Bush Speaks on Nuclear Weapons in Europe

LD0305215290 Moscow TASS in English 2140 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] Washington May 4 TASS—The United States will not modernise its land-based short-range nuclear weapons in Europe and [will] abandon plans to deploy more powerful types of Lance tactical missiles there, said President George Bush at a White House news conference on Thursday.

The revolutionary changes transforming Europe permit world nations to move from the post-war era to a new era outside the containment policy, Bush said.

The 1989 revolutions which have brought democracy to Eastern Europe, prospects for Germany's unification and the U.S. President's hope for the earliest conclusion of an agreement on the reduction of conventional forces and weapons in Europe bring world nations closer to a time when a peaceful and stabler Europe will be integrated and free, Bush continued.

The United States has approached this historic turning point thanks to firm partnership relations with European allies, the President noted. NATO will remain vitally important to secure the place for America and Europe.

This is a structure which proved its reliability and which underlies American security. This structure ensures a stable European order which accords with the spirit of cooperation, the President stressed.

The NATO alliance is ready to meet new challenges, he added.

Pointing to the need to draft the West's new strategy conforming to the demands of our times, Bush emphasised that after the summit with President Mikhail Gorbachev in the United States, he proposes that a meeting of the heads of state and government of NATO member countries be held late in June-early in July. The key aim of that meeting should be to draft a large-scale NATO strategy for the changed Europe of the 1990s, Bush continued.

Bush suggested that the meeting should discuss, above all, NATO's future political mission, confirming its critically important role in implementing changes in Europe and stabilising the European situation.

According to the President, meeting participants should also discuss prospects for NATO's defence with conventional armed forces and subsequent moves towards conventional arms control.

In addition, the meeting should discuss the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.

As democracy comes to Eastern Europe and Soviet troops return home, the need for short-range nuclear systems decreases. Therefore, the President decided to stop the programme to modernise Lance missiles and to end any modernisation of U.S nuclear artillery in Europe.

Bush noted that NATO summit participants should agree on a broad agenda for future talks between the United States and the USSR on the present tactical nuclear forces in Europe, which are to begin soon after the signing of an agreement on cutting conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe.

The President expressed the opinion that the forthcoming Helsinki-2 conference should be a forum for a political dialogue in a united Europe.

The U.S. future is inseparable from Europe's future, he stressed. Therefore, together with U.S. allies, the United States should be ready to use wonderful opportunities which will open in future.

At the news conference Bush replied to numerous questions concerning the situation in Lithuania. The President described the situation in Lithuania and around it as an extremely complicated problem.

He noted he wanted to convince Americans of the Lithuanian stock that his desire to ensure Lithuania's freedom and self-determination is as strong as that of all others.

On the other hand, he said, the United States wants to see the continuation of a peaceful evolution in the direction of democracy.

"We can't place this on 'you have to choose between Gorbachev or Landsbergis'", Bush said. This is not the policy pursued by the U.S. Government, and this should not be the policy of the U.S. people.

Bush stressed again that he is greatly interested in the success of perestroyka. Gorbachev is an architect of perestroyka.

The U.S. President again emphasised that he sincerely wishes success to political and economic changes in the Soviet Union.

Article Previews Gorbachev-Bush Summit

90UF0122A SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 27 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by Tatyana Mitkova under the rubric "A Columnist's Opinion": "USSR—United States: The Dialogue Will Be Continued"]

[Text] After the meeting on Malta with M.S. Gorbachev, President G. Bush said: "I hope we were able to achieve the kind of agreements that will make it possible to consider not only easy questions, but also difficult ones." In my opinion, these words of the American President quite accurately characterize the progress achieved in the USSR-U.S. dialogue recently. The forthcoming new meeting at the summit within a month, like the meeting on Malta, should become a new starting point in the relations between our countries.

As for the easy and difficult questions, then, of course, difficult questions always prevailed on the agenda for Soviet-American negotiations; for example, concerning limits on and reductions of nuclear arsenals. But as the U.S. President rightly observed, as strategic arms are reduced, the negotiations will only become more complicated because the thinner the nuclear shield, the more sensitive attitudes toward problems of security become, and the more difficult it becomes to adhere to the principle of reasonable sufficiency, which lies at the basis of the disarmament process.

Questions of the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, of course, will be in the first rank at the forthcoming meeting at the summit. But I especially want to talk about something else. The world is arranged in such a way now that any dialogue of the Soviet and American leadership leaves an appreciable imprint on the fabric of contemporary international relations, and it has an effect—even if not noticeable at first glance—on the development of one or another country. Therefore, it is not surprising that in Washington the presidents of both countries will discuss, for example, the future unification of Germany. But, perhaps, the most delicate question that will require the utmost frankness, limited only by the scope of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of another country, will be Lithuania. As for this aspect of Soviet-American relations, the position of G. Bush is as follows: He does not want the situation in Lithuania to prevent a broader development of bilateral contacts.

The forthcoming negotiations in Washington will be difficult. It cannot be otherwise. But without any doubt, they will move Soviet-American relations forward on the whole. I am convinced that the readiness for cooperation between Moscow and Washington will become stronger after the meeting at the summit. Both countries are interested in this objectively.

'Point of View' Program Views Ties With U.S.

LD0305173990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 3 May 90

["Point of View" program, presented by Nikolay Agayants, with journalists Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin and Vitaliy Ivanovich Kobysh]

[Text] [Agayants] Hello, dear comrade listeners! Here in the studio today are well-known Soviet commentators whose books, articles, and contributions on radio and television are widely known, not only in out country but also far beyond it. They are Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin and Vitaliy Ivanovich Kobysh. I won't go through all their merits, titles and honors, and not at all because of a fear of falling into a fit of panegyrics, but simply because it would take too much time. I will just say one thing: On the horizon of our Soviet political journalism, and not only Soviet, they are stars of the first magnitude, and we bow low to them in gratitude for finding the time and opportunity to participate in "Point of View."

But now, fingers crossed, as they say, let's get to business. I am referring to Soviet-U.S. relations at the present stage, on the threshold of the summit meeting in Washington between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev coming up at the end of May and beginning of June. Apropos, relations between the USSR and United States are at the moment going through what is not their simplest and, if you like, not their most pleasant period. There exist quite a few objective and subjective factors complicating the situation to quite a degree. For instance, Robert Legvold, director of the Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union at Columbia University, has said that a period of serious trials has now commencd for Soviet-U.S. relations. How true is that, Valentin Sergeyevich?

[Zorin] I would like, as it happens, to reply to your question by beginning with Legvold. I know him well personally; we have met many times. You have quoted what he says about the theme of the complications of the current period of Soviet-U.S. relations, and I would like to refer to Robert Legvold's pronouncements; I will just quote one point in a recent public statement he made. He said: The idea of improving and modernizing Soviet foreign policy, which is inherent in the new political thinking of the Soviet Union, is based on the whole upon the concept that it is the policies of a superpower which are being modernized, not those of a state which is losing this status. The Soviet leadership even today has not yet realized that it no longer heads a superpower, and for that reason it is not bringing its policies into line with the new and more modest status of the Soviet Union.

No more, no less. But let rhetoric be rhetoric, and granted that professors say whatever comes into their heads, the pity of it is that some politicians are already trying to act from such positions. They are already trying to take for granted what Legvold was talking about, and trying to start talking to us using the language of strength. They have already, after a long interval, put the term sanctions into circulation in the United States regarding the Soviet Union. The Americans have become accustomed to using sanctions against their satellites. The term sanctions on the lips of politicians of one great power with respect to another great power means either a lack of realism or simply thoughtlessness. Whatever the case, if one looks at things objectively, and does not lose sight of common sense and realistic assessments, then saying that the Soviet Union has ceased to be a superpower and that the Americans can talk to it from a position of strength is, putting it mildly, naive. Vitaly Ivanovich, I would like to hear what you think. Is this a genuine mistake and miscalaculation, or is it an attempt at blackmail, an attempt at diplomatic pressure against us?

[Kobysh] There is everything here, blackmail, delusion, and simply the American manner of taking things high-handedly. They took Grenada high-handedly, they took Panama, and they think that now, in connection with the difficulties which the Soviet Union is experiencing, serious difficulties with the crisis in which our economy finds itself, that they can make a breakthrough on some or other fronts in a high-handed way, where previously they did not manage to make way. This is a purely American phenomenon—forward, ever forward. But if one takes a serious look at things, then, in fact, what is happening, and where are we going? They reckon that the Soviet Union and socialism, if they have not already collapsed, are collapsing. The fact is, though, that not only have the Soviet Union and socialism not collapsed; and they are not collapsing, but they are becoming stronger, more humane, gaining a more open outlook, they are better adapted to the new reality, to the new thinking. The fact is that we are on the launch pad for the 21st century, and we want to enter it as a strong, modern, civilized, and democratic state. If we have problems, well, who has none.

[Agayants] At any rate, we do not have any of this mood for playing on the weaknesses or negative position of this or that state, but I get the impression that there are those in the West, including the United States, who would like to play the so-called Lithuanian card. I think we will be coming back to this later, but for now I would like to ask you, Valentin Sergeyevich and Vitaliy Ivanovich, about the current state of international relations, the difficulties which are emerging, subjective ones perhaps as well, in ties between states, and in particular between ourselves and the United States. Could they somehow reflect on the organization and holding of the summit meeting in Washington? You have so much experience in this regard, Valentin Sergeyevich, it seems to me that you have covered virtually all the summit meetings in the postwar period.

[Zorin] In general, yes. But, great experience leads one to one very important conclusion: Steer clear of predictions. The more experience you get, the better you know how these predictions do not get borne out.

[Agayants] Alright then, will the meeting take place?

[Zorin] I will try to give my point of view on this matter. I find that the outline which the American press is drawing at the moment, and which seems to be beginning to take root in our mass media as well, judging by the everyday reports, does not fully match up with reality. The outline goes like this: You have quarters in the United States—in Congress, in the press, among the right-wing Republicans—who are trying to make use of the situation in Lithuania in order to undermine this meeting, or if worst come to worst for them, to postpone it, but whatever the case, to prevent the meeting happening at the appointed time. And these quarters are opposed by the administration, which is resisting, is rejecting these proposals—it recently rejected proposals for sanctions. These were heard, but Bush expressed a negative attitude, which in general, let us agree, causes a feeling of satisfaction for us. But, I do not know whether you will agree with me, you colleagues, but I will permit myself to express what may even be a dangerous supposition. I think that in our time one can even put forward dangerous ones.

I am afraid the Bush administration is playing a double game, that this picture of a good administration and a bad Congress, or a bad part of the Congress, is an element in a game, because overall, somewhere, by pedalling talk about the possibility of cancellation of the meeting, the possibility of a postponement, the administration is firstly winning some sort of political points within the country....

[Agayants, interrupting] That is without doubt.

[Zorin, continuing]...because the meeting will most probably take place, and hence the support of the liberal part of the public will be ensured. But all these zig-zags, so to speak, soothe the right wing. That is from the point of view of domestic politics. From the point of view of foreign policy, this is a form of pressure on the Soviet Union. For example, the visit by Baker to Moscow for talks and to meet Shevardnadze is coming up, and there is a desire, evidently, to make some gains in the complex preparatory period which is in progress. But in order not to avoid the question which you put directly, Nikolay Ivanovich, I will reply to it plainly: I think, despite all these zig-zags and the zig-zags which are to come before the end of May, the Americans will not, whatever the case, opt either for cancellation or for postponement of the meeting. But I could be wrong.

[Kobysh] I think the term "double game" may not be the best one in this case, because this is simply politics. I would say they are biding their time, waiting to see what turn events take. After all, they could go different ways. And then Washington will have its back to the wall, so to speak, and will have to show the voters and Congress that it is strong, that it stands for freedom, that it is not allowing the Soviet Union to smother small peoples. Although, when you think about Panama, about Nicaragua, about Grenada, then of course, there is a whiff of very great hypocrisy.

Incidentally, there is quite a lot being said and written in the American press about this hypocrisy. There was a very interesting commentary in THE NEW YORK TIMES the other day by Thomas Freedman, a well-known commentator. He writes: The officials—American ones, that is—although they do not say so in public, think the Lithuanians have behaved stupidly by simply declaring independence and disobedience toward Moscow without any kind of tactical plan for how to achieve it. Deep down in their hearts, the administration has far greater sympathy for Gorbachev and the dilemma facing him than for the demands of the Lithuanians for immediate granting of independence. If the Soviet leadership goes too far, and we will know that when we see it, one administration staffer said—so this journalist continues—then the United States will punish Moscow by cutting back to some degree trade or economic ties which are more of an advantage to them than they are to Washington.

[Agayants] Well, Vitaliy Ivanovich, we have been through all this under Carter's Presidency—the refusal to take part in the Olympics, certain trade sanctions. There were also attempts with the Reagan administration—you recall, Valentin Sergeyevich?

[Zorin] Yes, yes.

[Agayants] And so, what interests me now is the position of the current American leadership from the following point of view: As the American press reports, NBC television and the THE WALL STREET JOURNAL conducted a public opinion poll among 1,000 registered voters. And the overwhelming majority of U.S. voters were against the political recognition of Lithuania as an independent state by the United States. To the directly put question: Should the United States recognize Lithuania's independence, two-thirds of those polled said: No, the United States should not interfere."

[Zorin] Nikolay Ivanovich, you have hit on a very important circumstance from several points of view. First, I think my answer to your question about what the final decision of the president will be, regarding in particular the summit meeting, would depend to a considerable extent on the figures that you have quoted. Of course he has an eye to what is going on in the corridors of Congress. Of course he is also reckoning with a well-controlled free press in the United States. But, it is an election year again in the United States. In the fall, one-third of the Senate and all the House of Representatives are elected, and the administration cannot fail to reckon with the majority of the voters, the majority in the figures you have just quoted. And, if in Washington they think that we are so naive, that we do not know these figures and do not realize [changes thought] Vitaliky Ivanovich, you said this was politics. And so, we, too, deal in politics, not in a dilettante way, and we understand the restrictions that exist for the American administration. They cannot fail to reckon with this circumstance. That is one thing I wanted to say. And the second—I don't know, perhaps you will disagree with me, but I am extremely disappointed, and even more than that, by one circumstance. And you know, so far we have heard nothing about it, but it deserves mention. Look here, the Americans are also subject to emotion. They are emotional no less than in our country, but they have been through a big school of politics, so to speak, in their political system, where for all these decades much more has depended upon every person than upon every person in our country. And, hence, perhaps there is a greater feeling of responsibility of each citizen, and no matter how the mass media whip up hysteria in connection with the events in Lithuania, in the end the results are like this. People weigh it up as more of this, less of this, and that is what they say. But what happens in our country? Let's start with Lithuania. We will not, so to speak, go into any depth about the domestic problems that many talk about, but I would like to ask many of my Lithuanian friends: Well, my friends, don't you think that apart from all the other problems, you have the problems of security? And inter alia, in this big and complex world, you have for decades not only suffered, as the Sajudis leaders say, at the hand of Moscow, but you have also sat it out under the nuclear umbrella of the Soviet Union, which has guaranteed your security.

[Agayants] And that is a fact.

[Zorin] It is a fact. And those who are presently trying to speak for the whole of the Lithuanian people ought to think about their security in today's world, where the nuclear threat has still not disappeared. As should those Lithuanians who give in to emotion and do not analyze this as seriously as those who were polled in the United States. That is the Lithuanians. I want to speak of the Russians, as well. Don't some of the admirers of public-meeting democracy, some of those who like extremist declarations, think that when Robert Legvold declares us to be a second-rate state, they are partly responsible for this illusion? And that what they are doing is damaging for national security? It is necessary to consider this side of activities. We have to campaign for democracy. We have to campaign for the restructuring of our political system and economic system, because otherwise we will simply collapse. But, losing certain perspectives meanwhile, losing also the feeling of patriotism and the feeling of national dignity, that means arriving at results whereby some people in Washington decide that they can adopt a grave tone with us.

[Kobysh] Yes, well, as far as this is concerned, what we are talking about also has a great deal of sense from the point of view of the reality of what the top U.S. and Soviet leaders have accomplished beginning from Geneva. We have already had quite a number of meetings. Serious documents have been signed. Talks lasting many hours have been held. The presidents and the foreign ministers have now really acquired a great deal of trust in one another. It seems to me that what they accomplished is now undergoing tests to see how durable and strong it is. History has left in its wake a very great number of unresolved problems. These questions will have to be tackled. This situation is a touchstone which will show whether we have already learned to understand each other so that during these sharp situations you do not put oil on the fire, but, on the contrary, you help each other. That is, you help yourself and you help the whole of mankind.

[Agayants] I would just like to dwell on this point. Everyone has expectations for the Washington summit meeting. Everyone expects the Soviet-American dialogue summit to continue. In order that it should continue successfully it is essential to tackle some specific problems on the agenda during all these talks. True, we have already scored significant successes and you, Vitaliy Ivanovich, were correct when you said that a strong beginning was made and that, all in all, it inspired one with optimism. But, the selfsame Legvold—he, for instance, appraises in a rather sceptical manner the possibility of resolving some disarmament questions. So, all the same, I would like to have your viewpoint on this question clarified, too, since it is of importance not purely from a formal point of view. After all, it is not a matter of whether Bush and Gorbachev will get together and put their signatures to the agreement or not, but what hope is there for us all, for the Americans, for the Soviet people, and for the peoples of other countries that the cause of disarmament will progressively advance?

[Kobysh] Well, in the coming days I think I will have an opportunity to find out from Robert Legvold, himself, why he said what he said. I don't know whether he is now listening to this broadcast or not. But he is in Moscow. He has arrived our country. At the Institute of the United States we will talk to him and....

[Zorin, interrupting] Despite all our respect for him, we will be feeling him out a little, trying to clarify what he means. But, if you ask me what lies behind such pronouncements, I would say there are two things. In the first place, Legvold personally is an amazingly cautious person. He prefers to comment on what has already happened rather than try to predict what is going to happen, even this very evening. That is a personal characteristic. And, in general, he is of course aware of a certain braking effect which fairily influential circles in the United States are trying to apply.

[Kobysh] As, in fact, they are trying to do, to apply the brakes.

[Zorin] Yes, indeed. However, excuse me for speaking frankly, but in our country, too, brakes are being applied to this process at the moment. Let's look at these things as they are. We have become accustomed to talking about the military-industrial complex as being something to do with the United States alone. To give the United States its due, one should say that the first person to put this term into circulation was none other than U.S. President General Dwight Eisenhower. It wasn't us here in Moscow. This took a lot of political courage. Maybe, among our generals, too, there is someone who has as much political courage to admit that we also have a military-industrial complex. Even if they won't admit it, the facts themselves don't change. Clearly, there are certain forces in the United States who fall into this category. Similar forces exist in our country, too. Therefore, the process about which you, Nikolay Ivanovich, are talking is not simple. All the same, I think that the meeting will not only take place. It will provide a very serious breakthrough precisely in this very difficult domain. Where of late we ahve bogged down a bit.

I will not go so far as to assert that an agreement on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons will finally be signed in Washington.

[Agayants] Valentin Sergeyevich, the overwhelming majority of Americans—86 percent according to the latest public opinion poll—want the United States and the USSR to sign this treaty at the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Washington, because they think the conclusion of such an agreement would be another step toward eliminating all nuclear weapons on the planet.

[Zorin] Indeed, despite all the circumstances, I do not doubt that we are getting closer to this and the chances that this gigantically important agreement will be signed this year are more than realistic. In short, it seems to me—maybe, I'm mistaken, in a few weeks time we'll be able to test this forecast—that if, as a result of pressure, including the events in Lithuania, something does fail to take place as planned, this is most likely to be in the sphere of the economy. As far as the political and military-political spheres are concerned, I view the prospects for the meeting with optimism.

[Kobysh] I think that, regardless of everything else, the situation now is such that we can conduct a dialogue without thinking that an enemy is sitting or standing on the other side. In his place we now see a negotiating partner, and this is very important. This is the view not only of analysts who make a deep study of these things. It's not only even the leadership of the White House that thinks this way. It is now the view of ordinary Americans, too. Statistics show that 95 percent of them believe that the Soviet Union is not an enemy. They do not regard us as enemy.

[Zorin] This is very important.

[Kobysh] Yes. Yes. It is very important. It means that they do not fear us. And we do not fear them. This means that all those problems will be solved sooner or later, because on their side, on our side, throughout the world, there is an understanding that there exist problems far more serious and far more terrible than nuclear weapons or even chemical weapons. This is, of course, the environment and everything else. So, we have to put an end to these stupidities, to all those games of guns and wars and to address ourselves to a serious matter, the saving of this planet, the saving of mankind.

[Agayants] The time allotted for our broadcast has, unfortunately, come to an end. On behalf of our listeners and myself personally I would like to thank you yet again, Valentin Sergeyevich and Vitaliy Ivanovich, for taking part in this program. I hope that you will return to this studio to talk about contemporary Soviet-U.S. relations after the summit meeting in Washington. Thank you once again. All the best.

U.S. Ambassador Received at Foreign Ministry

LD0305162190 Moscow TASS in English 1556 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 3 TASS—First Deputy USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh received on Wednesday U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock at the latter's request.

They discussed some problems of Soviet-U.S. bilateral relations.

IZVESTIYA Delegation Visits U.S.

PM0405085790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 May 90 Morning Edition p 4

["Own information" report: "To Washington to Exchange Ideas"]

[Text] On 1 May a delegation from the IZVESTIYA editorial office left for the United States. The aim of the trip is talks with the leadership of the Hearst Corporation, one of the biggest U.S. newspaper publishing concerns, about possible partnership. Both sides already have a whole series of proposals. It is not out of the question that the talks, which were initially held in Moscow, will result in the production of a joint publication geared to the mass reader in the USSR and the United States and prepared by the joint efforts of IZVESTIYA journalists and editors and the Hearst Corporation.

Correction to Obukhov Comment on Summit, Lithuania

LD0205124990

The item headlined "Obukhov Reviews Gorbachev-Bush Meeting, Lithuania" published in the 2 May issue of the Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 8, third paragraph, first sentence should read: ...should not influence the talks. "I hope our... (rewording)

China

Ryzhkov Condoles PRC on Earthquake

LD0305100690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0910 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] Moscow, 3 May (TASS)—Nikolay Ryzhkov, head of the Soviet Government, has expressed profound condolences to the government and people of the People's Republic of China in connection with the natural disaster the strong earthquake in Qinghai Province, which caused human casualties and serious damage. Nikolay Ryzhkov conveyed sincere sympathy to the friends and relations of the dead and injured.

PRC's Li Peng Hails Visit to USSR

LD0405092690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0830 GMT 4 May 90

[Text] Li Peng, premier of the Council of State, has called his recent visit to the USSR a success. The head of the Chinese Government emphasized that the visit was a step toward the opening up of the future. He noted that China and the Soviet Union hoped to develop friendly and good-neighborly relations. The economies of the two countries complement one another, and economic cooperation between them can develop in the future, as well, Li Peng pointed out.

Firm To Expand Cooperation With USSR, E. Europe

OW2604083390 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1200 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] The China National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corporation has announced that it intends to expand the scale of cooperation with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. According to Li Guangyuan, chairman of the Board of Directors of the corporation, it is very important to expand trade volume with (?this group of) countries, because sanctions imposed by the Western countries against China have suspended the importation of $1.1 billion machinery contracted previously with the Western countries.

Li Guangyuan pointed out: The corporation expects to gradually transition from governmental cooperation to signing of independent contracts with its own trading partners. For example, experts of the corporation are studying the feasibility of selling small tractors to Soviet consumers in exchange for combined harvesters.

'Goddess of Democracy' Arrives in Singapore

OW0305082590 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 1 May 90

[Text] In Singapore, it has been announced that the ship Goddess of Democracy, with which contact was once lost recently, is expected to arrive there Wednesday.

The ship will soon begin broadcasting on the high seas to the People's Republic of China. Yet there is an allegation that the ship Goddess of Democracy has already begun broadcasting news and television programs to China.

It is reported that the ship Goddess of Democracy met with a strong storm en route to Singapore, thus delaying her arrival in Singapore. The ship will sail from Singapore to Taiwan.

The ship has offices of publishing organizations [as heard] of Western countries, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Also aboard the ship are active participants in China's student movement between spring and summer last year who left China and went to France at different times.

Recently a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman described Taiwan's plan to support the Goddess of Democracy as an open provocation. Li Jinhua said that the ship's activities are aimed at committing sabotage against the Chinese Government.

Northeast Asia

Mongolia's Ochirbat Departs for Beijing 4 May

LD0405074190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 4 May 90

[Text] At the invitation of PRC President Yang Shangkun, Ochirbat, chairman of the Presidium of Mongolia's People's Great Hural, left Ulaanbaatar for Beijing today for an official friendly visit.

The sides are expected to sign a political document spelling out the main principles and directions of Mongolian-Chinese relations. There have been times when these relations have experienced difficult periods. Possibilities have now opened up for their normalization.

Orchirbat Cites MDU, MDP 'Illegal' Actions

LD0405064990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0540 GMT 4 May 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 4 May—Kim Boldokhonov, TASS correspondent, reports:

The aim of the people's state consists of creating humane, democratic socialism. To realize it we must value unity and unite our efforts. Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat, chairman of the presidium of the Great People's Hural of the Mongolian People's Republic, made this appeal in a speech in Ulaanbaatar.

Having recounted specific measures adopted recently by state and government to improve the socio-economic situation of the working people and to raise the people's standard of living, planned over three years, he expressed himself on the activity of new political movements and parties.

The head of state said that their conception and independent activity is a result of restructuring processes and manifestation of democracy. However, the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU) and the Mongolian Democratic Party (MDP) promise to raise the people's standard of living with words, while hindering with deeds the realization of measures in this direction planned by the state and government, remarked P. Ochirbat. Their representatives make journeys around towns and villages, carrying out work of a provocative nature among working people and applying pressure to them, which is leading to a serious violation of labor discipline and public order and disorders in the country in general. The MDU and the MDP have started to direct their illegal, extremist actions against the state, the government and laws of the Mongolian People's Republic, moreover—against foreigners, including Soviet citizens, diplomatic representatives of the USSR in the Mongolian People's Republic. Emphasized P. Ochirbat.

The head of state demanded that the MDU and MDP immediately cease illegal actions. He called on all political parties, associations and movements in the country effectively to cooperate for the sake of the interests of the people and Fatherland within the framework of the Constitution and other legislative acts of the republic.

Correspondent Presents Views on MPRP Congress

90US0789A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Nabatchikov report: "At a Crucial Boundary"]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar—A special congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] has opened in Ulaanbaatar. A plenum of the MPRP Central Committee held two days earlier discussed the draft, updated party rules and the procedure of the election of its executive authorities, formed to this end a special commission from the ranks of the congress deputies, and also instructed G. Ochirbat, general secretary of the MPRP Central Committee, to deliver there the main report "Immediate Tasks of Extending the Restructuring and Renewal of the MPRP".

A notable place in the report is devoted to questions of strengthening by political methods the independence and stability of Mongolia and its increased international authority and all-around cooperation with neighboring countries—the USSR and China. Suspicions as to the sincerity of the traditional friendship with the USSR were rejected as unfounded.

The working people and communists of Mongolia are placing big hopes in the congress. The situation in the republic is unduly complex and unusual. It is characterized by unprecedented public assertiveness. On a par with the governing MPRP, other informal associations and parties, some of which have plainly stated their opposition to the MPRP, have joined in the political processes. Yet, as a survey of working people's letters to the congress conducted on the eve of the special congress shows, the MPRP continues to enjoy extensive public support.

The party of communists is currently going through a difficult period. A process of critical evaluations of its own past, transition to new democratic forms of work, and the complete renewal of former organizational structures is taking place. These changes have affected all of society as well. They have encompassed the Mongolian People's Army, the unions, the Revolutionary Youth League, organizations of the artistic intelligentsia, and the mass media. Thus the first issue of the renovated newspaper UNEN, which appeared on the day the congress opened, notified readers that the former organ of the MPRP Central Committee and the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic] Council of Ministers had now become a purely party publication. Henceforth all party publications will appear under the slogan "For the Prosperity of Beloved Mongolia," which has replaced the appeal "Workers of the World, Unite!"

The party has much to do, at this congress included, to remove the mechanism impeding restructuring and to free itself of the command-administrative style and bureaucratic methods of work, without which the true exercise of democracy in all party activity is impossible.

As is believed here, the accomplishment of this task will largely depend on a correct combination of the interests of the entire party and its personnel, profound penetration of the life of the people, and an understanding of people's thoughts and requirements and the prompt and efficient solution of urgent social problems.

Together with this and other questions of the party's renovation, the congress will have to specify the main directions of the process of restructuring in the country and, primarily, map out the main ways and methods of renovation of the political system. If the party, the party organizations, party officials, and members of the MPRP in the name of the interests of restructuring achieve mutual understanding and cooperation with all healthy forces displaying goodwill and an aspiration to the renewal of society, the difficulties will be overcome, and the party and society will be able to achieve what is planned.

New public movements and parties for some two or three months have been establishing themselves even more firmly in Mongolia, taking root more strongly in the political arena, and specifying their political platforms and positions. Unfortunately, some of the new public formations are as yet mainly engaged in a struggle for power and for pushing the MPRP into the background. In spite of their statements and slogans, one does not have a strong sense of their actual influence on the positive transformations in the life of the country. Improper accusations against the government are made and abrupt and peremptory calls not always justified by the course of the political debate are heard from time to time...

The spread of opinions in society is extensive. There are various, at times polar views, and they are expressed in a varying key. To what extent they correspond to the country's interests and its prosperity and well-being, time will tell. The party also is today taking the test of glasnost and of the right to be considered the political vanguard of society. For the first time in their history Mongolia's communists have met for a special congress. Extraordinary tasks have to be discussed and tackled by the 927 deputies representing 94,000 party members and candidates.

Nikitin Outlines Problems of Ties With DPRK

LD2804205890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0840 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Aleksandr Zhebin]

[Text] Pyongyang, 28 Apr—The main problem in the area of bilateral economic ties between the USSR and the DPRK lies in making them more dynamic, more effective, and in increasing their contribution to resolving socio-economic tasks, stated V.V. Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, in an interview with a TASS correspondent here today before returning to Moscow. He leads a delegation which took part in the 24th session of the Soviet-Korean Intergovernmental Consultative Commission on Economic and Scientific and Technical Issues which has ended here.

The basic directions for restructuring foreign economic relations between the Soviet Union and the DPRK, he noted, are basically the same as those with other socialist countries. We must aspire to develop new forms and to establish direct production and scientific and technical ties between enterprises, associations, and organizations, and to create joint enterprises and develop border and offshore trade. There will be improvements to cooperation in producing light industrial goods, growing and processing fruit, and in the construction by DPRK organizations of social and cultural amenities in the far east of the country and in Siberia.

The agreement in principle between the sides on matters involved in switching to world prices and calculations in convertible currency is an important one, noted V.V. Nikitin.

An attempt was made to reduce the imbalance in our ties by increasing the amount of goods and payments for 1990 was signed.

Questions on rendering technical assistance by the Soviet Union in constructing installations on DPRK territory occupied a major place in the commission's work. There was discussion of matters involved in expanding cooperation in ferrous metallurgy, producing magnesite clinker, and developing lead and zinc deposits among other things. The Soviet side put forward a proposal that wider use be made of compensating forms of cooperation.

ROK Military Restructuring Noted Positively

SK0405005990 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 30 Apr 90

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] South Korea is planning to restructure the upper structure of its armed forces. The (?latest edition) of (?VOYENNYY VESTNIK) has reported on this.

In this connection, an article by our station military commentator (Sergey Kletskov) says as follows:

The (?plan) to restructure the upper structure of the ROK military leadership has been reportedly codenamed "818 program."

A ministerial position is going to be established for the defense command. [Sentence indistinct]

At the same time, the (?joint chiefs of staff) of the army, air force, and navy is going to be abolished.

At a glance, this change can be regarded purely as a (?military business of Seoul).

The restructuring is strictly an outcome of a pure military consideration, says Dr. (Ku Cha-yong), director of the ROK Defense Research Institute.

However, such a consideration must not be the only factor in the restructuring.

The timing of Seoul's enthusiasm in planning to basically restructure its armed forces is not accidental.

The question is that the ROK armed forces are under the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command, and that the Command is traditionally commanded by a U.S. general. Americans play leading roles at the Combined Forces Command.

However, the situation can change in the near future. According to high-ranking (?military officers) in Seoul, South Korea is reportedly going to exercise complete control over its armed forces, while the United States will play only a supporting role.

In a pure military concept, such a step should have been taken much earlier. This is because the proportion of U.S. soldiers and ROK soldiers is one to 10.

(?This matter) is now becoming an even more urgent issue, because the United States is changing its policy on the Korean peninsula .

Last February, it was declared that 2,000 soldiers would be reduced from the 43,000 U.S. troops. At the same time, it was also declared that 7,000 troops would be additionally reduced by the end of 1993.

In fact, no commitment has been made yet as to the reduction. However, the reduction of troops will reportedly continue according to the change of the situation.

The plan to restructure the military leadership provides a ground to say that it is a reflection of the political changes on the peninsula.

It can be said that the transfer of the military command to the ROK side is an affirmative development. This is because what will happen means (?a party's withdrawal) from the Korean question and, as a result of this, will provide a condition that Pyongyang and Seoul can solve the military question without the involvement of a third party.

Regrettably, however, North-South dialogue has not even begun. But, the DPRK proposal for phased reduction of the armed forces of the two countries may serve as a starting point for the dialogue.

ROK Firms Make Donations To Chernobyl Victims

SK0205233890 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Text] On 26 April a 24-hour charitable television marathon program in connection with the accident at the Chernobyl atomic power plant, a most tragic accident of the present era, was aired in Moscow. This program was to collect funds necessary for helping the victims of the accident. Many scientists, cultural activists, writers, politicians, and ordinary people gave donations for the fund. People in foreign countries and foreigners working in our country as well participated in this charitable function. For example, employees of KOTRA [Korea Trade Promotion Corporation], Daewoo, Jindo, Lucky Gold Star, and the Korean Air Lines, which are ROK [hanguk] business companies in Moscow, donated $1,000. The Hyundai Group donated $100,000 for the fund.

According to a report of [word indistinct], in this television marathon program, a total of 68 million rubles and $4.7 million were collected. These funds will be used in purchasing necessary medical supplies and in curing victims.

Joint Operation of Soviet, ROK Ships Reported

SK0405041790 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 26 Apr 90

[News from the feature program "Primorskiy Kray"]

[Text] The Soviet diesel-powered vessels (Ashilles), (Urania), and (Branihisto), which have been registered with Nakhodka Port in the Soviet Far East, worked together with ROK fishing boats, Taejin No. 52 and (Berol-ho), at ROK maritime bases, for one month. Soviet seamen handed over to the ROK fishing boats 75,000 tons of Alaskan pollack which will be processed into fish meat. Thus, the founding of joint venture enterprises, which will be based on [word indistinct] and Nakhodka, has been initiated.

A joint venture plant will be built in Nakhodka City for the production of various kinds of foodstuffs with fish. The ROK side will supply the facilities and other processing technology to the joint venture enterprise, and the Soviet side will supply fish. At first, products for sales in Soviet markets will be produced on the ROK maritime base. Some of them will be sold to a third country.

Japanese Criticism of Gorbachev Remarks Refuted

OW0305030690 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 29 Apr 90

[Dmitriyev commentary]

[Text] According to a KYODO report, a Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman criticized the remarks made by President Gorbachev in Sverdlovsk, a town in the Urals, concerning the Kuril Islands. Regarding this criticism, Moscow Radio commentator Dmitriyev writes:

Concerning the question of reversion of the Kuril Islands, President Gorbachev made the remark that it was the Soviet Union's position to observe the Helsinki accord, that is, to recognize the realities created at the end of World War II, including the inviolability of borders. A Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed disappointment over this remark.

The Japanese Foreign Ministry's overly sensitive reaction to the remark is in itself a cause of disappointment. The Soviet Union has been taking the position of recognizing the existing reality and appealed to Japan on the basis of this position. Without basing oneself on this position, it would be impossible to hold any dialogue and make a realistic approach. The statement issued by the Foreign Ministry spokesman makes it clear that Japan sticks not to reality, but to what it wants. In his statement, the Foreign Ministry spokesman said that President Gorbachev's remarks represented old-fashioned thinking and reminded one of the attitude formerly assumed by Gromyko, the former Soviet foreign minister who was also called Mr. No.

By making this wrong comparison, the Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman raised a question about his conscience. Everybody in the world realizes that occasionally President Gorbachev has said yes on various international issues. According to its new thinking, the Soviet Union has never regarded a review of the borders settled among states in the past as a premise, and it has never intended to renounce its state interests. The new Soviet thinking is based on the idea of putting an end to the Cold War and suspending confrontation for the sake of dialogue and cooperation. In Soviet-Japan relations, what prevents this change from taking place is Japan's official attitude, which links development of good-neighborly relations between the two countries to redressing the differences over a territorial issue in a direction the Japanese government desires.

While speaking about old-fashioned thinking, the Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman apparently forgot that in the past the Soviet Union paid no attention to Japan's territorial claims. At present, representatives of Japan and the Soviet Union are closely examining this problem from various angles at consultations on a peace treaty. Even if progress remains stagnant, is it not good not to ignore it?

It would not be surprising for Japan to make some concession from the standpoint of accepting the idea of developing Soviet-Japanese relations in a balanced manner. It is necessary for Japan to redress old stereotypes, while studying the other side's new thinking. As Shintaro Abe said in January this year, after returning to Japan from his Soviet visit, if Japan wants the Soviet Union to change its stance on any difficult issue, Japan should promote cooperative relations with the Soviet Union. When Mr. Yakovlev, a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, visited Japan last December, the Soviet side proposed exploring a third way to develop Soviet-Japanese relations. As Gerasimov, chief of the Information Administration of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, stated in February, it is necessary for the two countries to create a better climate to discuss issues. I think that this approach will be more constructive in preparing for President Gorbachev's visit to Japan next year.

However, the reaction of the Japanese Foreign Ministry to President Gorbachev's remarks in Sverdlovsk shows that the Japanese side continues to set the fulfillment of its demand for the return of the territories as a condition for improving relations between the two countries. The hypersensitive reaction of the Japanese Foreign Ministry is believed to have something to do with the series of remarks made by influential politicians, particularly Shin Kanemaru and Ichiro Ozawa, regarding the territorial issue. Later the two politicians were forced to retract their remarks, saying that their intentions had been distorted.

In Japan there certainly is a growing mood to seek dialogue with the Soviet Union. Therefore, we hope the Japanese government's tough stance on the territorial issue is not an indication of the entire public opinion in Japan. On the other hand, public opinion in the Soviet Union has been against abandoning the Kuril Islands. However, there are signs that public opinion tends to allow some concessions. It is necessary to use the Kuril Islands issue as an opportunity to save Soviet-Japanese relations from stagnation instead of worrying about it.

Japan-USSR Amity Group Holds Plenary Session

OW0205152390 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] The Japan-USSR Friendship Association's 26th regular plenary session opened at the Pastoral Hotel, in the Toranomon area of Tokyo, on 21 April. The Japan-USSR Friendship Association is one of the Japanese organizations actively engaged in promoting good-neighborly relations and cooperation with the Soviet Union. Of these organizations, the association has the largest membership, comprising people from a variety of social strata, including dietmen and local assemblymen. They are undertaking efforts to introduce the Japanese people to the Soviet people's lifestyle, including aspects of that country's economy, science, technology, culture, and art. The participants at the current plenary session of the Japan-USSR Friendship Association are summing up last year's activities and studying plans for this year. A Soviet delegaton, led by Yuriy Volmer, maritime fleet minister and chairman of the USSR-Japan Friendship Association, is attending the plenary session.

Official Interviewed on Investments in Vladivostok

SK0405043790 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 26 Apr 90

[From the feature program "Primorskiy Kray"]

[Text] Recently, VECHERNYAYA VLADIVOSTOK, a newspaper published in the Primorskiy Kray, carried an interview with (Valeliy Rosoboy), vice chairman of the Primorskiy Kray Soviet Executive Committee. (Valeliy Rosoboy) is the officer in charge of the affairs of the kray's economic relations with foreign countries. The following is the summary of the interview:

[Question] What are the position and role of Vladivostok City in the overall international life of the Soviet Union and the international life of the Soviet Far East?

[Answer] Vladivostok City has been the eastern window through which our country can look out at the world. This is because of its favorable geographical location. The port in the city which does not freeze in winter, its location which is not far from Southeast Asian countries and other countries in the Pacific, the various different kinds of plants and wild animals, and its rich natural environment are also favorable conditions. Vladivostok has attracted attention from politicians and businessmen in the Unitd State, Australia, Japan, China, and other countries. Recently, the city has also attracted South Korea's attention. Until 1917 Vladivostok was one of the largest ports in the Pacific. These days, voices calling for the redesignation of Vladivostok as a free commercial zone as it was in the past are increasing among the people.

[Question] What possibility does Vladivostok have now?

[Answer] The city's future prospects are very bright. The city, the largest in the kray, has a highly developed economic structure. In the downtown of the city are [words indistinct] and various kinds of products which attract attention from foreign trading agencies and business firms. [passage indistinct] In the city, a medical equipment plant is being built on the site of the Vladivostok tool plant. This plant will be equipped with production lines set up by a South Korean plant. The (Waliaga) plant in Vladivostok and Canon company of Japan, one of the leading companies of the world, will begin to produce xerox machines in the near future. The (Laipulibol) plant has begun producing thermo flasks in cooperation with Chinese companies. Fifteen to 30 foreign business delegations visit this city every day with various economic, scientific, and technological suggestions and plans. What draws our attention is China and South Korea. Economic cooperation with East European countries, as well, has been expanded. Delegations from Australia, Iraq, Denmark, and Norway visited Vladivostok recently.

[Question] How have the economic, scientific, and cultural ties of this city with foreign countries been developed thus far? Are there any problems in these ties?

[Answer] Yes, we still have many problems. The main factor which has hindered the development of these ties is the fact that Vladivostok is still off limits to foreigners at least officially. The reason for this is that a naval base is located in this city. However, some times we could see foreign trading vessels with their national flag hoisted anchored next to our naval ships in the [word indistinct] bay in the past. In Moscow, as well, the building of the American Embassy is located near the building of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. The issue of completely opening Vladivostok in 1991 is being solved now. This will make great contributions to expanding the city's economic ties with foreign countries. We hope that this city will become a free economic zone in the future.

Another factor which has hindered the development of this city's economic ties with foreign countries is the fact that there are very few high-class hotels in the city. Of course, we have received some offers from business firms of the PRC, Japan, and the DPRK. The Soviet Far East Maritime Transportation Station has an interesting plan. This station is planning to rebuild the (Heyuskin) Hotel in Vladivostok into a world-class hotel with support from the Italian Company (Tekolla Canabetch). Our main task is to build Vladivostok City into a more beautiful and richer city. Officially opening the city and its port will be greatly helpful for this end.

Near East & South Asia

Conflicting Signals From Iran on U.S. Talks

PM0305150190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 May 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Dispatch by special correspondent V. Skosyrev: "Iran: Tehran Puzzle"]

[Text] Tehran—In Iran, where Islam and the state are inseparable, references to the prophet Muhammad and his heirs are a formidable weapon in political struggle. You do not have to search far for examples. All you need to do is study the frenzied disputes that have flared up here in the last few days over the possibility of direct talks between Tehran and Washington.

Everything began with the influential ETTELA'AT (which means "News") publishing a commentary on a statement by U.S. Secretary of State Baker, who said that no chance of contacts with Iran should be passed up. A. Mohajerani, the writer of the commentary, is well known in Iranian ruling circles. Formerly deputy premier, Majlis (parliament) deputy, and member of the Iranian delegation at the peace talks with Iraq, he now holds the post of vice president for parliamentary affairs. This experienced politician indicated in his article that the idea of talks with the United States is not that bad. To justify this idea, Mohajerani cited both religious and practical arguments. As for the religious aspect, the writer recalled that, when necessary, divine prophets entered into talks with the enemies of the Lord. Practically speaking—as can be seen from the article—it is primarily Iran itself that is suffering from the state of confrontation between the United States and Iran. For instance, Washington has frozen Iran's deposits in U.S. banks and is preventing deliveries of spare parts for military hardware which Iran paid for long ago in the United States. The United States' international role, in particular, within the UN Security Council, prevents this power from being ignored.

Although Mohajerani refrained from making an outright appeal for talks, radical politicians saw the article as sacrilege. At first JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI assailed the author for having committed a "deviation" and provoked a "sense of loathing among the people and officials."

Subsequently, bigger guns began to speak. 'A. Mohtashemi, former minister of internal affairs and now parliamentary deputy, whom diplomatic circles here consider to be the most dogged adherent of the late Imam Khomeyni's views, wrote an article in KEYHAN. "There is no doubt that the publication of this kind of material is a stain that cannot be washed away even by waters from the heavenly spring. Our faithful people and the imam will not forgive this kind of thinking," Mohtashemi warned. "It is no accident that the imam cleaves to the opinion that America, that is, the Great Satan...is the source of our ills."

In short, the ayatollah's true heir rejects talks outright. He is not the only one. A protest demonstration took place at Tehran University against the vice president's proposals.

All this has given foreign observers in Tehran a great deal to think about. On the one hand Mohajerani's speech seems extremely inopportune. After all, it was announced only a few days ago that a group of American spies will soon be executed. Consequently, the fight against the "Great Satan" is not waning. On the other hand, could the vice president have voiced his heretical opinion without authorization from eminent bodies? The conundrum has not yet been solved.

Andreyev on Differences Among Iran's Hierarchy

NC0305164190 Moscow in Persian to Iran
1100 GMT 3 May 90

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary from "On the Waves of Radio Moscow" feature]

[Text] Iran's religious leader Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i has stated that there are no differences among the leaders of the Islamic rule. He refuted reports on collective conflicts among the clergymen and described these reports as short-sighted and illogical. Our commentator Yuriy Andreyev writes:

It has been a long time since statements on the existence of full concordance among the members of the Islamic leadership became a political tradition in contemporary Iran. All the outstanding political leaders of Iran swear that they are faithful to the ideals of Imam Khomeyni and they promise to fully pursue the path of the Islamic revolution. But the various clerical leaders interpret this path differently.

Presently, the situation for those who are trying to fill the vacuum created after the death of the founder of the Islamic Republic is not very calm. A silent struggle to maintain the spirit of the Islamic revolution continues in the country. Soon after Imam Khomeyni's death, there were secret confrontations within the religious hierarchy. However, it was only a matter of time before these confrontations surfaced.

It was a month ago that strong conflicts came into the open for the first time. Ayatollah Ahmad Azari-Qomi, one of the reformists, sparked off this process. During Friday prayers in Tehran, he stated that supporting the Islamic regime is more important than supporting religious duties, the implementation of which can be halted by Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, the country's leader. These remarks were met with a strong reaction by Majlis Speaker Mehdi Karrubi. He pointed out that pure Islam is in power and that it will stay there forever. He threatened that he will take to the streets to explain the imam's ideas to the people.

This went so far that 'Ali Khamene'i had to call on all Iranians to refrain from making remarks that might lead to differences. He ordered the Armed Forces to ensure an armed defense of the revolution's gains.

Voices died down temporarily after Khamene'i's remarks. But the differences remained, because the deep reasons behind the controversies still exist, and overt remarks on Islamic unity did not bring about a great change in the true balance of power.

It is actually the extremely clear problems related to the country's future growth that are hiding behind subtle religious discussions. On the one hand we see religious figures who call for Iran to return to the political and ideological irreconcilability of the first years of the revolution. They consider any effort toward making the country non-Islamic to be an insult to sanctities. On the other hand, we see the reformist clergymen who support a moderate line and expanded contacts with the outside world. They do not rule out giving up certain aspects of Khomeyni's policy for the sake of gaining benefits for Iran.

It may be gleaned from some reports that the conflict between these two trends among the Shiite clergymen is continuing fairly strongly. For example, Prosecutor General Mohammad Reyshahri recently announced that on the orders of the Islamic government 14 (?well-known) clerical personalities and 26 others are under house arrest. Observers believe that these figures do not agree with the regime's political line.

In short, conflict among members of the religious hierarchy is not a rare phenomenon.

Tashkent-Kabul Air Supply Route Described

PM0305135190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 May 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by special correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Oliynik: "Airlift"]

[Text] Kabul—In January 1989, in the last weeks of the departure of the limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghan territory, an airlift between Tashkent and Kabul began to operate, and operates to this day. Via this route, transport aviation and Aeroflot aircraft deliver to the Afghan capital flour, fuel, ammunition.... Everything that is essential for uninterrupted supplies to the 2 million inhabitants of Kabul and other cities of the country. The aircraft fly day and night in the most difficult weather conditions. About 25-30 flights are made each day.

The author of these lines flew in to Kabul on one such aircraft belonging to the Combined Aviation Detachment of the Uzbek Civil Aviation Administration. Our "bird no. 915," as they call it, was loaded to the brim with automobile tires for trucks.

"There are seven Il-76's in our aviation detachment," Yuriy Pachin, the aircraft commander and pilot first class, told me. "It has aircraft and crews from many regions of the Soviet Union. Our crew, for instance, is from Tyumen. We transport to Kabul not only the supplies our country sends to our neighbors free of charge, but also those that are sent to Afghanistan through UN channels. Our aircraft have been subjected more than once to rebel fire. Perhaps most difficult of all for us pilots is the constant psychological pressure, the constant readiness for action in emergency situations..."

The background to these words of a pilot with a 25-year service record is the true heroism of Soviet airmen, their high professionalism and courage. Each flight through the burning Afghan sky is always a risk, a trial of the endurance of the crew and the durability of the aircraft. Dozens of times antiaircraft machinegun fire has opened up and missiles have been launched against our aircraft while they were picking up altitude or coming in to land. The last time that this occurred was 2 February this year. On that occasion, during the takeoff of an Il-76, at a height of around 700 meters a "Stinger" missile was launched at Captain A. Gusev's aircraft. Only the timely firing from the plane of heat decoys diverted the missile from its attack course...

Then there is the following very recent tragic event. On 27 March, while coming in to land at a Kabul airfield, an Aeroflot Il-76 plane commanded by V. Tikhomirov suffered a disaster. All nine crew members perished. A special commission is investigating the causes of the disaster.

We drive to the landing bay, where a recently landed Il-76 is being unloaded, in the car of A. Vasilenko, Aeroflot general representative in the Republic of Afghanistan.

"This is already the 11th flight today carrying flour," Aleksandr Nikolayevich says, "and since the beginning of this year alone 458 flights carrying supplies have been made to Kabul by Aeroflot planes alone, transporting more than 5,500 tons of flour, 4,400 tons of fuel, and dozens of tons of other essential goods. Without these flights, life in Kabul and in Afghanistan generally would be goodness knows how much more difficult...."

The opposition understands this as well. According to data from authoritative organs of Afghanistan, Abdul Haq, the overall rebel ringleader in the Kabul area, has been set the task of disrupting the supplies that come to the Afghan capital via the airlift. The group ringleader has even addressed an official warning to foreign airlines in which he unambiguously declared that if their aircraft appeared in Afghan skies, they would be destroyed. Bandit groups arriving from Pakistan are currently concentrating around Kabul, and missiles and other weapons are being actively delivered to the Kuh-e Safi district, from where the aircraft come under fire most frequently.

"Military cover for the aircraft used to deliver supplies is entrusted to our combat aviation," Army General A. Delavar, chief of the Afghan Army General Staff, told KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's correspondent. "Air patrolling by support fire helicopters in the area near the airport and on the approaches to the airport has been organized. The air reconnaissance system for locating and eliminating PZRK [mobile antiaircraft missile system] gun positions works efficiently. The airport's security and defense regime has been strengthened...."

Kabul airport is not very crowded nowadays. It is one of the most dangerous places here. Not a single plane remains in the landing bays at night—it is forbidden. The workers also hurry toward shelter after unloading the recently landed aircraft. On finding a Soviet journalist in front of them, they willingly join in conversation.

"We who are poor have always highly valued Soviet people's help," says A. Mohammed, an old Hazar, stroking his beard. "When people see Soviet aircraft in the skies every morning, they know that it means bread or fuel. The people value this and say, 'Tashakor'" [expression of gratitude].

India's Singh Cited on Cooperation Benefits

LD0305130690 Moscow TASS in English 1218 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] New Delhi May 3 TASS—Cooperation with the Soviet Union, which has always helped India in difficult times, has promoted Indian economic development, Indian Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh said today.

Singh was speaking at the launch of the first blast furnace at a metal works built in Visakhapatnam with Soviet assistance.

The Indian prime minister thanked Soviet builders, people and government for their friendly help.

Metal works in Bhilai, Bokaro and Visakhapatnam are genuine monuments to Indian-Soviet friendship, he said.

Singh expressed hope that cooperation between the two countries will continue to expand.

The metal works in Visakhapatnam is the third such plant built in India. The first was built in Bhilai. Its first 3,200 cubic meter blast furnace is the largest in South Asia.

It has been named Godavari after one of the great Indian rivers.

Possibility Seen of Syrian-Israeli Negotiations

TA0305201490 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Hebrew 1500 GMT 3 May 90

[Commentary by Dmitriy Prokofyev]

[Text] Egyptian President Husni Mubarak has begun his visit to Syria. Mubarak and Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad are discussing the chances for a Middle East settlement, mainly within the framework of the Egyptian president's 10-point plan.

Here is a commentary by Dmitriy Prokofyev:

The impression at the moment is that all the parties involved in the Middle East conflict in one way or another are currently experiencing a change of values and are giving up outdated formulas. Not long ago, everything Cairo suggested was rejected out of hand in Damascus, and whatever Damascus said was rejected in turn in Jerusalem. Yet now Mubarak has come to the Syrian capital as a victor. His Middle East policy has proved its mettle and has passed the test: It turned out that it is far more constructive than the radical policy Damascus has embraced for a long time.

The Egyptian president said upon arriving in Damascus that in order to reach a settlement in the Middle East, it is necessary to take into consideration the Arab proposals, as well as the plan for an international conference, U.S. Secretary of State Baker's initiative, and the Israeli Government's peace plan. Hafiz al-Asad, who until recently regarded such declarations as implying treason, this time did not reject Egypt's unequivocal proposals.

In Israel, too, the reactions are novel and no longer the same as they were a few months ago. The theory that Mubarak and Al-Asad's intention is to establish an eastern anti-Israeli front no longer prevails. All the experts agree that this is highly unlikely. The assessment regarding [words indistinct] the Syrian president is more circumspect, but one no longer encounters the resounding negation as before.

It appears that this is a more (?sensible stand), since if the Syrian leadership has indeed forgone its traditional radical stand, which has been unacceptable to both the Likud and the Alignment, then a substantially new situation has emerged in regard to the chances for the Middle East political process.

Up to now everyone thought that Damascus would join the negotiations only after new, significant progress was made in the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Yet now, and particularly in view of the fact the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue faces enormous difficulties, perhaps it would be advisable to discuss the Syrian option, namely the idea of first engaging in a dialogue with Damascus and then, after some progress has been made, have the Palestinians join it.

Naturally there are huge differences of opinion between Syria and Israel. I doubt very much whether one side's initial declarations would be acceptable to the other. But that is what negotiations are for: to bridge the existing differences of opinion step by step. It should be pointed out that Jerusalem can join the political dialogue with Damascus even during the reign of a Likud government. Mr. Shamir has said on a number of occasions that the purpose of his policy is to engage in a dialogue with any country that should so wish. One is also advised against forgetting the attempt at coordination and cooperation the two sides worked out, on the military level, in southern Lebanon.

There is no doubt in my mind that the Israeli-Syrian dialogue will come up against many difficulties and perhaps also a lot of obstacles. But both sides have reason to show flexibility and a realistic approach, for economic as well as political reasons.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Upcoming RSA Government-ANC Talks Discussed

MB2704125890 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 26 Apr 90

["South Africa Today" feature by Aleksandr Fedorov—read by announcer]

[Text] Just a few days are left till 2 May, when talks are to begin between the South African Government and the African National Congress [ANC], days the success of the dialogue depends on to a great extent.

Aleksandr Fedorov elaborates in his weekly review, SOUTH AFRICA TODAY:

In my view, events in the country are developing as if under scenarios written by the South African playwright Athol Fugard in the late seventies.

The major topic is the emergence of distrust within the antiapartheid movement and the keynote [words indistinct] the distrust, though trust hardly ever existed, aggravated particularly when the meeting was postponed till May.

It's no use clarifying who was in the right and who was to blame: Both sides have offered weighty arguments which cannot be disregarded. The worst thing is that not all have learned their lessons, even though, as the latest developments have shown, the authorities managed to prevent policemen from resorting to their traditional methods of dealing with demonstrators.

And this sparked fierce criticism from the conservatives, who accused Frederik de Klerk for conniving with the ANC and used, in their propagandistic campaign, quotations from the implacable speeches made by some leaders of black liberation organizations. And this only confirms the obvious truth that a filling station is not the safest place to build a fire at.

Similar caution should be obviously practiced by participants in the upcoming meeting in regard to prognostications. I mean, the interview given by the minister of constitutional development and planning, Gerrit Viljoen, told the newspaper TIMES during his visit to London.

Aleksandr Fedorov goes on to say:

The impression is controversial. While the minister's openness was strictly [word indistinct] he sought to press his views on participants in the meeting before they sat at the negotiating table. Judge for yourself. Gerrit Viljoen says the 2 May meeting will be devoted to simply getting acquainted with each other, and it will be followed by lengthy talks about talks. The minister presumes that the questions of releasing political prisoners and lifting the state of emergency can be discussed only by the end of the current year. Another year is to be devoted to the drafting of a new constitution.

To get acquainted is a good thing of course, but there is an impression that there are plans to procrastinate it. In the meantime, the situation in the country hardly allows for carrying out [words indistinct] as described by Olive Schreiner. This relates to economic problems which do not get resolved in the expectation of changes and to social problems which concern not only the blacks but also whites.

There is also the danger of a coup; witness a statement made by the leader of the Afrikaner Resistance Movement, Eugene Terreblanche. One million rifles, he said, is better than one million signatures to the call for dissolving the government of Frederik de Klerk. It remains a fact that the arsenals of the right wingers get supplemented (?but) only by stealing arms from the air force depots in Pretoria. It's better, of course, when things are said rather than withheld.

Nevertheless, the hints of Gerrit Viljoen and his confused interpretation of the president's statement regarding constitutional problems hardly contribute to creating an atmosphere of trust, an atmosphere particularly needed by those who get acquainted and not only by them.

ANC Envoy in Moscow Interviewed on Talks

PM0305105590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 May 90 p 3

[Interview with Simon Sipo Makana (name as transliterated), head of ANC mission in the USSR, by L. Zakharov; date and place of interview not specified: "'We Know What We Want'. Talks Between the ANC and the RSA Government Begin Today for the First Time"]

[Text] [Zakharov] This year has been a year of great change for the Republic of South Africa [RSA]. The African National Congress [ANC] and other organizations which operated underground for a long time have been legalized and restrictions on opposition groups' activity have been lifted. What, in your view, provoked these processes.

[Makana] The main thing is that an increasing number of white South Africans realize that the apartheid system has become totally obsolete and its existence costs us too dear—not only our country, moreover, but the entire region as a whole. Hence the obvious conclusion that the RSA's white and black residents must settle the accumulated problems at the negotiating table. It is very important that the country's president, Frederik de Klerk, has directly acknowledged that the time for violence and confrontation has passed and the ruling white minority is no longer able to find the answers to all questions facing South Africa today. We believe that our country's progressive forces, along with the entire world community, must support President de Klerk's efforts.

[Zakharov] Does this mean, for instance, that the policy of sanctions ensuring the international isolation of the Pretoria regime can be abandoned?

[Makana] Not at all. A final victory over the apartheid system can only be won if all countries support the South African patriots' struggle. And sanctions—political, economic, and cultural—play a tremendous role here.

[Zakharov] The current processes in South Africa would have begun sooner or later. To what extent has Frederik de Klerk's coming to power helped to speed up these processes.

[Makana] De Klerk is a flexible and realistic politician capable of making compromises. But you must remember at the same time that he is the leader of the National Party—the very party which founded the apartheid system. That is why we believe that what De Klerk has done thus far only represents the first steps in the right direction....

[Zakharov] The ANC is an organization that was banned in the RSA for a long time. Its leaders are very popular with the people, are well aware of the nature of underground struggle, and are able to organize the masses. But they do not after all have experience of state activity. Will they be able to govern the country?

[Makana] ANC leaders are people wholeheartedly devoted to the struggle to build an independent South Africa, they know precisely what they want and how they intend to achieve it. As for experience, we are not saying that we intend to govern the country on our own. The ANC's stance on this issue is this: Skin color is irrelevant. We assert that the RSA belongs to all the people who live here today. History has had us live side by side for centuries. The white South Africans have no other homeland, their home is here. They will have all rights in an independent South Africa, including the right to govern the country.

Don't forget that the ANC does not only voice the interests of the black community. Membership of our organization is open to people of all skin colors. There are even whites in the ANC's leadership bodies. For instance, Jo Slovo is one of the most popular and influential leaders in the organization.

[Zakharov] He is also the head of the South African Communist Party [SACP]. How are your relations developing with the SACP?

[Makana] Our ties with this party are very important for us. We have been fighting apartheid together for many years and we intend to continue our cooperation, despite disagreeing on a number of essential points.

[Zakharov] Which, for example?

[Makana] The SACP program puts building socialism in South Africa as the final aim. The ANC does not set itself this task.

[Zakharov] Nevertheless many Western businessmen with vast capital investments in the RSA are afraid that the country's economic development may take the socialist path, which may take the form, in particular, of the nationalization of their enterprises. Will there not then be an exodus of foreign capital?

[Makana] This can be avoided if we manage to convince Western businessmen that their interests will not be jeopardized. We are not at any rate hiding the fact that foreign investments will be very important to an independent South Africa's economy.

[Zakharov] It used to be thought that as soon as the RSA's black community was united in its desire to overthrow the apartheid system, there would be no disagreements within it. However, recent events force us to look at this problem differently....

[Makana] The essence of our disagreements is that there are forces who claim that talks with the whites represent a betrayal of the interests of the indigenous population in Southern Africa and call for more resolute actions, including violent actions. Nonetheless the majority of the RSA's black population share the ANC's views that talks are part of the struggle for independence.

Incidentally, a similar situation can also be observed within the white community. Extreme right-wingers do not entertain the idea of a peaceful solution to the problem and intend to uphold their views, even with weapons in hand. Some are talking about dividing what is now the RSA into two halves—one of which will remain a country "just for whites."

[Zakharov] There have recently been reports that the inhabitants of a number of countries in East Europe are applying for visas to emigrate to the RSA.

[Makana] What is more, some Polish and GDR citizens have already moved to our country. We are voicing concern over this....

[Zakharov] But won't qualified cadres from abroad help strengthen the economy of an independent RSA?

[Makana] We mustn't anticipate events. Independence has not yet been won and as long as the old system exists, these people are working for apartheid. Admittedly, most of them are guided by purely economic considerations but this is a political question for us.

East Europe

Hungary's Goncz Comments on Soviet, Other Ties

LD0305102190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0504 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] Budapest, 3 May (TASS)—The establishment of sincere ties with neighboring countries is a primary task for Hungary's foreign policy. This was stated here by Arpad Goncz, interim president of the Hungarian Republic. Today the time has come when the borders between Hungary and neighboring countries should be erased [steret], he observed.

In the opinion of the Hungarian leader, the Soviet Union plays a vital and decisive role in the further destinies of Hungary.

Polish, FRG Presidents Cited on European Unity

LD0305102890 Moscow TASS in English 0925 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] Warsaw May 3 TASS—A unique opportunity has now arisen to base peaceful coexistence on a new, more solid foundation, President Wojciech Jaruzelski of Poland said on Wednesday at a reception given in honour of visiting West German President Richard von Weizsaecker.

This is being promoted by new thinking in international relations, the overcoming of cold-war stereotypes, and Soviet-American and all-European dialogue. The fact that Germany is again becoming one of the mightiest contemporary powers evokes understandable memories that bring back to mind various disquieting facts, Jaruzelski said.

The whole of Europe will attentively follow the policy of a reunified Germany. This particularly applies to Poland, Jaruzelski said.

It is difficult to speak of European unity without genuine reconciliation of the two largest nations in central Europe. Treaty-based guarantees for Poland's present western and northern borders are an indispensable condition, he added.

Jaruzelski voiced hope that a reunited Germany would play a constructive role in the European integration process and promote stability, mutual trust, and the building of an effective system of collective security in this part of the world.

The full and equal involvement of Poland and other central and East European countries in this process is one of key conditions for overcoming the division of the continent, he said.

The pledge by all European peoples to abandon forever their intentions to launch a fatal struggle for new territories is of cardinal importance for peace in Europe, Weizsaecker said.

"Poland's present western border will remain inviolable. We respect it and will not lay any territorial claims on Poland or any other neighbours either now or in the future. The borders should lose their dividing role and become bridges.

"East-West contradictions are receding into the background, and thinking in bloc categories is becoming an anachronism. No substance has yet been added to the common European home idea but it expresses our goal.

"The Poles and Germans," he emphasised, "are now brought together by the main goals: to support the return of central, eastern and south-eastern Europe into the fold of the entire Europe, to integrate the Soviet Union into the development of Europe and promote the success of President Gorbachev's policy of restructuring and the establishment [words indistinct] republics."

Having stated support for the process launched by the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Weizsaecker said that the proposal put forward by the Polish prime minister to set up a European cooperation council accords with the Federal Republic's objective—the establishment of a European confederation.

"The Germans and Poles live side by side in the heart of Europe. In this period of immense historic opportunities, we bear joint responsibility," Weizsaecker said.

Pressures on Polish Party Press Examined

PM0305144990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 May 90 Second Edition p 5

[Dispatch by PRAVDA correspondent A. Starukhin: "Legacy Without a Testament"]

[Text] Warsaw—Not so long ago S. Tabkowski, chairman of the "Prasa-Ksiazka-Ruch" publishing workers' cooperative, informed journalists about the elimination of another 10 periodicals under its authority. And it seemed unbelievable that the next day you would not be able to get hold of the popular Polish weeklies KULTURA and SPRAWA I LUDZIE and the periodical NOWE DROGI...

But this was only the latest "straw to break the camel's back." After all, since November of last year, the publishing cooperative lost 31 of its periodicals, temporarily suspended the printing of another 27, and transferred 17 into the hands of other bodies. But another 148 periodical titles remained, of which only 87 made a profit in January... Which means that even this "list" had to be cut down.

So what shook the supercooperative, which was responsible for over 90 percent of Polish periodicals? The point is that it belonged practically in its entirety to the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party], the former ruling party, which created it and gave it its very privileged position, exempting it from heavy taxes. The profits went to its own needs: subsidizing party committees and supporting and developing the publishing leadership. Likewise, TRYBUNA LUDU, the organ of the PZPR Central Committee, existed and worked by living off the cooperative's money, without even thinking about financial independence or recovering its costs. After the PZPR's dissolution, as is well known, a new party was formed—Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland [SDRP], and it has its own main newspaper, TRYBUNA. And since the beginning, or to be more exact, for three months now, TRYBUNA and other party publications, just like the party itself, have found themselves in the position of a man holding out his hand. The cooperative concern has started to give its profit to the state treasury.

But that is not all—people on all sides bore grudges against the cooperative: They said that the time of monopolies is over and that the publishing arm was not created by the party at all but just expropriated by it. In the final analysis, everyone longed to use even a part of the best printing base in Poland. The contenders' dream has been realized by the Sejm, which recently adopted a decision on the elimination of "Prasa-Ksiazka-Ruch." The SDRP Central Executive Committee protested against the new law.

The fate of the cooperative is only one fact, although it is a clear one, that confirms that the PZPR left a rich legacy, to put it bluntly. There was only one "but"—the party did not worry about the testament when it should have.

The PZPR's successor, the SDRP, the new party of left-wing forces, found itself in a complex financial and material situation. The following question confronted it in all its acuteness: How could it not only extend its influence among the masses, but also actually survive? It was no accident that at a meeting with Soviet journalists,

L. Miller, general secretary of the party's Central Executive Committee, referred to financial security as an urgent task. The successor did not receive much at all—the government arranged to grant it premises with floorspace of 150-350 square meters in each voivodship center. To be frank, this means ordinary small offices.

Party periodicals and newspapers are continuing to close down every day. Their existence is inconceivable without a subsidy. In some editions TRYBUNA printed on its front page an appeal to its readers to make sacrifices and transfer sums of money of any size to editorial and party accounts. Could anyone have supposed that a time would come when the main party newspaper would be forced to "pass the hat around"?

In connection with the Sejm's decision to eliminate "Prasa-Ksiazka-Ruch," the newspaper asked Prime Minister T. Mazowiecki the question: In the light of what is happening, does all this gel with the government's philosophy of affirming the principles of pluralism in the mass media? The premier answered: The existence of a publishing supercooperative happened not to correspond to pluralist principles. However, he assured the newspaper that he will do all he can to save it.

A critical situation has developed here. According to L. Miller, and what was said at one of the meetings with foreign correspondents, the authorities' actions have no legal basis, and if they are not amended, then even the basic party publications will find themselves on the verge of closing down and will only manage to survive for a month or two and no more.

Undoubtedly, what these official attacks and claims on the left-wing forces' press show is nothing other than a desire to establish a new monopoly, their own monopoly. After all, the mass media of one orientation—those expressing "Solidarity's" stance—will be the main ones to remain "afloat." At the same time the sharp conflicts that have arisen in Poland about the transfer of party property have presented us with another lesson. Amid the legal relations that are being constructed in the state, it is undoubtedly very important to establish in the letter of the law, from the very beginning, what exactly belongs to whom. The SDRP is the legal successor of the PZPR. For the most part, the party that has left the political arena created everything at its own expense. But somewhere along the line, it disregarded the relevant notarial acts. And today, this may cost the movement of left-wing forces a great deal.

I recently met with B. Wisniewski, one of the members of the SDRP Central Executive Committee.

"It is hard to talk about some kind of real support from the government," he said. "A simple example: For a few months now we have been trying to get the Sejm to adopt a law on parties which would at least in some ways protect our positions and regulate mutual relations with the authorities and state and public bodies. The supreme organ of power is working with enviable intensity and ratifying literally batches of new laws, but it is not getting around to the 'party law' at all."

In all probability, it is useful to some people in Poland to delay the adoption of the law on parties.

Article Assesses Poland's 'Balcerowicz Program'

90UF0069A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by IZVESTIYA staff correspondent L. Toporkov in Warsaw: "How Large Are the Resources of Patience?"]

[Text] Just over three months have passed since the implementation of "the Balcerowicz plan"—a government program of fundamental restructuring and reorientation of the Polish economy which should cover within a short period of time the distance marked by the notions of "free market" and "privatization," that is, the distance from an inefficient, centralized, state-operated national economy entangled in a bureaucratic web to a system in which private enterprise is called upon to play first fiddle.

What are the first results of the reform? If we are to judge by appearances, the following remark by the well-known satirist and humorist E. Lipinski is still topical: The country finally has a government that only speaks the truth: It said that it was going to get worse, and so it did. However, it is necessary to endure a period that is precisely described by the term "worse" before the public gets to see the desired "better" condition. It is another matter how long this period will be and whether the people will have enough stamina and the resources of patience due to their confidence in the new government.

The main author of the program Leszek Balcerowicz, deputy prime minister and minister of finance in the T. Mazowiecki government, is known in Poland not only as an economist but also as a medium-distance runner in the not-so-distant past. He knows well "the dead point" that appears when running. As soon as you overcome it you get a second wind and it becomes easier to run. Undoubtedly, such a point may come in the economy as well. This is exactly what the republic is going through at present.

We met with L. Balcerowicz a couple days ago.

He said: "Certainly this is a difficult and to a considerable degree dramatic moment. However, it could not be avoided. We would not have been able to arrest the process of inflation and even hyperinflation otherwise. It is beyond a doubt that we have succeeded in curtailing this process. We have also managed to stabilize prices, make them realistic, and reinforce the zloty which they have come to respect and by now have confidence in. Unfortunately, a decline in the volume of production and restrictions on meeting the demand of the populace for many goods have been registered because real wages have fallen whereas prices have remained high. Considerable amounts of finished products have accumulated in the warehouses of enterprises, but are not being sold because demand is low. This is a vicious circle. However, this is a temporary phenomenon. It is caused by our striving to implement a harsh, all-encompassing regimen of savings in the economy envisaged by the program, and to do away with waste. At present, enterprises cannot fail to count every zloty because they no longer have a right to count on state subsidies.

In the words of L. Balcerowicz, the processes of invigoration in the national economy are developing in the right direction, in keeping with the forecast, though not necessarily as fast as was expected. He went on to say that demands are being made for us to relax financial requirements. However, this is risky and premature: It is still too easy to bring back inflation. This is why we must remain firm and unyielding. Enterprises should earn their keep in order to survive rather than count on the budget. How did most enterprises behave in the new situation? In keeping with the principle "we will wait and see." The state did not interfere in their affairs, and they took the path which could be expected: They immediately raised prices for their goods. Subsequently so-called simple reserves were tapped. For example, those who had hard-currency funds in their accounts sold them in order to procure in this manner zlotys for paying wages. The next step was to cut back production and give workers unplanned leave time. In a word, they believed that everything set forth "was neither serious nor long term," and hoped to wait out the unfavorable period.

The government, and especially "the Balcerowicz team," operate under the attentive and acutely responsive critical gaze of the public, under pressure from all quarters. Perhaps for the first time in the history of Poland a considerable segment of its society has patiently agreed to have its standard of living reduced now so that tomorrow will be a better day. Recently the Center for Public Opinion Research published the following data: Almost all of those surveyed (90 percent) came out in favor of the changes under way in the economy. However, the difficulties of everyday life do affect the people. At present, 36 percent of those polled support "the Balcerowicz plan." This is eight percent less than in January, and three percent less than in February. The number of opponents has been constant—11 percent. The rest do not have a definite opinion. Confidence in the possibility of overcoming the crisis and the favorable development of Poland declined from 63 percent in February to 52 percent in March. Four-fifths of those polled agree with the view that "we are getting poorer." They referred to current prices for consumer goods as "scandalous."

The OPZZ [All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions], the trade unions headed by A. Miodowicz, take a firm critical stand regarding the difficult crisis situation. They say "yes" to the government of T. Mazowiecki, and "no" to "the Balcerowicz plan" which they view as the source of the current disastrous situation of the working people. The OPZZ states that it is in favor of the labor collectives themselves resolving the issues of property transformation at enterprises rather than the bureaucratic apparatus and the Sejm. Of course the trade unions reject unemployment, which as of early April already came to 267,000. Forecasts for April envisage 400,000 unemployed.

OPZZ Chairman A. Miodowicz said: "Every new government promises that after a temporary deterioration in the situation growth will occur, and, just as in the case of the 'Balcerowicz plan,' a period of six months is mentioned. However, according to our assessment an improvement may occur no sooner than in five years. Meanwhile, 63 percent of the populace are caught in the zone of impoverishment. Twenty percent of them live in extreme poverty. Fighting unemployment is the main task of the trade unions in a period when everything is becoming more expensive and only labor is getting cheaper."

Solidarity, which is now finding itself in an ambiguous situation, has begun to raise its voice. Having paved the way for a government from among its ranks, Solidarity has found that it is losing the support of those whom it has a duty to protect but who have actually been left outside the sphere of its concerns. Meanwhile, in late April the Second Solidarity Congress is to be held. What will its leadership report to the rank-and-file members of the trade union association? It is no accident that Solidarity has split: Recently, "Solidarity-80" took shape organizationally in Szczecin; it defends the ideals of the movement which powerfully made its presence known in the memorable year 1980. Lech Walesa, who is forced to support "his" government while at the same time retaining his "worker's character," has become nervous; this has become an endeavor that requires the masterly art of playing both sides of the issue.

The SDRP [Social Democrats of the Republic of Poland] are offering their own economic program as an alternative to the "Balcerowicz plan." In the words of the well-known Polish economist Professor J. Kaleta, it is called upon to debunk the myth that no other program is possible except for that of the government. The SDRP banks on a pick-up in production and the deliveries of goods to the market, on disagreeing with the possibility of overcoming inflation at any price. The implementation of "the Balcerowicz plan" has brought about a marked decline in production and a drop in the productivity of labor. Social democrats come out in favor of controlling the processes of ownership transformation and against spontaneous privatization which may only exacerbate the decline in production. The government does not have a social policy; the people do not feel that they are socially protected. The SDRP program makes the people and their economic security its mainstay.

Therefore, Poland is still at a crossroads. The past months have not provided an answer to the questions concerning society. In some areas of the republic protest actions have mounted against collective and individual layoffs, low remunerations, the dropping standard of living, and the disappearance of the slogan of social justice, the one that in its time attracted the masses of people to the Solidarity movement and made it popular, from the political vocabulary of the new authorities.

During its regular session on 5 and 6 April, the Sejm considered government draft laws on the transfer of state enterprises to private owners and on setting up an agency for property transformations. Speaking before the deputies L. Balcerowicz noted that the government has deliberately embarked on a path which is difficult for the populace and which requires it to be patient, but at the same time offers a considerable opportunity for success. Taking into account the attitude of society, he referred to the measures of aid to the peasants in more precise terms than before, promising to introduce special credits and subsidies for the production of mineral fertilizer. At the same time, as some deputies said, the government once again offered nothing for the social protection of the working people.

Keep the people in mind—this is what they expect of the reform and the new laws in Poland.

Correspondent on Situation in 'Different Poland'

PM0305125190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 May 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent L. Toporkov: "A Completely Different Poland..."]

[Text] Warsaw—It is interesting to observe life in Poland nowadays. Everything around you seems the same yet deep down this is a completely different country. Many people ask in surprise: Where has the Poles' innate sense of humor gone? Previously, "under the commune," as they now like to say, people were cracking jokes all the time. For example, if the elevator in a building was out of order a notice would appear next to it saying: Do not worry, the nearest elevator is in the block next door. Now however, on occasions like that, there is the gloomy message saying: This is the legacy bequeathed to us by the People's Republic.

Olga Lipinska, well known for the grotesque humor of her cabaret act, tried to poke fun at things that seemed funny but was immediately rebuked by a vigilant priest and professor at a religious seminary: "When an idiot plays the cretin and vice versa," he wrote in graceful style in GAZETA WYBORCZA, "it may amuse the two of them but will surely not entertain outside spectators."

Such things, the social democrat newspaper TRYBUNA notes, makes us realize, as people here like to say nowadays, that "at last we feel at ease in our own home." It turns out, the newspaper goes on, that you cannot crack little jokes about the new authorities in the free newspaper RZECZPOSPOLITA because that is nothing less than hostile intrigues by the "red nomenklatura."

That is probably why no one was surprised when the recently held Second Solidarity Congress adopted a resolution urging the authorities not to hire for work in schools and other educational establishments anyone who had previously worked for the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR], for youth organizations associated with it, or for Ministry of Internal Affairs organs. Such are the concerns of a trade union of all things, whose preordained purpose is to defend human rights, not to indulge in some kind of witch hunt.

"This document is self-compromising," we read in a statement by L. Miller, general secretary of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SDPR]. "In the past such ideas were disseminated by fascists and extreme rightwingers in the United States and the FRG. They were evidence of the persecution of people for their views and were condemned by all democratic forces in the world..."

On the eve of May Day, the SDPR Executive Committee published a letter to all party members which says, among other things: "Poland is threatened by a rightwing dictatorship. The people in power today are moderate and sensible but in the future they may be different. The roundtable accords are being violated and the campaign of intolerance and hatred is being intensified. Helplessness in the struggle against the crisis is being disguised by attacks on all former PZPR members, the overwhelming majority of whom are honest and conscientious workers. The peaceful road of building democracy is in danger... It is up to us all whether Poland will be democratic, fair, and self-managing or whether it will sink into hatred, intolerance, and a division into rich and poor."

Is there not some exaggeration here? The social democrats certainly do not think so.

Yes, this is a different Poland... At the end of April, during the discussion of the draft law to abolish the traditional state holiday of 22 July—Rebirth Day—which is the anniversary of the birth of People's Poland after the victorious offensive on the Eastern Front, the following words were heard in the Senate: "This was a commemoration of enslavement," "the Japanese fared better under the occupying forces than we did," "the sinister shadow of that July day," and so on in similar vein. They meant the Soviet Union, whose Armed Forces liberated Poland together with Polish patriots, and then went on to Berlin.

The new terminology reflects the new attitude toward the "former big brother." Nowadays, whenever they write or speak about him, everything that has happened seems to be viewed in terms of Katyn. The "blank spots" are rapidly turning into "black marks."

For the first time in several decades there is no official celebration of May Day in Poland. Only the trade unions belonging to the National Trade Union Confederation and the Social Democrats are marking it. True, the peasants are marking it in their own way by organizing "potato rebellions" in protest at the government's present agrarian policy: They are bringing potatoes to Warsaw and dumping them in front of the Ministry of Agriculture building and the television station fence. They cannot sell their stockpiled produce because, first, purchase prices do not make it profitable to do so, and second, because no one will take their produce at prices that do make it worthwhile to sell.

Poland is leaving behind many things which were once the symbols of its life and, in the process, is even losing its sense of humor. Which is a pity.

National Alliance Election Threat to Iliescu

PM0305152990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 May 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Volodin: "Romania: 'National Alliance' on the Offensive"]

[Text] Bucharest—Billboards and advertising pillars with colored posters bearing the emblems of the different political parties have recently become an integral part of the urban landscape in Romania. The fact that many placards are hanging in tattered strips from the display stands merely underlines the fact that the parliamentary elections in Romania will be very keenly contested and promise a mass of unforeseen surprises.

At 0600 on 20 May the doors to the 12,630 polling places will open, and Romanian citizens will go in to elect 119 senators and 187 deputies to the House of Representatives. As Ovidiu Zernescu, chairman of the Romanian electoral commission, explained, each voter will be given a ballot paper which promises to be as thick as a telephone directory. Its considerable size is due to the fact that as of today the 72 parties taking part in the election campaign have nominated 1,580 candidates for the Senate and 7,500 for the House of Representatives. Nevertheless, the nomination of parliamentary candidates is not yet over, nor is the process of forming party coalitions, whose task will be not so much to compete against one another as to oppose or support the National Salvation Front and its presidential candidate, Ion Iliescu, in the elections.

The creation of a fairly representative opposition coalition marked the completion of the constituent congress of the "National Alliance in Support of the 'Timisoara Declaration'" which was held at the Capidu Theater in Timisoara recently. It includes 29 professional and cultural associations, 154 collectives of enterprises and institutions, 51 free trade unions, and 24 parties.

The document adopted by the conference says that former activists of the Romanian Communist Party brought starvation and genocide to Romania. In the alliance members' opinion, those same people are today claiming the right to lead the country again and their continued presence in the political arena means that what has happened in Romania was not a popular revolution but a coup d'etat. Here one cannot fail to notice that the opposition alliance is proposing to include in the constitution paragraph eight of the "Timisoara Declaration," which provides for the disfranchisement of former activists of the RCP and state security employees for a period of 10 years. In other words, this is an insistence on the very same demand that was the formal pretext for organizing the demonstrations which have blockaded University Square in Bucharest for 9 days under the slogan of "Down with Iliescu!"

Of course, the around-the-clock demonstrations which are paralyzing the center of this city of 2 million people are attracting the whole country's attention. Romanians' opinions on them, however, vary greatly. Some people, who express disapproval, consider it a means of pressure by the political opposition on the country's leadership. Others, sympathetic to the opposition forces, call the demonstrations a "continuation of the December revolution."

However, it seems to me, as someone who has spent a number of days among the demonstration participants, that it is nothing more than an organized action aimed at creating a certain political climate in the country so as to remove I. Iliescu, the main opponent to the opposition candidates for the presidency, even before the elections. Furthermore, as events develop it is becoming obvious that there is a direct link between the blockade of the square and the consolidation of opposition forces.

By all accounts, the blockade will continue until the elections themselves, ranging with varying degrees of success from a few hundred to several thousand participants. However, the restrained stance of noninterference adopted by the country's government toward the demonstrators shows, in my view, that the blockade of University Square, which has begun to acquire the features of a carnival lately, is hardly capable of causing a political crisis or Iliescu's resignation.

A far more alarming symptom for him and the National Salvation Front which he heads is the creation of a powerful "National Alliance," which has united around a common idea the forces of a political opposition capable of springing a few unpleasant surprises on the National Salvation Front in the elections.

CSFR's Planned Exchange Rate Change Viewed

90UF0063A Moscow TRUD in Russian 10 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by TRUD staff correspondent N. Shevtsov, datelined Prague, April: "The Koruna Changes Its Exchange Rate"]

[Text] Quite recently they sold mostly vegetables and fruit at Prague's central market, Trznice. By now the assortment has expanded considerably. Trade in manufactured goods has been increasingly picking up, and Czechoslovak citizens are not the only sellers. Vietnamese workers engage in a brisk trade in cosmetics, videocassettes, and tape recorders. Nobody can explain coherently how they lay their hands on this, putting it bluntly, contraband. Citizens from Poland offer jeans with the labels of well-known companies. To be sure, one has difficulty believing that they were made at plants belonging to Lee Cooper or Rangers.

More and more often one can meet our fellow citizens in the market, mainly from the republics of Transcaucasia. One may buy from them at reasonable prices the hair dryers and coffee grinders which have long been in short supply in our country, German silver cutlery, and linen tablecloths, as well as vodka and caviar, of course. Moneychangers have also appeared. Instead of the official rate of one to eight, they are prepared to take two to three korunas per ruble.

However, it is possible that soon rubles will be exchanged officially at the rate of the present-day black market. This may be the consequence of a unilateral decision of the Czechoslovak federal government to annul mutual agreements with CEMA countries on coordinating the rates of exchange of national currencies.

This affects primarily noncommercial payments. As the deputy chairman [as published] of the Soviet Bank for Foreign Economic Activity in Czechoslovakia, V.S. Karpich, said in a conversation with a TRUD correspondent, this essentially covers the expenditures of the citizens of one country staying on the territory of the other. They account for a very modest share of the overall volume of payments relations between our two countries, between two and four percent. Also, they affect the interests of individuals rather than the sphere of interstate relations because at issue is the cash which employees on a business trip abroad receive, as well as those traveling by virtue of private invitations and tourists.

Undoubtedly, the measures taken will affect Soviet specialists staying in Czechoslovakia: The cost of renting space and the services used will go up. The amount of honoraria paid to Soviet citizens for their works published in Czechoslovakia will also change.

We should mention that the decision made is due primarily to economic considerations. Pursuant to the agreements previously in effect, Czechoslovakia had to notify its partner several months in advance in order to change the rate of exchange of the koruna to the currency of another country. Meanwhile, due to soaring inflation in a number of neighboring countries the real value of their currencies dropped even more, and Czechoslovakia always incurred a loss. The growth of prices in Poland and Hungary brought about the situation where Czechoslovak shops were being raided with increasing intensity by tourists from these countries. The Czechoslovak Government resolved to withdraw from the agreement on mutually coordinated currency exchange rates with a view to protecting its domestic market. The exchange rate of the koruna to the currencies of neighboring countries, including the Soviet Union, will be determined by market demand.

The newspaper RUDE PRAVO referred to the withdrawal of Czechoslovakia from the agreements as "an absolutely correct step." Indeed, it is right from the point of view of protecting the interests of Czechoslovak consumers. However, we can hardly agree with such a decision being made without prior consultations with partners in CEMA, which is not going through the best of times to begin with.

Here is one more aspect. A complete suspension of the issuance of funds by the Bank for Foreign Economic Activity to those going to Czechoslovakia on a business trip or on a private invitation may become an unpleasant consequence of the decision made. Even now Soviet citizens have no opportunity to convert their rubles into korunas. The bank simply does not have this currency which has not been provided by the Czechoslovak side in the amount requested due to our external debt.

I think that this will hardly promote the development of contacts between the citizens of our two countries. After all, very few people would want to go to Czechoslovakia without a single koruna in their pockets, without an opportunity to visit a museum, buy souvenirs, or even take a streetcar. However, the number of sellers from neighboring countries at Treznica in Prague may soar very soon.

Claim of Prague Ban on Communists Rebutted

PM0305103990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 May 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent L. Kornilov report: "Czechoslovakia: Any Cause for Drama?"]

[Text] Prague—On 30 April the Moscow Television program "Vremya" carried some "dramatic" news: "The local authorities in Prague have banned Communists from holding a May Day demonstration..." Initially I laughed when I heard this, then I wondered: Just how much untrue information can one solitary phrase contain?

In the first place, there have been no demonstrations of this kind in Prague in recent years. Prague, like other Czechoslovak cities, is greeting May Day this year "in its own way." As this item is being published, May Day is being marked in Prague city center simply by dances, songs, and merry-making for the first time since 1968.

The traditional students' May Day carnival began on the Old Town Square. Then there was a procession around the city center, a return to the square, and the election of a "king" crowned in the presence of J. Koran, mayor of Prague. The celebrations will go on until midnight. A new generation of young people has greeted the revival of an old tradition with smiles and happiness. "Civic Forum" organized it all.

What about the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ]? Who "discriminated" against it and how?

Well, no one. The May Day "jamboree" organized by Prague's Communists was held in the sports hall of the former Higher Political School. It began at 10 o'clock and will last until evening. The program is packed with events—performances by bands and artistes, a discotheque, children's competitions, dances, buffets, and a lottery with an attractive main prize—a Favorit automobile (the latest model from the Skoda works)... The rally was addressed by Czechoslovak Communist prospective parliamentary deputies.

Admittedly, at first it was proposed that the May Day celebration be held in Prague's Hvezda Park, but the Prague National Committee in fact wouldn't allow it to be held there. For environmental reasons. Among other things because this old and historic park is a massive bird sanctuary or an "ornithological reserve," according to the official reply. One may conjecture, of course: Was the ban imposed solely because of the birds? But that, as they say, belongs to the realms of fantasy.

...Very many people in Czechoslovakia watch the Moscow "Vremya" program. Hardly had the announcer read out the report that I mentioned before the telephone at the correspondents' center rang. Maria Kovcarova, a journalist and CPCZ member, said: "Why does your televison sometimes try to claim that there is an out-and-out counterrevolution going on here? And the way that report mentioned the renaming of streets was unobjective and biased. And a month ago," the journalist went on, "a comrade of yours said in an article that Communists are about to be evicted from their apartments. I wanted to phone Moscow right away and ask when I should pack my suitcases? What is the reasons for all this?"

Bulgarian Opposition's Election Platform Viewed

PM0305150990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
1 May 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "The Opposition's Program"]

[Text] Sofia, 30 Apr—The building of an "independent, democratic, and prosperous Bulgaria" is the aim declared by the opposition Union of Democratic Forces [UDF]. This was formulated in the union's pre-election platform published here.

The document is permeated with criticism of the policy of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] and the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. At the same time, many of the positions included in it coincide to a considerable extent with ideas previously expounded and published in the BSP's platform.

Thus, like the BSP, the UDF believes that democracy can only be achieved by peaceful means, and it advocates guaranteed human rights and legal equality for all ethnic groups, the building of a rule-of-law state, transition to a market economy, and affirmation of equal rights for private and state ownership. At the same time, the UDF program places emphasis on private capital as the "true force of economic life."

In the sphere of foreign policy, the UDF advocates "full integration with European structures" and, at the same time, reassessment of Bulgaria's participation in CEMA "due to the obvious inefficiency of this organization." "We support the simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, when the necessary conditions for this arise," the platform stresses. "Until then, Bulgaria will meet its obligations in the alliance with a sense of responsibility, while simultaneously striving for a speedy elimination of both blocs."

West Europe

Britain's Communist Leader Temple Interviewed

PM0305193390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Dispatch by PRAVDA correspondent A. Lyutyy: "What Would Marx Say? Reflections Following a Visit to Highgate and a Discussion with 33-Year-Old Nina Temple, Secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain"]

[Text] London, April—A few dozen meters further up Swain's Lane, and the iron gates leading to the old cemetery on the hillside appeared on the left... Established back in 1839 by the Bishop of London, it is in use to this day. OBSERVER reporter Farzad Bazoft, executed in Iraq on a charge of espionage, was buried there. One encounters other journalists' graves. The remains of John Galsworthy, members of Dickens' family, and celebrated philosophers and economists are to be found there.

But the main attraction is the grave of Karl Marx. The bronze bust fashioned by Laurence Bradshaw rests on a plinth of grayish granite. The following words are etched in gold: "Workers of the world, unite!" Until 1956 the grave was in a different place, but it was moved to a small rise, nearer to the path. British Communists gathered funds and erected the monument, which nearly always has visitors. What are they thinking about when they contemplate the stern visage of the bronze Marx?

The visitors' book contains the names of people from all over the world. Delegations from our country have signed it. It contains emotional, heartfelt lines, but one also encounters the stirring slogan: "Reading Marx is our Banner and Weapon!"

Of course, there are views of a different kind. "We see before us the grave of socialism"—two young nurses from Munich categorically declared. London engineer Stephen Byrne chose his words carefully, before announcing apologetically: "I feel sad here. Marx was for so many people a symbol of hope that capitalism would not grow so rapidly and so rampantly. I don't know, perhaps this philosopher's cause is lost. I don't know what he would say today. We will see what history's verdict is 50 years or so from now..."

Of course history will put everything in its proper place. But at the present time many people in the West would like to see both in our perestroyka and in the changes taking place in East Europe the complete collapse of socialism and also of all Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The desire to bury the legacy of the classics of Marxism as quickly as possible is passed off as its reinterpretation. And the Stalinist tyranny and other tragic episodes in our history are presented as the inevitable results of applying the teaching of Marx and Lenin in practice.

There are very different reasons for wishing to defame socialism. Sometimes unexpected reasons. In an article published in THE TIMES recently Kenneth Baker, chairman of the Conservative Party, tried to convince readers that Labour's accession to power in Britain would run counter to the whole course of change in Europe. He said that countries in the eastern part of the continent are getting away from state regulation of the economy and moving toward a market system, while Labour could return the country to "stifling socialism."

People in Britain are now reflecting a great deal in connection with the fifth anniversary of perestroyka. I would be sinning against the truth if I were to say that the attitude to it is entirely favorable. The tone of statements by political experts and newspaper commentators is becoming more cautious and at times skeptical. And in connection with the Lithuanian crisis certain press organs, unlike the government, have lost their self-control and begun loosing off poisoned arrows at Moscow. But respectable publications are still refraining from hysterics and urging people not to forget how much has been done in our country over the past five years.

There is no denying that perestroyka has enriched our relations with the West extraordinarily and made them more civilized, multifaceted, and diverse. This also applies to relations with communist parties in the West. By drawing some closer and alienating others in the past, we were robbing ourselves and narrowing the field for dialogue and cooperation with democratic forces. Much is changing today. But it is no secret that both here and in our country some people are speaking of a betrayal of the international communist movement and saying that perestroyka has called in question and even canceled out much of what communists in the West defended with such difficulty for so long.

There is no denying that some parties are in a difficult position.. Communist Party of Great Britain [CPGB] membership, for example, has declined in recent years and now stands at 7,500, whereas in the years immediately after the war the party had 56,000 members. There are many explanations for this. The chief reasons include a general shift to the Right in the country's sociopolitical climate, the decline of heavy industry sectors, from which the communists have usually drawn their strength, and the declining influence of the trade unions.

But does perestroyka have a bearing on all this and do the events in the USSR signify a betrayal of the ideals of socialism? I put this question to Nina Temple, who became CPGB secretary (the epithet "general" has now been dropped—A. Lyutyy) in January.

"I totally disagree that the process that is taking place in the USSR is a betrayal of the ideals of socialism. It is a creative process. It is hard to say at the moment what the end result will be, but our communist party has long been an advocate of democratization in the USSR. I realize that perestroyka is proving a difficult process. The old command-and-administer system was ineffective and unwieldy, but it worked to some extent. It is very difficult in such an enormous country to change the system from top to bottom and make it accord with people's interests. In my view, the critical moment has now arrived. Perestroyka must lead as quickly as possible to economic changes that will provide people with food and give them a higher living standard. I must confess, I am somewhat apprehensive, but, at the same time, I support the process of change. I see no alternative other than a dictatorship..."

I was talking with Nina Temple in her office on the second floor of an old house, No. 16 St John's Street, the party headquarters. The conversation was comradely and businesslike, but without undue deference or, indeed, familiarity. Despite her youth and somewhat boyish look, Nina Temple is a seasoned and experienced communist. She has been in the party since the age of 13. When she took over from Gordon McLennan, who had headed the CPGB for 14 years, she announced that she intended to strive to overhaul the party and bring it out of a state of stagnation on the basis of the "Manifesto for new times" program adopted by the congress at the end of last year. The CPGB, in the opinion of its new leader, must radically revise its attitude toward the most diverse social and political forces in British society, collaborate more vigorously with ecological, antiracist, and feminist movements, and encourage pluralism of opinion. Nina has boundless energy. She once headed the Young Communists' organization, she was the party official responsible for relations with the press, and she was a journalist. She has found time to bring up two children.

Reactions to Nina Temple's arrival in the party leadership were varied. British Communists have failed to avoid division in recent years. Some of them even accused Temple of abandoning Lenin's legacy, of class betrayal, and of wanting to weaken the party. It is difficult to arbitrate in this dispute. I was able to agree by no means with all my interlocutor's opinions. But the CPGB is currently engaged in a quest. Next year it will meet to decide its future.

I asked my interlocutor what relations are like today between the CPGB and the CPSU.

"It is no secret that in the past the party criticized the invasion of Czechoslovakia and your actions in Afghanistan. And although ties were maintained during this entire period, they were very formal. Essentially there was no political dialogue between us. However, we now feel an affinity with the process that is taking place in your country.

"I remember going to the World Festival of Youth and Students in Havana in 1978 as a member of the British delegation. I spoke there on the theme of the universal nature of the problem of human rights and the need for their observance in all countries of the world. This is approximately the idea that Gorbachev is putting across at the moment. Then the Soviet Communist Youth League [Komsomol] members left the auditorium and branded me an agent of imperialism. How times change."

"What made you become a communist?"

"My father was a communist. I was involved in his affairs almost from when I was a child. In the sixties I began to participate in the movement against the Vietnam war and then against the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

"Our party is small, of course. It has been stronger in the past. But its influence is greater than may appear at first glance. During the Thatcher years the circulation of the party journal MARXISM TODAY has increased fourfold and now stands at 15,000. It is read by very influential people, including people in the Conservative Party. The reason is that the journal provides fresh ideas on all manner of questions, provides an arena for a variety of opinion, and has become one of the leading publications for all left-wing forces.

"At present the CPGB is going through a stage of transformation. Perhaps we will change the party's name. I am absolutely sure that we will change the structure and get away from democratic centralism. As for the vanguard role in society, we relinquished any claim to that in our program 20 years ago."

"I want to ask a question which one often hears here: Is Marxism dead and buried?":

"No, I don't think it is dead. But, unfortunately, it is not flourishing. You see, it is occasionally seen as a religion, as if what Marx wrote more than 100 years ago can be used today in its original form, mindlessly, what is more.

"In our country there are many intellectuals who believe that British society needs substantial improvement, that the gulf between rich and poor is too great. And those who want to change the state of affairs are turning to Marxism. I cannot call them Marxists in the sense that they agree with absolutely all the ideas of the author of 'Das Kapital.' But these people get their inspiration from Marx's teaching, which retains its unfading significance today."

"What do you value most in Marxism?"

"Marx's conviction that the world is susceptible to comprehension anmd analysis, that it is not some kind of enigma, and that the sequence of events is not prescribed from on high. Of course, yet another great achievement of Marxism is the teaching on materialist dialectics.

"But there are things in Marxism that need to be revised. For example, the question of the relationship between the individual and society. Marx did not raise the issue of women's rights. All in all, I consider myself a Marxist, but I approach this teaching in a creative way."

..What would Marx say about the present day? We can, of course, only guess at this. But Martin Jacques, editor of the journal MARXISM TODAY, has given an original reply to this question. THE FINANCIAL TIMES recently carried an article by him couched in the form of an interview with an imagined Marx finding himself among us today. And it includes these words by the great philosopher: "Marxism is at last becoming pluralist and plural. It is losing its exclusivity and developing along with other political traditions under conditions of equal rights, not predominance. And this is just how it should be, more than a century later."

Shevardnadze Arrives in Bonn for Germany Talks

LD0405102990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1010 GMT 4 May 90

[Text] Bonn, 4 May (TASS)—Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR foreign minister, has arrived here to take part in the talks on the external aspects of the construction of German unity. At Cologne-Bonn airport, he was met by senior officials of the FRG Foreign Ministry; by Yuliy Kvitsinskiy, USSR ambassador in the FRG; and by other officials.

E.A. Shevardnadze will take part in the talks that will begin on Saturday according to the "two-plus-four" formula. At the talks, the foreign ministers of the FRG, GDR, France, Great Britain, the USSR and the United States will discuss foreign political problems connected with the unification of the two German states.

TASS Analyst Comments on German Unification

LD0305194590 Moscow TASS in English 1924 GMT 3 May 90

[By TASS political analyst Aleksandr Antsiferov]

[Text] Moscow May 3 TASS—The talks between the German Democratic Republic and West Germany as well as between the USSR, the United States, Britain and France, known as "two plus four", will open in Bonn on Saturday.

The talks which are expected to map out ways and to define the framework for the two Germanies' reunification, provoke diverse comments even today. Speculations were also fuelled by the recent visit to the USSR by the GDR Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere.

The Soviet and the GDR leaders specified and explained the two countries' positions during the Moscow meeting.

President Mikhail Gorbachev stated that identity or proximity of approaches taken by the Soviet Union and the GDR to key foreign policy aspects of Germany's unification is a factor which substantially helps find balanced and guaranteed solutions.

However, many in the West do not take this factor into account. Analyst Michael Simmons of the London-based GUARDIAN newspaper writes that the continued uncertainty about the Soviet Union's agreement to NATO's presence in a united Germany will evidently exert pressure on the "two plus four" talks.

But there is no uncertainty on this issue. The Soviet president unequivicoally said that the USSR takes a negative stand on unilateral and unbalanced proposals about the membership of a future German state in NATO.

Asked by journalists about his country's possible memberhsip in NATO, De Maiziere also stressed that this can be done if the North Atlantic bloc changes its structure and strategy.

In his opinion, NATO should decrease attention to military tasks and turn to political and econmic problems, arms control and disarmament.

Regrettably, there is complete "uncertainty" (to use Simmons' expression) in NATO on these issues. The entire course of events in Europe dictates the need to end this "uncertainty".

Genscher Article on FRG-USSR Relations Cited

PM1005081090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[Report from PRAVDA and TASS roundup column under the general heading "From the Flow of News: 29 April": "FRG-USSR"]

[Text] Relations with the USSR will hold a central place in the foreign policy of a future united Germany and will serve the interests of creating a new peaceful European order. This was said in an article by FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher published by the NORDSEE ZEITUNG newspaper. The FRG Government, the article notes, has left no room for doubt that the unification of Germany will not take place to the detriment of the USSR's interests.

Shurkin on Ties With Austria, Eastern Europe

AU0405090790 Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG in German 4 May 90 p 3

[Text] Good relations between Austria and the USSR are the basis for the USSR's agreement to Austria's EC membership, Vitaliy Shurkin, director of the European Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, said on Wednesday evening [2 May].

At the moment, these relations are extremely satisfactory, he said at an event organized by the Political Academy of the Austrian People's Party.

The revolutions in Eastern Europe mainly developed as a result of perestroyka in the USSR. Germany's reunification is part of that.

Shurkin said that the fact that for the first time since World War II there is a consensus on the developments in Europe is the most important element of these developments. The West promotes and supports the developments in Eastern Europe. This is the basis for quicker and better developments in Eastern Europe.

Despite all positive events, there are also strong reservations concerning the current development. Shurkin cited as one problem the question of nationalities, which leads both to bilateral and to domestic problems. It is a great challenge to all countries to deal with these problems.

So far, this problem had been "kept quiet" by the USSR; now it is suddenly erupting.

It will be the great challenge for the USSR to find a way to offer true partnership to the new democracies in Eastern Europe, Shurkin said.

Shatalin Arrives for Madrid Perestroyka Meeting

LD0405103390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 4 May 90

[Text] An international conference—Perestroyka in the Economies of the USSR and Spain—has opened in Madrid. Academician Shatalin, member of the USSR Presidential Council; Popov, chairman of the Mossoviet; and Soviet specialists have arrived there to take part in it. At the opening of the forum, the thought was stressed that the situation on the European continent will, to a considerable extent, depend on the development of the situation in the Soviet Union.

Yurkov Returns From Irish Labour Party Meeting

PM0305121390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 May 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Return to Moscow"]

[Text] A.P. Yurkov, chief editor of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, returned to Moscow 1 May from Dublin, where he took part in the Irish Labour Party's annual conference as representative of the CPSU.

Congress of New Finnish Left-Wing Alliance Held

PM0305151590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 May 90 Second Edition p 6

[Report by PRAVDA correspondent Yu. Kuznetsov: "Toward the Unity of the Forces of the Left"]

[Text] Helsinki, 30 April—The two-day founding congress of Finland's Left Alliance, which was created on the initiative of the Finnish People's Democratic League, the Communist Party, and the Democratic Union of Women, has been held here.

Representatives of the Finnish Communist Party (Unity) were also among the congress participants.

At issue was the attempt to create a broad coalition of left-wing forces in Finland, a coalition which is intended to be a new political organization "to the left of social democracy." Following the decision on the creation of the Left Alliance, which was adopted without a vote, a general discussion began which included consideration of the congress documents—the program and the statutes. The new organization, according to its initiators' idea, is to be not only a parliamentary party, but also a broad association of people of different world views—both Marxists, and those who see the solution of ecological problems as their main task, and those who direct their efforts toward the battle against the arms race.

The delegates who spoke at the congress called for the manifestation of a "new political culture," for the facilitation of the consolidation of all the forces of the left, and for avoiding fanning the flames of old quarrels, including those of an ideological character. As both delegates and journalists noted, the main feature of the congress was the desire to seek the ways and the opportunities for constructive joint work.

Bakatin Signs Crime-Fighting Pact With Cyprus

LD0405101490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 4 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast: Correspondent V. Alekseyev report]

[Text] [Announcer] The visit to Cyprus by a USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] delegation led by Comrade Bakatin, the country's minister of internal affairs, has come to an end.

[Alekseyev] The USSR MVD delegation was received by Lissarides, president of the Cypriot House of Representatives, the country's parliament. He expressed satisfaction with the state of current Soviet-Cypriot relations, and specifically with the establishment of direct contacts between the internal affairs ministries of the Republic of Cyprus and the Soviet Union in order to step up the struggle against organized crime.

The ceremony for signing a cooperation agreement on the fight against crime, which envisages not only the exchange of information between them, but also joint operations against the producers and sellers of drugs, took place at the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Cyprus. [video shows signing ceremony]

The document also provides for investigators from the two states to spend time working in each other's internal affairs ministries. At present, five staff from Moscow's Criminal Investigation Department are studying the work methods of the Cypriot police in the fight against organized crime.

Comrade Bakatin and the members of the Soviet delegation visited the police headquarters of the Republic of Cyprus. [video shows Bakatin inspecting lines of policemen on a parade ground]

Prospects for Turkish Communists Examined

PM0205151790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 2 May 90 Second Edition p 5

[Article by V. Viktorov: "Democracy And Jails. Persecution of Communists Continues in Turkey"]

[Text] Many questions occur when from time to time you encounter pronouncements by Turkish officials about the abolition of Articles 141 and 142 of the country's criminal code. In fact, in Turkey—the only state in Europe—these Articles still prohibit communist party activities and its leaders have been in jail for 2 ½ years now because of their beliefs.

Haydar Kutlu and Nihat Sargin—general secretary and chairman of the Turkish United Communist Party [TUCP]—have staged a warning hunger strike. According to Ankara officials, there was no reason for this decision: The Turkish leadership is increasingly inclined to abolish Articles 141 and 142, which are now the talk of the town. It is not impossible that they will be removed from the Criminal Code this very year. This development, naturally, would entail the release from custody of the leaders of the TUCP and other members of the communist party leadership and its legalization.

However, all that I have said is, unfortunately, only wishful thinking, because when President T. Ozal or Prime Minister Y. Akbulut, people on whom the solution of the problem depends, are asked about the specific date for the abolition of the antidemocratic articles, they choose to remain silent. That is why, tired of waiting, the communist party leader declared the hunger strike on 6 April, after another court sitting at which their release was suggested. "We came home," they said in the Ankara court, "to fight for the legalization of our party. Leading circles, while promising that the question would be solved as soon as possible, have essentially done nothing. We hope that all democratic forces inside and outside the country will understand and support us."

The TUCP began the struggle for the legalization of its activities in November 1987, when its leaders returned to the country, having been emigres. Kutlu and Sargin were actually arrested at the airport. They were tortured in jail. They were fully aware what lay in store—Article 141 stipulates the death penalty for people who are leaders of such organizations as the communist party. But the TUCP leaders associated their decision to return home primarily with the party's political aims—to start working openly in Turkish society, to become actively involved in political life, and to secure the abolition of

Articles 141 and 142, the revision of the Turkish constitution, and on that basis, the implementation of extensive democratization in the country. Last September some other members of the TUCP Central Committee and Central Committee Politburo returned home.

Turkish communists believe that an underestimation of the significance of democracy lies at the root of the crisis in many fraternal parties, including those in Eastern and Central European countries. The TUCP favors cooperation and dialogue between communists and other parties within the country. This, of course, does not mean abandoning the party's strategic goals—the creation of a modern, developed society of social justice.

However, a number of Marxist groupings—there are quite a number of them in Turkey—describe this TUCP stance as "appeasement" and "compromise." And, without waiting for the official legalization of the TUCP, these groupings the other day declared that a Turkish Marxist party would be set up in the very near future. Time will tell what becomes of this. Meanwhile...

Let us hope the warning hunger strike by H. Kutlu and N. Sargin will finally make the Turkish Government and parliament abolish the notorious articles as soon as possible. Particularly as there is already a consensus on the matter of freedom of conscience in the country. It was reached by representatives of the three leading Turkish parties: the Motherland Party, True Path Party, and Social Democratic Populist Party.

The fact that the issue is in many respects complicating Turkey's relations with Western Europe and hindering the country's entry into the EEC, which it has been seeking for more than 15 years, makes one believe that the government will abolish or modify Articles 141 and 142. Turkey is a signatory of the European convention on human rights and basic freedoms and of the European convention against torture. However, neither Turkish nor European lawyers as yet have guarantees that political emigres will not be arrested and tortured. Moreover, they are sure that the European court of human rights, having studied the conclusions of the special investigative commission, will acknowledge that torture is being used in Turkey.

In conclusion, I believe it would be appropriate to cite the words of the patriarch of Turkish literature Melikh Dzhevet-Anday [name as transliterated], with whom I talked during his recent visit to Moscow:

"The Turkish leadership has proclaimed a course of economic and democratic integration with the outside world. This will certainly presuppose the removal of all obstacles in the way of freedom of conscience and belief. And whereas Turkey certainly has achieved enormous economic successes, it is still lagging behind in the sphere of humanization and democratization of society."

Latin America & Caribbean

Baklanov Delegation Arrives in Cuba 3 May

LD0405010190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0020 GMT 4 May 90

[Text] Havana, 4 May (TASS)—A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation led by Oleg Baklanov, people's deputy and CPSU Central Committee secretary, arrived here yesterday. It was met at the airport by Army General Raul Castro, second secretary of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee and the Republic's Council of Ministers, and Juan Escalona, minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, chairman of the National Assembly of People's Government, and other officials.

Yuriy Petrov, Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee member and USSR ambassador to Cuba was among the reception party.

Visit To Strengthen Cuban Ties

LD0305173790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1536 GMT 3 May 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 3 May—The visit to Cuba, beginning 4 May, by a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by People's Deputy Oleg Baklanov is called upon to strengthen interparliamentary ties, and Soviet-Cuban friendship and cooperation. Iskhak Mashbashev, a writer; Rozygeldy Pirnazarov, an ophthalmologist; Aleksey Sorokin, admiral of the fleet; Valentina Tereshkova, former cosmonaut; Vladimir Utkin, general director of the Yuzhnoye [South] Scientific Production Association; and Konstantin Frolov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences are part of the delegation. Many of them over a long period of time have been connected by the nature of their work with the Republic of Cuba and are good, old friends due to it.

During the visit, which will last until 10 May, the USSR guests will meet with Cuban parliamentarians, state, and political figures and will discuss the state and prospects of Soviet-Cuban relations. They will take part in the festive acts on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the restoration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Republic of Cuba, which is marked on 8 May, and also of the 45th anniversary of the victory over Hitler's Germany. Unfortunately, sometimes statements on Soviet-Cuban relations appear in the Soviet press which have not been thought through and fully weighed. Naturally, they are a reflection of the complex processes taking place in the USSR, of the breaking of stereotypes of thinking, of the mechanical transfer of new schemes to international links, including to relations with Cuba.

Moscow is convinced Cuba is a reliable political ally and commercial and economic partner of the Soviet Union. The peoples of the USSR and Cuba are linked by firm ties of friendship, which have withstood the severe tests that have fallen to the lot of both countries over the last

30 years. Moreover, and this is the main thing, in its relations with other states, Moscow firmly adheres to the principles of noninterference and self-determination, of its recognition of the right to choose one's own political structures and methods of leadership.

The efforts of the Cuban leadership aimed at imparting greater weight to the parliament in the country's political life, which is fully in keeping with the events taking place in the USSR, have evoked interest in Moscow. The growing understanding by Cubans of the character and essence of the processes of perestroyka in the Soviet Union is also regarded here as a positive phenomenon. In particular, it is a question of the activization of the law-making activity of the national assembly of popular power, the strengthening of parliamentary control over the government's activity, the recognition by Cubans of the need for the radical improvement of economic relations between the two countries in the conditions of the Soviet economy's transition to regulated planned market economy relations.

There is no doubt that these positive trends will be developed further and will be consolidated in the life of Cuban society, in Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union.

Supreme Soviet Session

Supreme Soviet Committees Debate Press Law

90US0779B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by IZVESTIYA parliamentary correspondent V. Dolganov: "The Law on the Press on the Eve of the Second Reading"]

[Text] Summing up the results of the discussion held on 6 April at a joint meeting of the two committees for the draft law on the press and other mass media, the chairman of the committee on questions of legislation, rule of law, and legal order, Yu.Kh. Kalmykov, said: "The document is ready for the second reading in the Supreme Soviet; all that is left are a few finishing touches on several articles."

The main speaker that day was B.N. Nikolskiy, deputy chairman of the committee on questions of glasnost, rights, and citizens' appeals. He reported on the work of the coordination commission which for several months, enlisting experts and specialists from various branches, had been completing the work on this legal act. The draft law was shortened: It now has not 43 articles as before but 39. B.N. Nikolskiy said that they were sorry to get rid of some of them, particularly the articles that envisioned penalties for officials for refusing to give information to journalists or unjustifiably postponing it.

Incidentally, somewhat later one of the specialists enlisted by the committee, Doctor of Jurisprudence M.A. Fedotov, disputed this decision. He said that when recommending that these articles be removed workers of the USSR Ministry of Justice and Supreme Court were afraid that journalists would be given unjustified priority over other citizens in the right to obtain information. But this is quite natural: In no other profession is information, as it were, the initial raw material to the extent that it is for workers of the press and other mass media.

This viewpoint was disputed by the chairman of the committee on questions of legislation, A.Ye. Sebentsov, in his joint report. Other opinions were also expressed. But all participants in the discussion agreed that—following the example of many other states—our country needs a law on the citizens' right to information. The draft decree on the procedure for putting the Law on the Press and Other Mass Media into force includes the corresponding point, which presupposes the preparation of the necessary legal act before 1 January 1991.

People's Deputies A.S. Yezhelev, A.S. Potapov, N.Yu. Reshetova, and several others had doubts about the current version of Article 26, which envisions the right of citizens and organizations to refutation and response. Indeed, the second paragraph does sound extremely indefinite: "A citizen or an organization about which the mass media have published information which, even though it may be true, encroaches upon their rights and legitimate interests or has a negative effect on their reputation, has the right to publish a response in this same mass media." It is this point that the majority of participants in the discussions in the committees think needs to be clarified and refined.

If you recall, with the first reading of the draft law in our parliament many disputes were evoked by the sum of the fine that was to be imposed on journalists as restitution for the moral harm caused to a citizen as a result of the dissemination of information that does not conform to reality and impugns human honor and dignity. During the process of additional work it was suggested that the original amount of R50,000 be reduced to various amounts. But as a result they finally agreed that the amount of moral harm in monetary terms was to be determined by the court in keeping with the law. What law? Regarding this they also prepared a draft decree on making several changes to the Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics.

A dispute arose regarding S.B. Stankevich's suggestion—he thinks that the law on the press should envision the right of citizens to acquire reproduction equipment and small-scale printing equipment. Actually, nobody doubted the right itself; the discussion was about something else: Should this entry be in this document or some other one.

The draft law clearly designates not the permit principle but the registration principle in the creation of mass media. There were many other points that came to light during the course of the completion of the work on the draft law. But some of them unfortunately disappeared without a trace—for example hidden censorship, whose existence in the article proposed in the first reading by certain deputies was pointed out by participants in the second session of the Supreme Soviet.

In general, the document that was so eagerly awaited not only by us journalists but also by many, many other citizens who called it one of the most important legal acts of perestroyka is ready not only in the opinion of the two committees that were immediately involved but also by other permanent parliament formations whose members are familiar with it.

Now it is up to the session.

Further on Laptev Election to Chairmanship

90US0779A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
9 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by PRAVDA parliamentary observer Miroslav Buzhkevich: "After Four Rounds"]

[Text] **Why do they put podiums in the meeting halls and, as has been the case recently, microphones between the armchairs in the aisles? The question seems rhetorical to some people but it is clear to everyone: to give speeches, discuss problems, and hold debates on critical issues. This is what happens in the meeting hall of the Supreme Soviet.**

But it takes place with varying degrees of success. Both chambers of parliament—the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities—last week without especially prolonged discussions adopted several important laws regulating relations within the Soviet federation and the procedure for resolving problems related to the withdrawal of a Union republic from the USSR. This is the result of careful preparatory work on the part of the committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet.

But still it would have been possible to do more and even work out a schedule. If the deputies wanted to save the deputies' time and their own. Frequently, as the joke goes, all they do is talk.

Let me go back a little. On the last Wednesday in March for the first time government leaders responded to the questions of the people's deputies. Coming up to the podium in turn were V. Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and I. Belousov and A. Biryukova, deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers. The first, although it was not a failure, could not be considered a success either. After the speech by V. Nikitin, in which he discussed mainly the general situation in the complex of the agricultural industry and devoted little time to answers to specific questions from the members of parliament, one of them reasonably noted that in general no discussions were needed. For they, the members of parliament, do not wish to and do not have the right to waste their time.

A worthy position. But the deputies themselves immediately departed from it. In the Soviet of the Union it was necessary to elect a new chairman of the chamber. When the discussion of the candidates for this post began (and this occurred a little later on that same Wednesday, 28 March), nobody could have guessed that the debates would not be over until almost a week later—on Tuesday 3 April.

In relating this story I do not wish to cast the slightest shadow either on the chamber as a whole or on those deputies whose candidacies were discussed and voted on—they are all worthy people and they are not to blame for the fact that the elections took so long. I should also like to congratulate our colleague Ivan Dmitriyevich Laptev on his election to the high state post of chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

And now about the sudden changes in the elections. What happened in the hall evoked surprise and bitterness. I do not intend to cast doubt on the deputies' desire to see a worthy person as chairman of the chamber. I do not see anything prejudicial in the fact that a number of candidates were discussed: Elections should be competitive—this is a guarantee that they are democratic and accurate. Something else troubled me: During the course of the debates many deputies lost control over their own emotions and forgot about the time and the place they were in.

The first round went quite properly. Brief speeches were made in support of two candidates. But neither of them received the necessary number of votes. It seemed that everything would be completed quickly in the second round. But on Monday 2 April someone said that repeat nominations were not allowed. Six new candidates appeared. Three of them withdrew their nominations. Certain colleagues began to interrogate with offensive zeal those who remained before the voting. One, for example, was asked how he felt about the idea that after election to the post of chairman of the chamber he would be introduced into the CPSU Central Committee or even the Politburo. But the tone and the subtext of the question was this: If the candidate agreed with this he would lose the confidence of the person asking the questions as well as certain others.

The voting again ended without results. The nomination of candidates began again. One of the deputies declared with alarm: The chamber is without a chairman for the fourth (!) day and we do not have the moral right to leave this hall without electing one. At this moment my eyes looked for a stove with a pipe in the meeting hall. What came to mind was the tradition of the Catholic cardinals not to leave the building until the new pope is elected, which is announced by smoke coming out of the stove. Of course there was no stove in our hall.

The hero of one of Arkadiy Raykin's interludes said: You consider me an esteemed person, so this means we are esteemed people! At the meeting of our parliament from time to time from the podium one could hear: "Esteemed deputies, esteemed colleagues." If you listened to the debates you would be convinced that frequently these words have nothing to back them up; they are spoken merely as a matter of form, by force of habit. One time I witnessed this: An extremely respectable member of parliament, a doctor of sciences, congratulated a respectable colleague, also a doctor of sciences, on his intelligent statement when discussing one of the draft laws. And a half hour later from the podium, he refuted this statement in front of everyone. Later I asked the person who had been criticized: "How can this be?" He just waved it off: "You have to know my 'friend'!"

But let us return to the hall where the elections of the chairman of the chamber were taking place. On the third round, among others, the two candidates who were in the running at the beginning of the elections were nominated. A member of the USSR Supreme Soviet I. Smorodin, calling for people to look one another straight in the eye, asserted that one of the candidacies had been discussed beforehand by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. And, finishing this brief phillipic, exclaimed: "For once let us show who we really are. There is no need to give us suggestions, we are no more stupid than the Politburo and all the others...." Such are the motives of the esteemed deputy.

A colleague responded to him: We are indeed inconsequential people if we all make unjustified attacks on the Politburo. And he suggested that we exclude the course of the discussion of the candidacies from the television broadcast. That way they would not disgrace themselves before the people. The objection came immediately: Deputies should not conduct themselves in such a way that they are embarrassed to be seen on television. In my opinion, this is fair.

But the passions still did not subside. Deputy V. Yudin suggested putting the elections off for a week so that there would be time to evaluate each candidacy. Someone was disturbed: "The third round of voting was coming up." Deputy Ye. Kim considered this normal, stating that, for example, in the Italian parliament there are sometimes more than 30 rounds of voting before a president is elected.

And then came the third round, and after it the fourth, and to everyone's joy—the last. The results are known.

I left the press balcony exhausted with nervous tension. And I thought: What kind of people were they whose names were submitted for voting? Why did their colleagues subject them, as one member of parliament keenly noted, to such a difficult, cruel, and burdensome election procedure. It is no wonder than when he went up to the chair of the chairman of the Soviet of the Union, I. Laptev asked that his deputy, A. Mokana, continue the meeting so that he could go home.

The election "ordeals" had not ended in the Soviet of the Union before they began in the Soviet of Nationalities. There on the first try they were not able to elect a new chairman for one of the permanent commissions of the chamber. Was this a random occurrence? Or is it a symptom of one and the same disease?

Recently on a street of the capital a car with a curious "decoration" popped out in front of me. An inscription under the trunk informed me that before me was an ordinary "Lada." But on top in large Latin letters it sparkled the word: "Cadillac." Thus the owner of the car, satisfying his primitive pride, wanted to "transform" a modest "Zhiguli" into a luxurious, prestigious limousine before the eyes of those around him. Is something similar not happening with certain members of the country's Supreme Soviet? While calling themselves members of parliament, many of them forget that the title of deputy does not automatically enrich them with the art of respect for their colleagues and the parliament itself or the ability to control their own emotions and conduct intelligent discussions and not just engage in talk.

International Affairs Committee Briefs Press

LD0305191490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] [Announcer] A news conference was held in the USSR Supreme Soviet today. Such news conferences are held in our parliament regularly. Usually they are connected with issues considered by the session on that day. During recent days, exclusively issues of internal life in our Supreme Soviet have been on the agenda. And now, during the parliamentary holidays, correspondents have been invited here by members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs. Soviet and foreign journalists asked questions about the situation in Romania, the emigration of individuals of Jewish nationality from the USSR, and the evaluation by the world's parliamentarians of the situation in Lithuania. Many questions were devoted to the future of united Germany. I propose that you listen to two answers to this question, on the possible membership of an united Germany in a military bloc. This is what was said in connection with this by Dzasokhov, chairman of the Committee for International Affairs.

[Begin Dzasokhov recording] Four states, the participants in the Potsdam Accords, have the right to count on the fact that their opinion will be taken into account although these four states themselves should, of course, relate in an extremely respectful manner to the will of the German people, themselves, as well. There is a whole series of practical and very important tasks. For example, the Soviet side at all levels cannot interpret the formulation of the issue in such a way that the united Germany will be an integral part of NATO. This would be a step, and moreover a dangerous step, in the direction of violating the military and political situation which has taken shape in Europe. Moreover, we could then discuss why a united Germany should not become a member of the Warsaw Pact. We approach this issue in a more constructive manner and are discussing it today, and we consider this task a realistic one, what may happen. [sentence as heard] The future united Germany should in some way be commensurate both with the West and the East, and perhaps this united Germany, during the large transitionary stage, should be part, while these alliances still exist, of both NATO and the Warsw Pact. [end recording]

[Announcer] This same thought was develoed and a somewhat different point of view on this problem was expressed by Academician Arbatov, the director of the United States and Canada Institute and an USSR people's deputy.

[Begin Arbatov recording] You know, I think the changes in Europe are now going so far, as we are the changes in world politics, that we are still, involuntarily, attempting to evaluate them in the old dimensions, the old concepts, but meanwhile, they will probably progress further and I think the issue of the existence of the two military blocs is on the agenda. And I do not believe the NATO bloc can outlive, or in any case outlive the Warsaw Pact for long, although people are trying diligently to convince us of this now, from the West. It seems to me that a breaking of the whole cold war structure has occurred. The ground is disappearing from underneath the feet of the Cold War and together with this, when the ground disappears, the whole superstructure on top of it will also collapse, in particular such buttresses as military treaties. They will be transformed, possibly into political alliances. Then this will be accompanied, in a good scenario, with the development of pan-European processes, but I do not see any prospects for the preservation of the old confrontations of the two military blocs. [end recording]

Political & Social

Yakovlev Briefs Media, Denies Coup Rumor

LD0405133890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1242 GMT 4 May 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow, 4 May (TASS)—Perestroyka in the USSR is the only real program on which it is possible to base the consolidation of Soviet society. This was stated by Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the USSR Presidential Council and CPSU Central Committee Politburo, at a meeting with journalists held in Moscow today. The meeting was organized by the USSR Foreign Ministry and the Soviet INTERFAX information agency.

One of the reasons for the destabilization of Soviet society at the present stage, according to Aleksandr Yakovlev, is "a dangerous gap between the pace of the political and economic reform." He stressed that it should be removed by the program measures being developed by the USSR Council of Ministers, aimed at going over to a controlled market economy which, he said, should "raise the quality of life of the people, remove tension, lower the level of intolerance, and reduce the opportunities for the activities of the 'ultras,' of both the rightwing and leftwing variety." The existence of such forces was confirmed yet again during the recent May Day demonstration in Moscow, this member of the country's top leadership noted. He considered the fact that some demonstrators put forward extremists slogans as an "attack by the extreme right wing and those who are behind them".

Aleksandr Yakovlev denied the rumors that an attempt to stage a coup with the participation of the Armed Forces took place on 25 February. "We have no grounds at all to suspect the army of any malicious intent whatever toward the country's leadership," he said. Replying to a question concerning the possibility that the Armed Forces and law protection bodies would be depoliticized, he said that this issue is not on the agenda "for the time being."

Preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress taking place in complex discussions were described as a most important event by Aleksandr Yakovlev. "I think that the CPSU will come to the congress having been significantly renewed, capable of being society's vanguard force in conditions of a multiparty system," Aleksandr Yakovlev said. Speaking of the possibility of creating a Russian Communist Party, he emphasized that even though "Russia undoubtedly needs new state and political forms," there are dangers that the creation of an RCP would put CPSU unity and the country's integrity in question. The final decision on this issue ought to be made by the Russian Communists themselves.

As for the possibility of holding "roundtable" talks with the representatives of the opposition forces, Aleksandr Yakovlev said, "I do not, for the time being, see partners for holding serious talks with the CPSU."

Speaking of the Lithuanian problem, Aleksandr Yakovlev called Lithuania's decision to secede from the USSR "a reckless step." "It is absurd to start by making a decision which may become a result of talks and only subsequently to commence the talks themselves," Aleksandr Yakovlev stressed. It is his view that a way out of the situation that has taken shape can only be found at the negotiating table and the talks can start only after the Lithuanian leadership "has revoked, suspended, or frozen for the period of the talks" the declaration on Lithuania's independence.

Journal Cites Ryzhkov Resignation Rumors

LD0405134790 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1232 GMT 4 May 90

[Text] Moscow, May 4 (TANJUG)—KOMMERSANT, a weekly published by the Association of Soviet Cooperatives, writes in its latest issue about the spreading rumours that Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov could shortly leave his office.

The paper does not give the reasons for this, but names as possible candidates Yuriy Maslyukov, Lev Ryabev, and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

The weekly believes that Ryzhkov "indirectly" confirmed the rumours when, asked by the paper's interviewer about his departure, he said that the government should maintain "a centralist position regardless of whether it will include Ryzhkov."

Ryzhkov refused to comment on a statement by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker that his views on some questions of Soviet different [as received] differ somewhat from those of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

The Soviet prime minister said he did not want to comment on something he had not read, but added that there are also differences in opinion within the supreme organs which lack a single stand on a number of questions.

Some believe that Ryzhkov could run for president of the parliament of the Russian Republic, the largest Soviet federal unit. Ryzhkov would thus be an opponent to Boris Yeltsin, who is not favoured by the Soviet leadership.

Further Reportage on May Day Activities

Prokofyev Views Provocation

PM0305214590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 May 90 Second Edition p 2

[Unnamed PRAVDA correspondent interview with Yu. A. Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow City CPSU Committee: "On a Wave of Irresponsibility;" date, place unspecified]

[Text] [Correspondent] In many cities, including the capital, the May Day festival by no means followed the stagnant scenarios of past years. How did the idea of de-bureaucratizing this traditional spring ceremony come into being?

[Prokofyev] The main thing that concerned the organizers of the festival was to bring back its meaning and roots: After all, for a whole century now it has been called the Day of International Solidarity of the Working People. Let me note that, at first, matters proceeded with difficulty and it would have been easier to go back to the customary pattern of doing things. But the general desire not to let oneself be led along by outmoded dogmas prevailed. Moscow's party and trade union organizations and thousands of working people prepared energetically and with genuine enthusiasm for May Day. Inventiveness and native wit were displayed in producing the banners with slogans on them and in putting together the procession.

Incidentally, for the first time the usual columns in which formerly only the representatives of the biggest enterprises had marched were abandoned. At the suggestion of the Moscow trade unions representatives of all the numerous sectors of the capital's economy went to Red Square. For the first time the participants of the May Day rally included, for instance, doctors, teachers, and workers in the service sphere. Also, for the first time the number of participants in the festivities was not regulated.

The present difficult situation, the complex period that the country and society are experiencing, were taken into account, as was the general desire to openly and honestly discuss at the rally all the most urgent matters and to express opinions about the progress of perestroyka.

The rally's resolution which was based on an appeal for cohesion, mutual assistance, comradeship, and worker solidarity was unanimously supported by Muscovites.

[Correspondent] Alas, as is known, it was supported by far from all. People were outraged at the ugly incident at the end of the May Day festivity....

[Prokofyev] It is worth dwelling in more detail on this. The new leadership of the Moscow City Soviet sent a letter to the USSR Council of Ministers requesting permission to hold a rally from 1400 to 1800 hours on Sovetskaya Square on 1 May with the participation of several hundreds of thousands of representatives of recently formed political groups and movements.

The Council of Ministers came up with a copunterproposal: That a joint procession be organized with joint participation in the May Day rally on Red Square, proceeding from a desire not to divide but to unite the various movements of working people. Confidence was expressed that everyone would understand the kind of responsibleness that the occasion demanded and would not allow uncontrolled emotions to prevail. The law enforcement bodies did everything incumbent upon them and operated efficiently, professionally, and totally correctly. There were no hindrances or any fuss either at the places where the processions' participants mustered or when they processed along the city's streets and through its squares....

[Correspondent] So what happened then?

[Prokofyev] I think we have to call a spade a spade: The May Day rally which had gone off very well was marred by a veritable provocation. The organizers of the "second wave" held up their part of the columns and then went out into Red Sqaure after the basic procession (there were about 25,000 people) had ended. Among them was a group of people in a malicious mood who differed strikingly from those Muscovites who had come to the rally in good cheer and in a businesslike frame of mind. There were offensive slogans, which went beyond all bounds of decency, defaming the leaders of the country and of the CPSU, and the president, crude yells, almost unprintable obscenities, and [derisive] whistling.

The aim of these people was absolutely clear: To spoil the festival, poison it with the venom of confrontation and schism, and to aggravate the already difficult situation in the capital. War and Labor veterans, people's deputies, the guests of Moscow, and representatives of the diplomatic corps watched this shameful spectacle with indignation and anger.

We Muscovites live in a vast city of 9 million inhabitants with a mass of diverse problems which we can solve only in concert. Only in concert will we be stronger and not shrink before any difficulties. However, the desire of people to rally together and march shoulder to shoulder is not to the liking of all. The ideas of fraternal solidarity are not to everyone's liking. And now both extreme leftist radicals and extreme rightist conservatives are linking up in this destructive movement, fully aware that the success of perestroyka will be the downfall of their political ambitions.

Moscow Mayor Recalls Protests

LD0405150190 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 1200 GMT 4 May 90

[Text] An exceptional eyewitness to the protests and booing in Moscow's Red Square on 1 May was the reformist mayor Gavriil Popov, who was standing just beside Mikhail Gorbachev on the platform. Popov, who at the moment is participating in a seminar in Madrid on the economic perestroyka, gave us his version of events:

[Begin Popov recording in Russian with superimposed Spanish translation] Gorbachev knew what he was doing—meaning that he has been promoting the development of democracy in the country. From the outset he knew what the stance was of the different participants in the demonstration. For this reason what happened came as no surprise to him. What happened was that at a certain point the demonstration came to a halt and there was a kind of disturbance, making it impossible for other demonstrators to get into the square. For this reason the only solution was to leave because after few minutes it was still blocked and there was no movement. [end recording]

May Day 'Impressions' Noted

LD0305203490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1742 GMT 3 May 90

["Topical Interview" program]

[Text] [Announcer] Esteemed comrades, as you know, this year the international day of solidarity of the Working People, May 1, was marked in Moscow for the first time, not by the traditional procession on Red Square, but by a May Day rally which, on the 100th anniversary of the shooting of the Chicago workers, was organized by the Moscow city Council of Trade Unions. We have asked Vladimir Pavlovich Shcherbakov, chairman of the Moscow city council of trade unions, and Yevgeniy Konstantinovich Kuznetsov, a rolling mill worker and chairman of the trade union committee of the Serp i Molot Works, to give their impressions of the event which took place.

[Shcherbakov] For the first time on May Day, Red Square met the representatives of the labor collectives of Moscow at a rally. There was a procession, a rally, or to put it more simply, a May Day celebration of the representatives of the labor collectives of the city of Moscow. The leitmotif of this rally was the international solidarity of working people, the struggle for peace, the unity of our Union, because of late, in our country, there has been a sharp exacerbation of interethnic quarrels, and also, of course, our main functions as trade unions, the defense of the interests of the working people, the defense of the economic, social, and legal interests of the working people.

We addressed a request to the government to give us permission to hold such a rally, taking account of the fact that it was the 100th anniversary of the holding of May Day meetings, and we received this permission. The particular feature of our May Day celebration and procession was that we came in columns differentiated not by rayon but by profession. Representatives of the textile and light industry marched past, metal workers marched past, engineering workers marched past, doctors and teachers and representatives of other professions marched past. They marched with their worries, with their concerns. But one could sense in their faces, in spite of all their concerns, one could sense a feeling of confidence in tomorrow. They marched with demands for solidarity, with demands for the consolidation of all healthy forces on a democratic basis, and with demands—quite harsh demands—for an improvement in the economic situation, that unemployment should not be allowed, that a sharp reduction in the living standards of the working people should not be allowed. This is with what the representatives of the labor collectives came.

When we listened to the speeches by the working people, whether it was the weaving worker Olga Vasilevna Samokhotova or Yevgeniy Konstantinovich Kuznetsov, the rolling mill worker from the Serp i Molot Works, or Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Kablov, candidate of technology, state prize winner—in all of their speeches one could sense worry and concern, but at the same time an appeal for unity and consolidation in so far as it is only we, ourselves, by our own selfless labor, who are able to get out of this difficult position, out of this difficult situation in which we now find ourselves, particularly with regard to the economy.

We are in favor of the market economy, but against unemployment. We are in favor of the market economy and in favor of the economic transformation of our country, but not at the expense of the interest of the representatives of the labor collectives and the interests of the working people on fixed incomes. This was spoken about, in particular, by the chairman of the students' trade union committee, Grigoriy Fedorovich Budya, who spoke with great concern about the problems of our students. And there are many such issues and problems. But, in the way these problems were expressed we sensed optimism in the participants in the rally and in the speakers.

And, of course, one can say with regret that the first part which passed—let us say straight out—in an intense, businesslike, and constructive atmosphere and later when the participants in our rally passed in front of the mausoluem with their banners, with their slogans, constructive slogans even though quite harsh ones. [sentence as heard]

The second part of the festival, unfortunately, at first aroused amazement and then, to put it bluntly, indignation. But with regard to the second part of the procession—procession, manifestation, or demonstration—which was organized by the Moscow electors' association I would like Yevgeniy Konstantinovich Kuznetsov, a rolling mill worker, to share his opinions and impressions. At the present time he is the chairman of the trade union committee of the Moscow Serp i Molot Works. This is a works which in the past three years has undergone major reconstruction, a works which has achieved vast successes of late, including the matter of improving working conditions, raising efficiency, and introducing the latest technology. The concern of the collective, just as of other collectives, is that it is now time for our economy to get onto a new track and for people, in making their contributions, to feel the results of their work. I would like Yevgeniy Konstantinovich to say a few words about his impressions and about how the workers perceived our rally and what their reaction was. Yevgeniy Konstantinovich, please.

[Kuznetsov] Today, in the trade union committee at my work place the phones have been ringing since this morning. It was not just my colleagues at work who rang up, but also other Muscovites. Many liked my speech [at the Red Square rally]. There was also negative calls. But this is, as the saying goes, up to people's consciences. Naturally, there were many questions about the second part, for Muscovites did not see it. What can one say? At first there were slogans with which one could conduct some sort of dialogue. These were slogans about Lithuania, questions about refugees. Some groups and electors' clubs welcomed their deputies. Everything was normal.

But then there appeared—I would not call them slogans, they were appeals on scraps of paper, written by hand, which cannot arouse in a normal person any feelings other than vileness and loathing and the very lowest feelings. It is simply impossible, I mean, for a real Russian, Soviet person to feel anything other than this.

Today, I went into a workshop where I worked for many years. My comrades asked me. Many could not believe that it was possible to go onto Red Square with such slogans. Of course, these people who carried them would scarcely venture to bring them into workers' rayons.

[Shcherbakov] Yevgeniy Konstantinovich, I would like to add literally just a few words. Many Muscovites are saying—I know the opinion of the deputies, including the deputies of Moscow City Soviet—that these people were not expressing the interests of the corps of deputies of Moscow City Soviet, even though they laid claim to this. They were not expressing the opinions of Muscovites.

These were people who do not cherish the principles of consolidation. These are people who do not want an improvement in the country's economic situation. These people want our system to be dismantled. These people want a situation in which they say, the worse the better. In this situation I would like to say that in the first part of our rally, seeing the faces of people together with their families, with their children, one simply once again becomes convinced that our country has a vast future, that our perestroyka has a vast future, and that the way out of our difficult economic situation is in the hands of our collectives, themselves. And only creative labor is capable of getting our country out of this situation.

Youth Paper Roundup of Events

PM0305100990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 May 90 pp 1-2

[Roundup of reports by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondents and TASS correspondents coordinated by A. Bystrov: "The Return of May Day"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Aleksandr Yermakov, own correspondent in Kemerovo, on the line:

"The local metallurgical workers and miners in Novokuznetsk have been reinforced by almost 300 delegates from the first congress of the independent workers' movement of the country.

"The delegates took part in a rally on May Day. The buses carrying delegates, incidentally, drove all around the city looking for May Day demonstrations. The even traveled out to the legendary West Siberian railroad settlement. But the surprising thing about the city streets was their unfestive calm and emptiness.

"On the other hand, when they did eventually find the rally, which was being held by the city authorities, passions really did rise. And the disturbers of the peace were, of course, the workers' congress delegates. Representatives of the most diverse organizations spoke in turn. The inhabitants of Novokuznetsk had scarcely ever heard such 'seditious' speeches, even by present-day standards. Ubozhko, a congress delegate, demanded the 'scrapping of the CPSU.' This demand, it must be said, was far from being the harshest. On the other hand, one local veteran called for the removal of Ubozhko himself and the whole 'antiparty gang.'

"So you see, the desire of the city authorities to adopt a 'low profile' and hold a rally in peace and quiet did not work out. They, of course, hold that it was the visitors who caused the disturbance.... On the other hand, it is strange that the local population did not come out on to the streets—and we know about their determination to stand up for themselves from recent events in the Kuzbass." [passage omitted]

Report from own correspondent Arkadiy Khantsevich:

"Kishinev's central square was awash with 'tricolors.' That is understandable—it is only four days since the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] passed a law confirming the republic's new blue, yellow, and red state flag. Within hours of winning official recognition, buildings, flag poles, and the lapels of city-dwellers' jackets were adorned with the 'tricolor.' It is the other extreme, however, that is alarming—the disparaging attitude toward the Soviet state flag. I, for example, counted just a handful of scarlet flags in the square that day. In sight of dozens of journalists a group of determined young men tried to prevent someone carrying the red flag getting on to the rostrum. He got through only after the intervention of the chairman of the city soviet." [passage omitted]

Own correspondent Vladimir Pantsyrev on the telephone:

"It has been drizzly and windy in Vologda since morning. 'Comrades, the demonstration has been canceled owing to the bad weather. Instead flowers will be laid at the Lenin monument and a rally will take place.'

was what the demonstrators heard from street loudspeakers. Some people set off home, but many went to the monument. The chairman of the oblast trade union made a short speech of welcome to the assembly. A veterans' representative said a few words. Music struck up. And the rally was over.

"'Let Lopatin speak,' demanded the assembly.

"Vladimir Lopatin, the mayor and a USSR people's deputy who, through the will of the supreme military command, was recently expelled from the CPSU (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA described this 29 April), took the rostrum. But the microphones had already been switched off. 'You're too late, Vladimir Nikolayevich, the rally is over,' the CPSU gorkom [city party committee] first secretary said.

"'Let Lopatin speak!' the people of Vologda insisted.

"The deputy began to speak without a microphone, but the powerful loudspeakers struck up a march. However, the people demanded hush and the music had to be turned off.

"The real May Day rally lasted roughly an hour—contrary to the banal official scenario but through the will of the people.

"Great truths sometimes begin to appear outmoded, and people get accustomed to them. And ignore them. Then there is trouble."

Our own correspondent Viktor Kosyak in Donetsk was most concerned by the fact that people could gain admittance to the celebrations without special passes (I can well understand this—these passes were often only issued after a rigorous selection procedure). This is a joke. But, joking aside, Viktor reports: "The rally at the 'Lokomotiv' stadium occurred without any grating ostentation. It was conceived as a discussion between the new city soviet deputies and voters. There does seem to have been a discussion, although it did get out of hand at times. Disputes, hysterical claims, and loud whistling could not be avoided. Nor extraordinary incidents either. One speaker literally flabbergasted those present with the following revelation out of the blue: 'Look, there's not a single Soviet flag flying over the stadium.' When a red banner blazed against the yellow and blue Rukh banners, there was a roar of applause."

So, this was the first attempt at a free May Day.... In some places it was successful, in others not entirely. The main thing is that we tried to do our thing during the holiday and not only listen, but also speak. We realized that May Day is not a bureaucratic day for handshakes, it is our day.

Special Archives Shed Light on French POW's

LD0305204490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 3 May 90

[Video report by correspondent M. Zotov, including interview with USSR Central State Special Archive Director A.S. Prokopenko, identified by captions; place and date not given—recorded; presented by Leonid Elin; from the "Vremya" newscast.

[Text] [Elin] Although the USSR Supreme Soviet has not yet discussed the Law on State Archives, many so-called secret archives are becoming accessible to journalists. Here is a report from one such "closed" institution: [video shows map with certain areas, apparently those of German settlement in Europe, marked in red; second chart shows directions of wartime German military thrusts; title page of Mein Kampf shown, front page of BERLINER ILLUSTRIERTE NACHTAUGABE]

[Zotov] These pre-war German maps, which were used to teach German schoolchildren, show the territory which the Reich eventually seized by 1940 and the territory planned for the Reich in the future. Hitler's works and speeches are also kept here, among captured documents held at the Special Archive. [video shows typed "intelligence briefing" in Russian, marked "top secret;" other shots of dog-eared volumes of case histories]

Also here are documents about which we did not know anything for a long time. Those who did know about them kept quiet. These are the papers of what was known as "Beria's Department." The most important documents are probably in these files. They are authentic documents about the killing of the Polish officers at Katyn. They also come from the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] files. [video shows document headed "Order of the NKVD for 1944" referring to rations allocated to POW's]

Now these files contain correspondence between various NKVD officials about the state of affairs at a camp for French POW's near Tambov. These Frenchmen, from the territories seized by the German Reich, were pressed into Wehrmacht service and taken prisoner on the Eastern Front.

[Prokopenko] [Video shows him leafing through various yellowing files] I think that we have to weigh reports that 10,000 Frenchmen perished very carefully. After all, that country was in fact allied to us. Fortunately, some of the documents relating to that camp, No. 188, during the period 1944-45, have survived. Here is what I found most interesting. As you will recall, French scholars are claiming that after July 1944, when 1,500 Frenchmen set off to join de Gaulle's army, the NKVD wanted to recruit some of the Frenchmen. After they refused, it is alleged that the treatment of these Frenchmen became extremely bad. They were badly fed and badly treated. As a result, they claim, 30 persons were dying there every day.

We examined such documents as this Order of the People's Commissar for Internal Affairs, issued on 18 October 1944. This document gives details of the food ration set aside for each POW. Just look. It shows that they were allocated a wide selection, so to speak, of provisions. As far as the grams are concerned, I can tell you for certain that even the Soviet citizens who were employed at these camps did not get such quantities. Therefore [video shows another document, headed "Ration No. 1," listing quantities of bread, flour, fish, etc.] now look at this document, which relates to 1945. You can see the same things.

[Zotov] Anatoliy Ivanovich [as heard], tell me please—can you say now roughly how many Frenchmen perished?

[Prokopenko] According to [word indistinct] documents—these are official documents—we were holding 23,136 Frenchmen captive. Of these, 21,811 were released at various times. In this camp, 1,325 died throughout the entire period, so to speak, of these years. We have lists of them. Their graves exist. In fact, this cemetery is visited by French visitors. But to talk about another 10,000 is...[changes thought] at any event, we were not able to ascertain this from the documents.

[Zotov] In other words, we can now say that the claim made by the French side is groundless?

[Prokopenko] It is based solely on certain eyewitness accounts. People could say....[changes thought] But only 1,325 people died. And don't forget, this was wartime, was it not? This was captivity. [video shows end of interview; Zotov addresses viewers, showing outside wall of building, with bars over windows]

[Zotov] By all accounts, the whole story of the French POW's has not yet been cleared up. Serious work still has to be done. However, there is one reassuring thing. The staff of the Special Archive is clearly doing all it can to get at the truth.

'Confederation of Labor' Formed

PM0405092590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 May 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by V. Valeryev: "'Labor Confederation' Formed"]

[Text] A new organization—the "Confederation of Labor"—has been formed in Novokuznetsk at the congress of independent workers' associations of the USSR.

The 268 delegates representing about 50 workers' movements, unions of working people, free trade unions, and political clubs took part in the elaboration of the organization's statute.

"Today there is intensive formation locally of workers' organizations which, seeking to acquire independence, are trying to overcome the apparatus' resistance," your IZVESTIYA correspondent was told by Yu. Garold, deputy chairman of the council of Kuzbass workers' committees. "Free trade unions are appearing which are really defending working people's interests. All this is taking place because the workers have understood that it is pointless to wait for a 'better life' to be handed down from above. The desire to pool their efforts to seek the set goals together led to the creation of the 'Confederation of Labor.'

"The congress adopted a declaration reflecting the main principles of the organization. We are in favor of stable guarantees of democratic freedoms, in favor of free labor without bureaucratic fetters, and the fair distribution of what is earned. We advocate the assertion of the full power of the people and we will struggle for the real representation of the working class in organs of power and management. The mechanism of workers' control which we want to elaborate is called on to protect democratic gains from possible encroachment in the future by ruling political parties. The confederation will seek enterprises' economic independence and defend the idea of the development of regulated market relations while elaborating broad social programs."

'Ideas That Unite Everyone'

LD0305221890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1952 GMT 3 May 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] [Yuriy Rostov] A congress of strike committees and other independent workers' organizations met for three days in Novukuznetsk. A confederation of labor [konfederatsiya truda] has been set up, which, it seems to me, could become involved in conflict with the traditional trade unions.

[Unidentified correspondent] Each of the delegates is aware that at this moment of crisis in the country's life, general dissatisfaction could turn into spontaneous destructive actions. [video shows brief interview with O. Gunchenko, a congress delegate]

[Gunchenko] At the present time only one thing is important: To gather all the country's sound forces together—that is, the voluntary forces and not those of the apparatus—and concentrate our strike upon the existing structures of power. [video shows interview with V. Golikov, chairman of the Kemerovo Oblast Committee]

[Golikov] I think the congress has fulfilled its task and has even exceeded our expectations. That is to say, a body has been set up, a declaration has been adopted, and rules have been adopted. We have been able, despite all the diversity of opinions, proposals, and currents, to find the ideas that unite everyone and for which we all assembled here.

Medvedev Views Political Events, Career, Family

PM3004160990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with V.A. Medvedev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, by A. Drozdov and V. Fronin: "'Without Young People There Will Be No Perestroyka.' Our Correspondents Talk With V.A. Medvedev, Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee"—date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Our young readers have seen you in the official section of "Vremya" [TV newscast] or, as recently, appearing live on the "Political Dialogues" program. That program was interesting by virtue of its lineup of participants, which automatically attracted attention. Anyhow, animated discussion on a live program always evokes trust. In general, it would be nice to see such things more often.

Now for our first question. The 21st Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Congress is over. You not only observed its work but also took an active part in it. What are your impressions?

[Medvedev] I would not be wrong if I said that this congress was awaited with special emotion and interest not only in Komsomol circles but also in the party and throughout society. The reasons are understandable. It was meeting at a very difficult time and was called upon to elaborate and adopt decisions of exceptional importance for the fate of the Komsomol. In my view, the congress was held in a democratic atmosphere and expressed the great diversity of real interests characteristic of the various groups of young people and a broad spectrum of opinions and assessments. Some people hastened to accuse the delegates of aping other political forums. (The allusion was clearly to the Congresses of USSR People's Deputies.)

I don't think this is the point. The main thing is that there was a sense of young people's sincere desire to probe the essence of the processes taking place in our society today, to analyze the state of affairs in the Komsomol and the youth movement as a whole, and to consider its role at this crucial period of the country's history. I was impressed by the freewheeling, trenchant, and innovatory thinking of many speakers and by their desire to defend their correctness in raising questions and in proposed solutions, and to do so, moreover, without an eye to any authorities. In its decisions the congress reflected young people's desire to take an active part in the process of our society's renewal and the harmony between the Komsomol's ideological aspirations and the main tasks of perestroyka.

I thought that not all the questions topical for the Komsomol were discussed and considered to the same extent and it was not possible to adopt optimum decisions on all of them. That is not surprising. After all, the Komsomol, with its many millions of members, represents an extremely wide range of problems, interests, convictions, and inclinations. It is important for these not to be suppressed, but to be given a natural outlet. I think the congress fulfilled this task while retaining its own unity and ideological proximity to the party.

The party fully realizes that without the Komsomol, without young people there will simply be no perestroyka. We all greatly worry and fret about the processes taking place within the Komsomol. We also realize that this is not the fault of the Komsomol itself, but reflects the situation in society and the exacerbated difficulties and contradictions which actually prompted perestroyka and which necessitate fundamental changes in the activity of youth organizations.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] At the February plenum you said that there is now "ideological confusion in the minds" of people in our country. This probably applies also to young people....

[Medvedev] Yes, of course, both to young people and to the whole of society. The reason here is clear. An extremely profound turnaround is taking place in the social consciousness, in people's minds, a turnaround that reflects the fundamental changes in our entire social structure, which has begun a transition from directive, administrative-edict socialism to humane, democratic, self-renewing socialism.

If you also take into account the fact that this turnaround is being overlaid on a broad spectrum of interests and needs of different social groups within our society, along with the contradictory course of perestroyka itself, it will become clear that this state of mind is practically inevitable.

But I don't think we should see any tragedy in this and lapse into pessimism. The crisis of social consciousness should also be regarded as an aspect of its renewal associated with its breakthrough to a modern social vision of the world. I am sure that the present state of, if you like, a certain chaos in people's minds will certainly find expression in the features of a natural diversity of social consciousness. This will take considerable time. In the process it is important that fundamental socialist values not be lost.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] What elements of today's sometimes sharp criticism of ideological work do you accept, including accept personally, and what not, and for what reasons?

[Medvedev] In general, criticism should be taken seriously, irrespective of what lies behind it. Everything must be analyzed. Above all you must take into account criticism of real shortcomings that is prompted by a wish to eliminate them. To be more specific, this applies also to the activeness and incisiveness of ideological work, to the elaboration of what is described as ideology (it would be more accurate to say—as the theory of perestroyka), and to the elaboration of new forms of ideological work in conditions of political pluralism. It would be simply ridiculous to say that there are no substantial shortcomings here. Especially as this concerns large-scale processes of renewal.

At the same time there is criticism of today's ideological work that reflects different political positions. On the one hand, there is the conservatively inclined section of party members and party activists who essentially reject glasnost, openness, and pluralism of opinions and charge that ideals and ideological bearings have been eroded or even lost within society, the whole press is totally out of hand and has been captured virtually by antisocialist forces, and so forth.

On the other hand, there are voices claiming that ideology remains dogmatic, that it has not departed from the canons of the past, that it does not recognize innovations, and that the ideological apparatus is continuing to exert harsh pressure on the press.

I would not say that there is nothing instrumentally useful even in this criticism. But nevertheless, it should be regarded as a reflection of the political struggle. Hence the appropriate reaction to it. While deriving something useful from it, we must defend the party's political positions, the course of radical perestroyka, from attacks from the right and the left, which is what I try to do.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] October [1917] is now described by a number of authors as a catastrophic historical mistake for Russia, no less. You have to arrive at the truth via doubt. What is your attitude to this problem?

[Medvedev] I think that a negativist attitude toward our theoretical heritage and the attempts to revise the teaching of Marx, Engels, and Lenin and to review the historical role of October are totally lacking in foundation and unproductive. This is not the first time such attempts have been made. All this is very familiar.

The peculiarity of the present attacks on our teaching and on our historical choice likes in the fact that they proceed from the sharp debate surrounding the problems of the present perestroyka—where should it go from here: Should it take the path of the socialist choice or turn off it. In a way, this is a projection onto the historical past of a negativist attitude toward the socialist thrust of perestroyka, which is untenable even from a methodological viewpoint.

The question arises: How is Lenin to be defended in the present situation? I am convinced that the first condition for such defense lies in an objective, historical interpretation of Lenin's ideas, in freeing them from subsequent accretions and interpretations. This in itself is not so easy. Of course, a considerable amount has already been done to cleanse Lenin's legacy. But this work is still a long way from completion. Unfortunately, today there is a lack of intelligent, sensible defense of Lenin. There are probably more negativist remarks and attacks.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Could you cite what you regard as successful examples?

[Medvedev] Yes. A number of recent articles. I could mention, for instance, the articles of V. Startsev and V. Kelle in PRAVDA and A. Volodin in KOMMUNIST. I would also mention the article in RODINA by G. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov, and V. Loginov, who critically analyzed V. Soloukhin's essay "Reading Lenin." The authors specifically and cogently debunk the arguments and fantasies based on quotations taken out of context.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Vadim Andreyevich, the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th congress evoked a mixed reaction both among participants in the plenum and among young people, and there are also totally different opinions and views about this within society.

[Medvedev] That is perfectly natural, although I must note that on the whole the draft platform and the new statutes have been greeted with interest and support both within the party and within society, as the course of the precongress debate and sociological public opinion polls demonstrate. I think that this is explained by the fact that the draft platform takes the whole spectrum of topical problems of our development, including the interpretation of perestroyka of the party and the definition of the party's new role in society and of the key directions in reforming it.

Of course, the platform is not a party program. It is a political document designed for the immediate future of perestroyka. Therefore, it is natural that certain questions are set out in it in a compressed, fragmentary form. Moreover, it is merely a draft open for discussion, improvement, addition, or even the reworking of particular provisions.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Does not the task of consolidating the party come into conflict with the prospect of the democratization of internal party life? The very word "consolidation" is interpreted unequivocally as a refusal to consider alternative viewpoints.

[Medvedev] At first glance these two points, consolidation and democratization, are indeed contradictory. Consolidation is associated with unanimity and democratization with the toleration of dissent and with pluralism. But the point is precisely that we must seek a combination of them, despite the outward contradiction.

I am sure that consolidation is also conceivable on the basis of pluralism. Moreover, this kind of consolidation is probably firmer and healthier than consolidation attained via unanimity. Indeed, there can be no such thing as total unanimity.

I disagree with the calls for consolidation of everyone without exception, from the most inveterate conservatives and even Stalinists, as is sometimes proposed, to those who preach a departure from the socialist path and liberal bourgeois principles. I disagree with the view that consolidation should be expanded in such a way as to include both the former and the latter. That would be unprincipled consolidation. But the consolidation of all forces advocating the socialist renewal of society is perfectly possible and necessary. And the spectrum of these forces is quite broad, the palette is very diverse.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Is it theoretically better for the party to have wings? Can it be put like that?

[Medvedev] It depends what you mean by wings. If by wings you mean diversity of opinions regarding the content and methods of resolving particular tasks, they are perfectly natural. I think they have always existed in an overt or covert form. And they will always exist. At all levels and in every party organization, starting with the primary organization and ending with the Politburo.

But if you mean factions formed on the basis of political platforms, that is, groups with their own internal structure and their own internal discipline different from the general party structure and discipline, then I am opposed to such factions. I think there is no need for them, especially in conditions of political pluralism and the possibility of creating other parties. Why should such groups exist within the party when these people can leave the party and form their own political organization?

Take the Democratic Platform. Essentially it is proclaiming a demand for freedom of factions. The logical extension of this approach is the direct raising of the question of a split in the party. Freedom of factions means a split in the party. And they have arrived at this....

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Do you believe that the transition to a multiparty system is not only inevitable, but also desirable for our society?

[Medvedev] The fact is that the constitutional possibility of forming parties has been enshrined. Everything else depends on the political consciousness of the people, social groups, and classes, that is, on the real sociopolitical process. Any party, and this is perfectly natural, is interested primarily in ensuring that the positions of its political forces, rather than those of any others, strengthen in society. This is the point of the struggle for influence over the masses. Our party will seek to ensure that its prestige and influence are preserved and that it continues to play the role of ruling party.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] But today this is unthinkable without the people's trust and support.

[Medvedev] Of course. We have pledged before the people, before society, to attain this goal by purely constitutional democratic methods.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Clearly, the whole debate within the party is not confined to the CPSU Central Committee Platform and the Democratic Platform....

[Medvedev] Yes, of course, in my view, these platforms cannot be compared at all. I will emphasize once again: The CPSU platform "Toward Humane, Democratic Socialism" embraces the entire range of problems of socioeconomic and sociopolitical development and is more in the nature of a program. Whereas the Democratic Platform, I would say, has an organizational-party emphasis. In other words, it highlights questions of the party's role and its structures. And all socioeconomic problems, interethnic problems, and even historical and theoretical problems are left out of the frame....

In my view, it would be more correct to compare the Democratic Platform with the CPSU Statutes. Understand me correctly: It is not even a matter of different weight divisions. It's simply that a decathlete doesn't compete with a boxer....

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] But let us nevertheless take the extreme case. The splitting off of the Democratic Platform as part of the CPSU and possible claims by it to some of the party property. No matter how different the weight divisions are, nevertheless the threat of a split—stratification, division—should not be underplayed. In general how likely is this and what could be the consequences?

[Medvedev] As you know, the Democratic Platform sets out practically no views on the basic problems of our country's development. On the other hand its supporters display heightened interest in party property. And this is worrying. It looks as though problems of dividing the property bother them more than the problems of the country. I hope that the party will not allow a split to occur. We will do everything possible to consolidate healthy party forces on a principled perestroyka basis. There must be a parting of the ways with those who would like to undermine the party from within and to demolish it. This is the point of the CPSU Central Committee open letter to the country's communists.

In general I cannot understand people who intend to remain in the party when they disagree with its basic principles.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] When did you have your last arguments? With whom? What was the argument about, what problems?

[Medvedev] I have never avoided and I do not avoid participation in any debates, whether on television, in a lecture hall, or with pickets on the street. All my trips to the Baltic republics essentially proceeded in a continuous and quite harsh dialogue. And nowadays any speech in a worker collective, in an institute, or even to a party audience (and such speeches are made constantly) takes place in an atmosphere of sharp debate.

Of course, party workers must also go out into the streets and take part in rallies. But here you have to take into account the attitude shown toward this by the organizers of the rallies and the participants. If they don't allow an unwanted speaker to open his mouth but begin to boo and whistle (as happened at a recent noisy rally in Moscow), there is little point in taking part in such a rally.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Please say a few words about your relations with the leaders of the mass news media. Do you often meet with them and call them about particular articles in the press?

[Medvedev] As far as the party press—newspapers and journals—is concerned, there is direct and close contact. We regularly assemble the editors of party newspapers and journals and we also invite other comrades, other communists—the editors of IZVESTIYA, TRUD, and PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK, for instance. We exchange opinions about the coverage of particular problems. You yourself can judge the usefulness of these meetings, after all, you take part in them. Of course, there is also everyday working contact, especially with PRAVDA: We consult on particular publications.

I do meet, although not as often as I would like, with the editors of NOVYY MIR, NASH SOVREMENNIK, ZNAMYA and OKTYABR, and OGONEK and with writers, scientists, and cultural figures.

In general I am in favor of diversity in our press, in favor of each publication having its own identity. It cannot be otherwise. If our periodicals want to express and shape public opinion, they can only be diverse—diverse in viewpoints, attachments, and traditions. There is no need, for instance, to turn NASH SOVREMENNIK into ZNAMYA or vice versa. A sense of annoyance and protest arises when infighting and squabbles spill over into the pages of journals, when the eroprieties are forgotten in the heat of polemics, and especially when people start to revile our values and what we hold sacred.

I know that there are attempts to judge my position and my attachments, my place in the political spectrum. Some people are constantly shifting me from the left toward the right. A pointless pastime!

Incidentally, I will return to your question about debates and arguments. With whom? About what?

In fact, to one extent or another they are present at many meetings. But clearly what interests you is instances when they assume a principled character. A few months ago there was a thorough and principled discussion with Yu.N. Afanasyev. It concerned fundamental questions of sociopolitical development and the party's program goals. My position is this: If we recognize the basic ideological platform, recognize the social choice, then there are no questions that cannot be the subject of discussion in a theoretical or practical context. No question is rejected out of hand. On this basis our party and its leadership are open to discussion of questions. This can be done both within the party framework and within the framework of representative organs of state power.

There were also meetings with G.Kh. Popov and A.M. Yemelyanov, whom I have long known as fellow economists.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Let's recall the topic of your doctoral dissertation....

[Medvedev] You know, it sounds topical even now, although I defended it back in 1967 at Leningrad University. The topic was "The Law of Value and Material Incentives for Socialist Production." The whole dissertation was closely linked with the economic reform of the mid-sixties.

It was quite bold for its time. It put forward and defended ideas regarding the economic isolation of socialist enterprises and the regulating role of the law of value and the market. These were regarded almost as criminal at the time. It was no accident that the dissertation had considerable difficulty getting past the Higher Certification Commission.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] In the recent past the award of a high academic title to a major leader automatically went along with the post, so to speak. How and as a result of what did you become a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences? Do you now do any academic work, what form does this take?

[Medvedev] My election as a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences did not go all that smoothly and was certainly not automatic. I first ran in the elections to the academy in 1982, during my time as rector of the Academy of Social Sciences. By that time I had around 100 scientific works to my name, including five books. I did not make it in those elections—I was a few votes short.

After this, in 1983, I wrote another book entitled "The Management of Socialist Production" and a number of other works, and I got in at the next elections.

A new political economy textbook prepared by a collective of authors including myself and under my leadership was published in 1988. It contained many new, progressive ideas, proposed a new course structure, and so forth. However, we have come so far in our economic ideas in just two years that a great deal now appears in a different light.

Collective work is now under way on an expanded two-volume version of the textbook which will take all this into account.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Vadim Andreyevich, please tell us how you came to join the CPSU Central Committee apparatus. If we are not mistaken, it was during the Brezhnev period.... What has changed?

[Medvedev] It is probably worth going another three years further back and saying how I ended up in party work in general. I had thought that I would definitely pursue an academic teaching career. At the time I was chief of the political economy department at the Technology Institute named for the Leningrad Soviet....

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] The institute that Nina Andreyeva comes from?

[Medvedev] Yes, but I don't think she was at the institute then, or at any rate I didn't know her. In general that kind of phenomenon is not typical of the Technology Institute, which has always been marked by its democratic spirit.

Then, in 1968, there was a sharp turnaround—though I had no experience of party work at all, I was elected secretary of the Leningrad party gorkom [city committee]. This was quite a rarity for those days—a doctor of sciences in party work.

Inside three years I was invited to work at the CPSU Central Committee. I will be frank (my colleagues at that time can confirm this): I was not enthusiastic about this switch. I immediately found myself in an atmosphere very different from the party gorkom. The gorkom involved real work, constant contact with collectives and the intelligentsia. My teaching skills came in handy. But here I immediately found myself in the atmosphere of the apparatus, and a distinctive kind of apparatus with its own traditions which had become so strongly rooted during the Brezhnev period. This was early 1971.

It was difficult to adjust to the mentality of apparatus official. Virtually no discussion of instructions from on high was allowed. It was precisely the system of ideological cliches and edicts passed downward that we have already mentioned. Attempts to introduce some degree of liveliness into time-honored traditional questions like political enlightenment and socialist competition were fruitless.

Admittedly, I did manage to do something in the sphere of economic education during this period. But later this work, too, was overformalized.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] A great deal is written and said about the personal responsibility of party ideologists for the implementation of the guidelines in question. After all, they were linked with the names of specific figures, for instance, Zhdanov, Suslov....

[Medvedev] I would not exaggerate the role played here even by the people you mentioned: They were a product of that era, of that system. Each of them more or less adequately reflected the spirit of his time and the nature of the system.

I personally met Suslov two or three times. The impression he gave was of an ascetic, unemotional, unworldly man, but one who was well aware of his power. It was he who decided the terms in which assessments of the top leader of the time were couched. At least, I had the impression that he decided this. He could take out one epithet and add another. Once political documents had been through his hands no one made any further corrections to them. I don't think they even went past Brezhnev....

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] How did you make the acquaintance of Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev?

[Medvedev] My first personal meeting with Yu.V. Andropov was during my time as rector of the Academy of Social Sciences. He had shown interest in the work of the Academy of Social Sciences, and I asked for an appointment to see him. And for probably 50 minutes or an hour we discussed the academy's affairs, the training of cadres, and the reinforcement of party work with scientific personnel. All this was greeted with great understanding and great interest.

My second meeting with Yu.V. Andropov, who by this time was general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, came when I was appointed chief of the Science and Educational Institutions Department. This was not a one-on-one meeting. M.S. Gorbachev took part in it. He introduced me as the candidate to fill this post. The conversation was very good and comradely.... That was in August 1983, and Yuriy Vladimirovich already looked quite sick even then.

My personal acquaintance with Mikhail Sergeyevich probably dates back to the mid-seventies, when he was still working in Stavropol Kray. It stemmed from participation in a scientific and practical conference on economic education. After M.S. Gorbachev moved to work in the Central Committee, he often visited the Academy of Social Sciences and addressed the students, and afterwards we would have a detailed exchange of opinions, especially on problems of socioeconomic policy. I was often invited to see M.S. Gorbachev at the CPSU Central Committee to discuss economic problems. These discussions became particularly intensive after I was approved as chief of the Science and Educational Institutions Department. By this time it was the eve of perestroyka, its embryonic period, so to speak.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Please tell us about your family. We think readers would find this interesting.

[Medvedev] It's a small family. My wife and I live on our own. Our daughter lives separately with her husband and son, but they are in close touch with us. My wife is a colleague, we married after university. She is still working as a political economy lecturer. My daughter and her husband are scientific workers, they are both candidates of sciences. Our grandson Misha is 14 years old.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Do you get along with your children and your grandson?

[Medvedev] You know, I would put it like this: The degree of mutual understanding, probably with regard to both personal and sociopolitical matters, is increasing with the passage of time. Maybe because the children have passed the age of Christ. I have had and continue to have a good relationship with my grandson. We spend my few leisure hours together, on Sundays we go for long ski trips, bike rides, or hikes and we play chess.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Is your grandson going to join the Komsomol?

[Medvedev] I think that question will arise and he will decide it independently, without any pressure.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] You have a big magazine rack right here in your office. What books do you have on your desk at home, to read for pleasure, for instance?

[Medvedev] You know, I greatly value the Russian prose of Viktor Astafyev, Valentin Rasputin, Yevgeniy Nosov, and Fedor Abramov. I knew the latter for a long time. I even remember the time when he maybe did not even engage in literary creativity but was chief of the Soviet literature department at Leningrad University. And when his works appeared I was simply astonished by the freshness of his talent, the rounded characterization of his heroes, and the purity of his language. It is a great pity that he died so early. I greatly revere everything from the pen of Chingiz Aytmatov.

I read Solzhenitsyn rather earlier, so I could form my own opinion. Naturally, I do not share the author's ideological stance, but I regard as unjustified the fact that he was stripped of Soviet citizenship and expelled from the country. If you go by purely artistic merits, in my view, his earlier works "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich" and "Matrena's Day" are better than "The GULAG Archipelago" and "Cancer Ward." But that is a matter of taste.

Of course, I have read some of the books that saw the light in our country only in the last few years—Platonov, Nabokov, Grossman, Pristavkin....

Literature is sometimes oddly interwoven with real life. In a story by Ales Adamovich I encountered an admiring description of the life's exploits of a front-line flier and recognized in the description someone with whom I have long been linked by comradely relations and who is well known and respected in Belorussia. Namely Aleksandr Trifonovich Kuzmin, former secretary of the republic Communist Party Central Committee.

I also like to see new names in literature. At the moment I am reading "Chronicle and Stories" by Vyacheslav Pyetsukh. He is a very modern and distinctive writer who subtly senses the style of life today. But few really major new works are appearing. Isn't this because writers are getting carried away with infighting?

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Do you read KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA? What annoys you about the paper and what maybe pleases you?

[Medvedev] It is an interesting modern paper which works to high professional standards. That is now an established tradition. And, in my view, it is a tradition that is not being lost but, on the contrary, is being augmented. It raises questions trenchantly and has its own view. I think it reflects young people's sentiments quite fully.

But the paper also has its weaknesses. I think that sometimes it drifts with the current and is subject to certain influences. But the newspaper's role in influencing social consciousness sometimes demands that you swim against the current. I think this is what your paper lacks.

One more point. About the coverage of young people's problems. I realize that it is impossible to escape the common questions that perturb the whole country, the whole people. Especially as not only young people read KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. But nevertheless, young people's problems must come first. Especially as nothing can take the place of the assistance of the paper—a good counselor and interlocutor for young people. It is very important.

Komsomol Statutes Published

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[Statutes of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League]

[Text] The All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League is a voluntary, independent social-political organization of Soviet youth built on federative principles.

The VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] operates on the basis of its own statutes and program documents in accordance with the USSR Constitution, Soviet legislation, and international treaties concluded by the USSR.

The principal goal of the VLKSM is to create the conditions for man's free development, to disclose his creative potential and to protect and realize the interests and rights of members of the organization and young people of the country; and to promote the creation of democratic humane socialism, the country's transition to the condition of a genuinely federative law-based democratic state and to accomplish this transition without coercion, by the parliamentary path.

To achieve its program goals the VLKSM seeks to participate in the control of the country's state and public affairs and makes use of the available possibilities and powers for protection and realization of the interests of the youth, members of the VLKSM primarily.

The VLKSM independently determines long-term and current tasks and the directions and forms of work and cooperates with other youth and different organizations.

I. Principles of Intra-League Life of the VLKSM

1. The intra-league life of the VLKSM is based on the following principles:

a) respect for the personal dignity and opinion of each member of the organization;

b) collectiveness in the work of all organizations, collegiality in decision-making and the personal responsibility of VLKSM members for their assigned work;

c) the electivity of all Komsomol [Communist Youth League] authorities top to bottom;

d) the periodic accountability of the Komsomol authorities to their organizations and the organizations' notification of the superior authorities of their activity;

e) freedom of debate and complete glasnost in the work of all Komsomol bodies and organizations;

f) respect for the rights of the majority and minority: The interests of the majority are ensured by its right to speak and act on behalf of the whole organization and the right to dispose of property of the organization; the interests of the minority are ensured by the right to uphold its position, appealing to public opinion, to structure itself organizationally in the elective authorities, to engage in activity not in conflict with the VLKSM Statutes and to determine its own position organizationally, up to and including separation;

g) the binding nature of the decisions of the superior for the lower authorities, if these decisions have been adopted by them within the bounds of their jurisdiction, with which these authorities have been endowed by the lower organizations;

h) the competence of the higher and elective authorities is delineated in the VLKSM. The functions and powers of the elective authorities are determined by a decision of the VLKSM congress and the corresponding congresses of the union republic communist youth leagues and conferences and meetings of Komsomol organizations.

Unity in exercise of the general line and tasks of the VLKSM presupposes the broad independence of these Komsomol organizations in the choice of forms and methods of their realization.

2. The VLKSM Central Committee and Komsomol committees may institute Komsomol awards.

II. The Member of the VLKSM and His Rights and Duties

3. Any young person of the Soviet Union aged 14 to 28 who recognizes the program documents and statutes of the VLKSM and pays his membership dues may be a member of the VLKSM.

Membership in the VLKSM may be realized through membership in organizations which are a part of the VLKSM, in accordance with these organizations' statutes or normative documents.

The age limits for membership in the VLKSM may be extended by the statutes or normative documents of the subjects of the federation.

Members of the VLKSM have a Komsomol card of a uniform design and a badge.

4. The transition of a member of the VLKSM from one organization to another should not infringe his rights determined by the VLKSM Statutes.

5. Admittance to VLKSM membership.

The question of admittance to VLKSM membership is examined and decided in the primary organization. The decision is considered made if more than half the members of the VLKSM present at the meeting vote in favor.

6. A member of the VLKSM has the right:

a) to appeal to the Komsomol organizations and authorities and the Komsomol mass media for assistance in the defense and realization of his interests and rights and to make use of the political, organizational, and material possibilities of the VLKSM;

b) to nominate, elect, and be elected to the Komsomol authorities;

c) to discuss, criticize, submit proposals, and defend his viewpoint on all questions of Komsomol activity;

d) to personally participate in meetings and sessions of Komsomol authorities when the question of his activity or behavior is being discussed;

e) to apply to the Komsomol organization for references and a recommendation;

f) to obtain information at the disposal of the Komsomol authorities and to address questions, applications, and proposals to any Komsomol body, up to and including the VLKSM congress, and to obtain an answer pertaining to the substance of the appeal;

g) to participate in the work of other public and political organizations and movements whose principles and activity are not in conflict with the USSR Constitution and do not impede compliance with the program documents and statutes of the VLKSM;

h) to participate simultaneously in the work both of his primary organization and of any other or switch from one organization to another with the consent of the latter within the framework of the subject of the federation.

7. A member of the VLKSM is obliged:

a) to participate in the accomplishment of assignments determined by the program documents of the VLKSM and to comply with the demands of the VLKSM Statutes;

b) to display concern for the authority of the VLKSM and propagandize its ideas.

8. Termination of VLKSM membership.

Membership of the VLKSM is terminated:

a) by a member of the VLKSM at his own request after he has notified the primary organization of this and handed in his Komsomol card;

b) in connection with attainment of the age limiting membership in the VLKSM if the Komsomol member has not by this time been elected to the Komsomol authorities, is not in Komsomol employ, is not a pioneer guide and has not submitted an application for extended membership in the VLKSM.

9. Expulsion from the VLKSM

The question of expulsion from the VLKSM is decided in the primary organization. The decision is considered made if more than half of the members of the VLKSM present at the meeting vote in favor.

10. The VLKSM expellee has the right within two months to appeal to superior Komsomol authorities, up to and including the VLKSM Central Committee. The appeal is examined within two months as of its receipt.

III. Organizational Composition of the VLKSM

11. The VLKSM is a federation of communist youth leagues uniting young people of a communist and socialist choice. Subjects of the federation are the communist youth leagues of the union republics, the USSR Armed Forces, the USSR KGB Border Forces and the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Forces. The subjects of the federation operate on the basis of ideological unity and a certain organizational independence, a voluntary approach and equality.

12. The primary Komsomol organizations are created at the place of work, service, study, and residence and on the basis of an affinity of socially significant interests of the Komsomol members (by youth category, for the realization of social programs, in political clubs and ecology formations, and so forth).

18. For the coordination of their activity and interaction with state and public organizations and authorities at the regional level the Komsomol organizations unite in rayon, city, okrug, oblast, kray, and republic Komsomol organizations and communist youth leagues of the union republics and, where necessary, in other territorial associations.

The Komsomol organizations may also unite in regional and all-union societies and associations on the basis of an affinity of socially significant interests.

Note: Members of the Komsomol who are overseas unite in Komsomol organizations of Soviet establishments and collectives in the corresponding countries. These organizations are directly a part of the VLKSM and work on the basis of the program documents and statutes of the VLKSM and normative documents of the VLKSM Central Committee.

14. Where necessary, primary Komsomol organizations may become directly a part of their oblast, kray, and republic organizations and of the communist youth leagues of the union republics.

In this case their place in the structure and their status are determined by them and the corresponding higher elective authority.

15. The Komsomol organizations form their own elective bodies—Komsomol committees (presidiums, secretary councils, and so forth)—and, if necessary, control commissions. The elective bodies may create their own staffs, independently determining their structure and lists of personnel.

16. The highest authority of a Komsomol organization is the general assembly and conference, and for a subject of the federation and the VLKSM, the congress. The assembly, conference, and congress are competent if more than one-half of the members of the organization or elected delegates participate in them.

17. The elective body of an organization uniting Komsomol members of a given territory is the superior body in relation to all the elective bodies of the Komsomol organizations which are a part of it.

IV. The Primary Komsomol Organizations

18. The primary organization is the basis of the VLKSM.

The priority of the primary organization in the VLKSM is ensured by its right:

a) to decide all questions of its life and activity other than those whose solution is within the jurisdiction of a superior authority;
b) to independently determine its internal structure and create organizations with the status of primary and Komsomol groups;
c) to independently determine the periodicity of Komsomol assemblies;
d) to have the right of legal entity and to dispose of its financial resources and property;
e) to engage in publishing activity and have its own news organs;
f) to nominate its representatives to the elective bodies, give them instructions, make inquiries, hear accounts, and, if necessary, recall.

19. A decision to create a primary organization is adopted by a constituent assembly of no less than three members of the VLKSM and is registered with the superior Komsomol authority.

20. The general assembly or conference of the primary organization elects a committee (bureau, presidium, and

others) and/or secretary. The committee (bureau, presidium, and others) of the Komsomol (secretary) organizes the current work of the organization. The primary organization may elect a control commission.

21. The decision to disband a primary organization is adopted by a general assembly of the given organization. In the event of the actual termination of its activity or its activity being contrary to the program documents and statutes of the VLKSM, the decision to disband the Komsomol organization is made by the superior body.

V. Subjects of the Federation

22. On the basis of a voluntary approach and equality, the subjects of the federation unite in the VLKSM and participate in the solution of all-Komsomol questions through guaranteed representation in the higher and central elective authorities of the VLKSM. They have full rights, with some of which they voluntarily endow the central elective authorities of the VLKSM, collectively enshrining them in the decisions of the VLKSM congress and the Komsomol Statutes. In accordance with this, they are guided by the program documents and statutes of the VLKSM and decisions of the congress and the VLKSM Central Committee.

23. The subjects of the federation may have their own programs and statutes or normative documents which are not in conflict with the program documents and statutes of the VLKSM and their additional symbols.

All rules of intra-league activity, except for those determined in the VLKSM Statutes, are the province of the subjects of the federation.

24. The subjects of the federation have the right to withdraw from the VLKSM. A decision on withdrawal is made according to the results of a referendum and two-thirds majority vote of all registered Komsomol members.

VI. All-Union Societies and Associations of the VLKSM Based on Affinity of Socially Significant Interests

25. All-union societies and associations of the VLKSM may be formed by youth category and for the realization of social programs and the association of political clubs and ecological formations and also on the basis of an affinity of other socially significant interests of the youth.

All-union societies and associations may have their own programs which are not in conflict with the program documents of the VLKSM and participate in the solution of all-Komsomol questions through their representatives in the elective bodies.

In determination of the rules of intra-league life they are guided by the VLKSM Statutes.

The all-union societies and associations may have their own additional symbols.

VII. The Central VLKSM Authorities

26. The highest body of the VLKSM is the congress. Congresses of the VLKSM are convened once every three years. A decision to convene a congress is adopted by a plenum of the VLKSM Central Committee.

Special congresses are convened on the initiative of a plenum of the VLKSM Central Committee and also in accordance with the demand of no less than one-fourth of the subjects of the federation or in accordance with a decision of Komsomol organizations uniting no less than one-fourth of VLKSM members.

The convening of a congress and the agenda are announced no later than three months prior to the congress. Delegates to the congress are elected with regard for the opinion of the primary organizations by closed (secret) ballot. The representation quotas and the procedure for the election of delegates to the congress are determined by a plenum of the VLKSM Central Committee.

27. The VLKSM congress decides all questions of the life and activity of the Komsomol without exception.

To the exclusive jurisdiction of the VLKSM congress pertain:

a) the adoption of decisions on the reports of the VLKSM Central Committee and VLKSM Central Control Commission;
b) the adoption of the program documents and statutes of the VLKSM;
c) the adoption of the VLKSM Central Control Commission Regulations and the election of the VLKSM Central Control Commission.

The VLKSM congress confirms the authority of the members of the VLKSM Central Committee elected by the Komsomol organizations. The congress elects, by majority vote of the delegates present, the first secretary of the VLKSM Central Committee and the chairman of the VLKSM Central Control Commission.

As demanded by one-fourth of the subjects of the federation, the first secretary of the VLKSM Central Committee and the chairman of the VLKSM Central Control Commission may be elected by the majority vote of delegates from each subject of the federation.

28. In the period between congresses the work of the Komsomol is coordinated by the VLKSM Central Committee within the bounds of the authority determined by the congress.

In addition, the VLKSM Central Committee:

a) where necessary, changes the status of Komsomol organizations which are members of the VLKSM, not infringing the rights of the subjects of the federation, and registers all-union societies and associations of the VLKSM;

b) forms the Central Committee Bureau for organizing the work of the Komsomol between plenums of the VLKSM Central Committee;

c) re-elects the first secretary of the VLKSM Central Committee and confirms the authority of the newly delegated members of the Central Committee;

d) approves the editorial charter and chief editor of the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA;

e) elects secretaries of the Central Committee for the performance of current business and organization of the activity of the VLKSM Central Committee apparatus;

f) approves the structure and lists of staff of the apparatus and the budget of the VLKSM Central Committee and the report on its fulfillment.

Note: The apparatus of the VLKSM Central Committee is formed by the first secretary of the Central Committee and is submitted for approval by the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau.

29. Central Committee plenums are convened by the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau not less than once every six months. The convening of a plenum and the agenda are announced, as a rule, no less than a month prior to the plenum.

A VLKSM Central Committee plenum may be convened at the demand of no less than one-fourth of the members of the VLKSM Central Committee or no fewer than one-fourth of the elective bodies of subjects of the federation.

A VLKSM Central Committee plenum is deemed competent if more than half the elected Central Committee members participate in it.

30. The Central Control Commission monitors compliance with the requirements of the VLKSM Statutes, established procedure of routing and the examination of letters, applications, and complaints in the central Komsomol authorities, and monitors the soundness of the fulfillment of the VLKSM Central Committee budget and also the financial and economic activity of VLKSM Central Committee enterprises and establishments and other questions in accordance with the VLKSM Central Control Commission Regulations.

VIII. All-Union Komsomol Conferences and Referendums

31. In the period between VLKSM congresses an all-union Komsomol conference may be convened by a plenum of the VLKSM Central Committee or on the initiative of no less than one-fourth of the subjects of the federation for the solution of urgent political and intra-league problems of the Komsomol. The procedure for organizing the conference, the representation quota and the delegate election procedure are determined by a plenum of the VLKSM Central Committee.

32. In the period between VLKSM congresses an all-union Komsomol referendum for the solution of most important political and intra-league problems which have arisen in the life and activity of the Komsomol, including those on which the VLKSM congress was unable to adopt a decision, may be conducted in accordance with a decision of a Central Committee plenum or on the initiative of no less than one-fourth of the subjects of the federation.

An all-union Komsomol referendum is deemed valid if more than one-half of the members of the VLKSM has taken part in it. A referendum decision is considered adopted if more than half the Komsomol members who participated in it voted in favor.

IX. The Komsomol and the V.I. Lenin All-Union Pioneer Organization

33. The Komsomol cooperates with the V.I. Lenin All-Union Pioneer Organization in the interests of the social development of the child and renders it material-financial and scientific and methods support and assistance in personnel training.

The pioneer organization is guaranteed its representation in the elective Komsomol bodies. Members of the VLKSM working in the pioneer organization are elected to the elective authorities by the councils of the pioneer organizations in accordance with quotas determined by the corresponding Komsomol committees.

X. Property of the VLKSM

34. The property of the VLKSM includes the monetary resources, buildings, installations, equipment, enterprises created by the Komsomol, and other appurtenances necessary for the accomplishment of program and statutory assignments in the interests of members of the VLKSM.

The primary, rayon, city, okrug, oblast, kray, and republic Komsomol organizations, the subjects of the federation and the VLKSM in the shape of its elective bodies are proprietors in respect of the property of the VLKSM which is formed at their level and are legal entities. The subjects of the federation collectively dispose of VLKSM property formed at VLKSM Central Committee level.

In the event of an organization quitting the VLKSM, the former settles the question of property with its superior elective authority.

Upon the liquidation of a Komsomol organization or one of its elective bodies, the highest body of this organization (congress, conference or general assembly) or the superior authority determines the legal successor to the property, who is a legal entity, and who pursues goals stipulated by the program documents and statutes of the VLKSM.

35. The Komsomol organizations may create enterprises, publishing houses, editorial offices of youth newspapers and journals, establishments and business organizations and engage in foreign economic activity. The procedure of their creation, functioning, liquidation, and reorganization is determined by the VLKSM Central Committee and the elective authorities of the subjects of the federation in accordance with legislation of the USSR and the union republics.

36. The Komsomol's monetary resources are formed from membership dues, resources obtained from Komsomol organization activities, income from tourist-excursion and foreign economic activity, taxes on the profits of publishing houses and publications, enterprises and business organizations created by Komsomol committees or with their participation and other types of activity. Voluntary contributions from citizens, enterprises, and foreign organizations may constitute VLKSM income also.

The budget in the VLKSM is formed from the bottom up.

37. Monthly membership dues are determined in the following amounts:

with a monthly income of: R100 and less the contribution is 0.5 percent;

from R101 to R150, 1 percent; R150 and more, 1.5 percent.

Trainee and student VLKSM members not in receipt of grants pay membership dues only from money they have earned.

Members of the VLKSM without a source of income, as also those on maternity leave or on leave to care for a child, and also those in receipt of benefits from the social insurance fund may be exempted from payment of membership dues in accordance with a decision of the primary organization.

Members of the CPSU on the VLKSM register, other than full-time Komsomol officials, are exempted from the payment of Komsomol membership dues.

The VLKSM headquarters is in Moscow.

Komsomol Plenum Begins Work 4 May

LD0405122290 Moscow TASS in English 1203 GMT 4 May 90

[by TASS correspondents Galina Vinitskaya and Aleksandras Budris]

[Text] Moscow May 4 TASS—The plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Soviet Young Communist League (Komsomol)—a 30-million-strong mass youth organisation—began work in Moscow today.

Its participants met for the first time after the 21st congress of the youth league which ended on April 18 to form the leading bodies—the Secretariat and the Central Committee bureau and to approve a number of resolutions which the youth forum failed to approve because it was pressed for time or because they provoked differences among the delegates.

The youth press is now discussing the results of the past congress. The forum failed to meet expectations of a radical renewal of the organisation which, according to the majority of young people, has lost all trust. One of the reasons for this was undoubtedly the fact that more than half of the congress participants were functionaries, paid secretaries of youth organisations who were least of all interested in radical changes.

A telephone poll of young Muscovites aged between 15-30 and including schoolchildren, students, workers and employees, conducted during the congress confirmed this. Only 14 per cent of people polled called the congress "successful."

The newly-elected YCL leader, Vladimir Zyukin, 36, said in an interview that one congress was not enough to restructure such a complex organisation as the Soviet Young Communist League. His opinion was borne out by the contradictory resolutions approved by the congress. Even the new description of the organisation is contradictory—the communist federation is intended to unite youth associations of "communist and socalist choice."

The YCL leader believes that contradictions of this kind can only be removed by forthcoming forums. He did not rule out the possibility of convening an all-union conference to introduce corrections to the newly-appointed rules and other youth league documents.

Liberal Democratic Party Viewed

90UN1612A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 17, 25 Apr 90 p 11

[Report on interview with Vladimir Bogachev, coordinator of the Liberal Democratic Party Central Committee, conducted by "Studinform" correspondent Oleg Boldyrev; date and place not specified: "Steady Center"]

[Text] Newer and newer parties, associations, and societies are announcing their appearance. It is difficult to say as yet which of them will have a long and illustrious life, and which are fated to die "in the cradle." Today we continue to acquaint our readers with the new public movements.

"The Liberal Democratic Party was the first to be officially recognized following proclamation of a multiparty system at the Third Congress of People's Deputies," said Vladimir Bogachev, coordinator of the Liberal Democratic Party Central Committee. "The party's constituent congress, at which 215 delegates from all republics of the Union assembled, was held on 31 March in the Rusakov Cultural Center. Together with guests and observers, 400-450 persons attended the congress altogether. There was no opposition on the part of the authorities."

[Boldyrev] What was the reason for your so rapid response to the cancellation of Article 6?

[Bogachev] This is explained, I believe, by the flexible political tactics of the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party. We do not conceal the fact that we were waiting for this moment. Not being carried away by mass meetings and clamorous declarations of the "No to the CPSU!" type, we prepared a congress and awaited only a decision on a change in the notorious Article 6. That is, the reasons why our party was the first to be registered amount to a certain political diplomacy and a balanced approach to the current situation.

[Boldyrev] How many members does the Liberal Democratic Party have as of this time?

[Bogachev] Prior to the congress the party had approximately 3,000 members. This figure is now approaching 4,000. People are telephoning and coming from various cities just to join the party.

[Boldyrev] What can you say about your political allies and opponents?

[Bogachev] We do not as of today have any clearly expressed opponents. And I have to say that we will aspire in every possible way to consolidation with various political forces, be they the CPSU, the Democratic Union, or others. We consider our principal ally the Constitutional Democrats, who are the closest to us both in terms of the aims of their struggle and methods of achieving these aims. In addition, contacts are being established with the liberal democratic parties of the FRG and Japan.

[Boldyrev] What does your political compass show?

[Bogachev] Steady center.

Loss of Party 'Dynamism, Drive' Pondered

PM0305114990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by O. Shenin, first secretary of Krasnoyarsk Kray CPSU Committee, under the rubric "The Party and Perestroyka. Leading Up to the 28th CPSU Congress": "Questions for the Center and Ourselves"]

[Text] The news about life in our country, which enters our homes with the click of the television set being switched on and the rustle of newspaper pages being turned, not only offers little comfort, but is actually alarming. Especially recently, with the start of the process of dividing up the living space of our party home, in which capital repairs are under way. When foundations are being moved, it would be better if all the inhabitants were to join in the work rather than take the house away brick by brick.

Despite the fact that the center of Russia is several thousand kilometers away, the seething passions of the public have reached even our kray. First Shushenskoye was agog with the rayon committee's resignation, then Achinsk was swept with rally fever, then the square in front of the concert hall in the kray center was a riot of color as crowds gathered. I constantly wonder why this is happening? At what stage did we lose our dynamism, drive, and ability to see ahead? The prime task of any political party is to integrate ideas, develop theory, and shape domestic and foreign policy. We were able to inspire the people with perestroyka because we were quick to seize the essence of the processes taking place in society and quick to prepare and hold the 27th CPSU Congress.

But now it is one problem after another, very slow progress over enormous obstacles in the political sphere, marking time, and, in some respects, slipping backwards in the economic sphere. At some stage along the line we substituted democracy of action with democracy of words. What we feared has now actually happened: We have talked perestroyka "into the ground."

The loss of dynamism and ability to see ahead, and the ideological differences in party ranks, stem from the crisis in the theoretical sphere. Because time moves fast, this hesitation is being transferred from the ideological sphere into the sphere of practical action, which is certainly not going in the CPSU's favor.

Whereas until recently it would have been possible to somehow justify leaving the party by citing immaturity of ideological positions, mistakes in cadre selection and placement, and poor work with candidate members of the CPSU and blame it at least partly on the legacy of the stagnation period, the refusal by major industrial enterprises' party organizations to transfer membership fees and speeches by communist candidate deputies for republic and local soviets not based on the party platform are a differnt phenomenon altogether. The attacks on the party and its ideological-theoretical foundation—Marxism-Leninism—show that there actually exist groups within the CPSU which are undermining its roots.

I regard the preparation and adoption of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform on the 28th congress as a stage and as recognition of the need to make a breakthrough in theory. That is how it was when V.I. Lenin wrote the book "Materialism and Empiriocriticism," when a whole series of scientists contended that matter had disappeared but Lenin proved that matter had not, in fact, disappeared but that outmoded methods of cognition had exhausted their potential. That is how it is now: Marxism-Leninism is not bankrupt, but what is exhausted is the concept of socialism which formed the original foundation during the revolution and the Civil War, and also the methods of influencing the economy and working in the party and society, which were designed for extreme conditions.

We have a right to ask a lot of questions of the center and of party theoreticians and ideologists about the way theory is failing to keep pace. That is easier than holding ourselves responsible for omissions at grassroots level. The elections to soviets are now behind us. Many party and soviet officials did not become deputies. We could blame these failures on the fact that it is now the fashion to vote against the "apparatchiks" and that various groups and associations are very much working against us. But what are we doing to work "for" us? Have we talked to people about the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform? Have we defended its positions? What new, untraditional forms of ideological work have we used? And do they exist in our arsenal anyway? In the run-up to the elections, many communist candidates certainly did not base their campaigns on the platform. The resulting situation was that communists went into the elections on their own, every man for himself.

The new soviet has begun work. Despite the mistakes of the election campaign, we have managed to establish a considerable communist majority in the soviet. But we can feel that work is going to be very difficult. And not just because difficult times lie ahead in connection with the transition to a plan and market economy. The people in the soviet are all different in terms of their professional level, experience of sociopolitical work, character, and desire to work constructively. One thing is beyond doubt: They are all people who have come through the crucible of struggle and have firm mandates from the electorate. This mass of different personalities must be brought together for the common cause and to fulfill people's one wish: That their lives be made easier and better.

Far from everyone can stand the enormous pressure that is now the party member's lot. In the last two years, more than 3,000 people have left the Krasnoyarsk Kray organization. Our view of this used to be that it is the weaklings and careerists who are taking to their heels. But now we have changed our view of things and are taking a more serious look. We appear to have begun to fight for every individual, but people are still leaving. It is particularly alarming when we break this phenomenon down to establish its social characteristics. Workers are surrendering their membership cards! We are losing intelligent people whom we have been unable to convince, and the party's support in the collectives is melting away with them. As a whole, we need to assess such facts as weak stands taken by party committees in cadre policy. But not only in cadre policy. The party's blurred political reference points are now largely the cause of this outflux of people and declining numbers joining the CPSU.

Meetings, plenums, and conferences are now debating the question of forming a Russian Communist Party. This debate is concerned not so much with whether this party is necessary as with who should be elected as delegates and what its program and status should be.

The formation of a Russian Communist Party will probably help to resolve the problem of the republic's statehood, as well as economic and political problems. But it could also have other consequences. So, in my view, the forthcoming conference of Russian communists must carefully prepare everything necessary for a constituent Russian Communist Party congress. But it would, nevertheless, be more correct to make the final decision after the 28th congress, when the outline of the renewed CPSU will become clear. The Russian republic's communists must remain what they have always been—the party's advanced detachment that is organizationally and ideologically cohesive—at this highly crucial point in the country's life.

However, while the majority of party members are busy with the difficult job of creation, some have begun to knock together other parties and unions. For example, an organizational group of the Russian Social Democratic Party has appeared in Krasnoyarsk. Paradoxical it may be, but it is a fact that a CPSU member heads this group. Life strongly demands that the party's ranks be cleansed and that this be followed by reregistration and exchange of membership cards. There must be no people with double standards among congress and conference delegates.

With the beginning of cooperative-entrepreneurial activity, a new ideology has started emerging from backstage and moving into the foreground. New heroes have appeared who certainly could not be described as disinterested or selfless. They are the bearers of a new morality, which they propagandize through video salons and mass media known as the "informal press." The powerful critical force of the first years of perestroyka, coupled with the growing ideology of slick operators in our society, has led to a situation where young people and school children have begun to feel embarrassed talking about their fathers and grandfathers who have given the country their all but have only one decent suit in their old age. In this boundless destruction we have reached the furthest point, the last bastion: Leaders of the Interregional Group have raised their hand against Lenin. We must stop, look around, and realize that if we continue in this way, not looking where we are going, we must admit that the lives of several generations have served no real purpose.

The newspapers have already brought us the news that a liberal democratic party and Marxist-Leninist party—a party of the dictatorship of the proletariat—have been formed. Everyone is consolidating their forces. But what about communists loyal to the CPSU Central Committee Platform? It is time they did the same!

More Regulation of Cooperatives Proposed

904A0298A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Interview with Yu. Khachaturov, deputy division chief of the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers for Economic Reform, by V. Romanyuk; date and place not given: "Cooperation, Commerce, and New Amendments to the Law"]

[Text] **On Friday, 6 April, the USSR Council of Ministers submitted for consideration in the USSR Supreme Soviet a draft law on changes and additions to the law "On Cooperation in the USSR."**

Are these more restrictions on the activity of cooperatives which have recently lost ground to the departments anyway? I asked this question of the deputy division chief of the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers for Economic Reform, Yu. Khachaturov.

One must keep in mind, Yuriy Nikolayevich said, that the Law on Cooperation was adopted at a time when we still had a solid practice in this sphere. It was intended for the "detachment of civilized cooperators," people with high moral qualities. But practice and the conditions of the severe deficit made their adjustments. The more so since many legislative norms simply did not work or were interpreted arbitrarily and now insistently demand clarification. Moreover, the cooperative movement was eaten away by departmental norm setting. The cooperators themselves counted about 300 departmental acts that "regulated" their activity or, more precisely, subordinated it to the interests of the departments. To be frank, the USSR Ministry of Finance was more successful than others at this. It is now engaged in taking down the barriers which it erected on the path to the cooperative movement.

[Romanyuk] Workers of state enterprises and cooperatives are unanimously demanding equal rights. State enterprises are achieving the freedom in the disposal of their income which is enjoyed by the cooperators, and cooperators are receiving guarantees of resource provision on a par with state enterprises. What has happened as a result?

[Khachaturov] On the surface it looks as if there is stronger control over economic and especially financial activity. And in this respect the conditions for the activity of the cooperatives have undoubtedly come closer to those of the state enterprises. On the other hand, they are protected from the dictatorship of the departments and more reliably defended by the law.

[Romanyuk] How, specifically?

[Khachaturov] In the first place, in the organizational sphere The government has received many suggestions regarding this and has rejected many since they were obviously administrative in nature and recalled the strict decisions for curtailing the cooperative sector of the economy such as were adopted in Moscow, Krasnodar Kray, Rostov Oblast, Kirghizia, and the Ukraine. Now a more democratic and at the same time more demanding policy is being introduced for the creation of cooperatives. The role of the ispolkom [executive committee] of the local soviet is no longer reduced to formal registration of the charter—the local soviet will determine the priorities in the development of specific kinds of productions. It will be mandatory to have state registration of cooperatives with the issuance of licenses for the right to engage in particular kinds of activity. It is being suggested that we introduce registration of unions and associations of cooperatives, which will make it possible to create a legal basis for their recognition by all state, economic, and other organs.

In the second place, the financial activity of the cooperatives is being put into order. The purposes of this are to introduce a clear-cut policy in accounts with suppliers and purchasers, to limit the possibilities of the cooperatives to manipulate noncash and cash funds, and to eliminate unjustified differences in the rights of cooperatives and state enterprises in the utilization of cash money. Many difficulties and abuses have arisen because of the fact that the cooperatives have had several bank accounts each. Now each of them will have the right to open one account in the banking institution in the place where they are registered. And another thing: Certain cooperatives have received from the banks considerable sums of cash which is in no way needed for their current expenditures. These cases blemished the reputations of all other cooperatives. Now, in coordination with the banking institution—taking into account the specific features of the activity of the cooperative—we shall determine the maximum amount of cash money that is always available to the cooperative for current expenses.

Third, bank control over the activity of the cooperatives is becoming stronger. The pro forma approach to control has done no good for cooperation since it did not make it possible to promptly prevent many legal violations which discredit this form of management. In the proposed additions we are introducing control by banking institutions of the observance of credit, accounting, and cash discipline. In the event the cooperative fails to meet commitments under the credit agreement, the bank can demand the entire sum issued without appeal, which was extremely difficult before. It also reinforces the possibility of inspections of the cooperatives by financial organs (tax inspections), banking institutions, and other state organs.

[Romanyuk] I think there will be cooperators who will see this as an attempt to interfere in their commercial activity. Indeed, is this not too much regulation?

[Khachaturov] I agree with you that increasing control should not encroach on the independence of the cooperatives. But when engaged in economic activity one cannot be free of accounting and control.

[Romanyuk] We have heard about merciless exploitation of workers in cooperatives and the lack of equality between members of cooperatives and hired workers.

[Khachaturov] I too have heard of cases where for three cooperative members there are up to 200 "hired workers," and the ratio of their incomes differed accordingly. Now the situation is changing. As before, it is permitted to hold second jobs, but if the worker transfers to the cooperative completely, leaving the state sector, he will have to be accepted as a member with equal rights and not kept on as a "hired worker" without rights. And according to the labor contract pensioners, disabled persons, housewives, students, and people in training may participate in the activity of the cooperative.

[Romanyuk] I cannot get rid of the feeling that the proposed changes will make the Law on Cooperation stricter.

[Khachaturov] But there is a need for this! Taking advantage of the "liberal" wording in the existing law, many cooperatives establish in their regulations purely symbolic responsibility for the debts of the cooperative. As a result many organizations and people, who are not in a position to recover even minimal sums for damages, have been deceived. I know of a case in which an ispolkom chairman who registered a "reliable" cooperative ended up in this unenviable position. Now it is being established that when the cooperative does not have sufficient funds its members are responsible under the policy, in the amount, and under the conditions envisioned by its charter. (The limits of the responsibility of a cooperative member cannot be less that the share he invested and the annual income he receives.)

[Romanyuk] Well, let us not anticipate the course of the discussion in the Supreme Soviet, although you will agree that strict regulations and prescriptions about how to conduct oneself in one situation or another too frequently are reduced to "subdue them!" I had occasion to observe something similar recently at a meeting of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers when they were considering the foreign economic activity of the cooperatives. And now come corrections that sound very much like attempts to "restrain" the "free spirits" of the cooperatives...

[Khachaturov] I must note that the proposed changes and additions to the law have been knocking on the door for a long time. Some of them come from the cooperators themselves. I am convinced that the more order we introduce, the more effective the economy of the cooperative sector as a whole will become.

Trade Unions Say R97 Minimum Survival Income

LD2704110790 Moscow TASS in English 1016 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 27 TASS—By TASS correspondent Vladimir Yegorov:

The forthcoming transition to a market economy in the Soviet Union has prompted Soviet trade unions to offer their version of the minimum consumer budget. The budget is designed to ensure social protection of the low-income groups, who are hardest hit by any retail price hike.

Trade union specialists did not agree with the official version advanced by the State Committee for Statistics, it places the country's survival minimum at 78 roubles per person per month. This, clearly, is a general indicator, on the basis of which specific sums are calculated for individual regions and groups of the population. This indicator provides ground for the judgement concerning the basic level, the zero point for calculations.

The trade union variant insists on a minimum of 97 to 99 roubles for the beginning of 1990. Even so, nearly 80 million people (27 per cent of the country's population) are below the poverty line. Any further worsening of the situation can plunge them into utter misery.

Trade union specialists have calculated the cost of the consumer basket which comprises foodstuffs, consumer goods and services needed for normal life using the normative statistical method known throughout the world. The trade union basket is filled with 229 various goods and services.

The USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] Committee also use a combined method in its calculations and this calls for additional research to establish whose variant is more accurate. Anyway, trade union specialists, unlike state statistic committee staffers, took into account the fact that with universal shortages being what they are, it is impossible to do without purchasing some goods at the more costly collective farm market. The inflationary process and actual spending on tobacco and alcohol were also taken into consideration.

No matter which variant is accepted, the crux of the matter, trade union specialists believe, is that all calculations must be made openely, without any "secrets".

"Under any circumstances we shall insist, national Trade Union Council Chairman Gennadiy Yanayev told journalists, "that the government take no measures to introduce market relations without consulting the trade unions first, making them clear to the people and holding counsel with them".

"We deem it necessary to establish this year respective compensatory measures for low-income population groups, including pensioners, war and labour veterans, new families and families with many children and students. They should be corrected in the future, depending on the level of prices on the consumer market."

Congress of USSR Independent Workers Associations

LD0205214590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 2 May 90

[Text] Despite the holidays, a congress of USSR independent workers associations was held in Novokuznetsk.

A confederation of labor was set up. The delegates, representing 50 workers' movements, unions of working people, free trade unions and political clubs participated in working out a charter for the organization. A declaration reflecting the basic principles of the organization was adopted at the congress. These are firm guarantees of democratic freedoms, free labor without bureaucratic fetters and a fair distribution of earnings.

New 'Progressive' Fund Proposed

PM0105142390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

["Letter to IZVESTIYA" from Academician S. Shatalin, Metropolitan Pitirim of Volokolamsk and Yuryev, USSR People's Artiste M. Ulyanov, and Hero of Socialist Labor B. Fomin, general director of the "Elektrosila" Production Association: "Let Us Create a 'Reform' Fund"]

[Text] Dear fellow citizens!

Our country has embarked on a path of historic reforms.

However, perestroyka is proceeding with difficulty. A crisis has come about, and everyone is seeking the way out of it. It is clear now that only the labor, initiative, enterprise, energy, and concord of all our motherland's citizens can overcome this crisis and extricate us from the labyrinth of economic failures and political and national discord onto the road leading to our country's transformation into an economically developed, civilized, and democratic society.

Perestroyka was begun "from above." The established structures and our customary methods and means have proved inadequate for attaining the set goals. The political, economic, and interethnic cracks that have appeared in the body of our society cannot be eliminated solely by efforts "from above."

We need social forces with authority inside the country and abroad, which can rely on the trust and support of public organizations, associations, enterprises, employers, individual citizens, and the entire people. We need forces and new structures which can support and unite all initiatives "from below," direct them into a single channel of creative processes, and not set the interests of the state, regions, enterprises, and citizens against each other but contribute to their consolidation and to the economic, cultural, and spiritual revival of our great, multinational motherland.

We need new ideas and economic and social projects to ensure confident progress toward the people's well-being and spiritual health. We see the creation of a social organization as a real means of ensuring support, including material support, for the economic and social reforms that have been begun. We propose to name it the Economic and Social Reforms Fund—conventionally, the "Reform" fund. We already have unions of enterprises, associations, consortiums, and unions of cooperative members, lessees, and peasants. The new organization will be able to unite the interests of all people involved in any forms and structures with a business and a social thrust. This organization will hopefully be able to advance the economic reform both at the center and locally.

We urge all citizens in our country, wherever they live and whatever spiritual or material opportunities they possess, to pool their wishes, their talents, their enterprise, their will, and their actions to participate in the activity of the "Reform" fund.

To take a broad view, this organization must be able to give substantial material and other support to organizations and citizens in formulating and implementing progressive ideas and projects, as well as to the most promising scientific and applied developments which might ensure a breakthrough in the development of society's economic and social life.

The fund must assist the broad development of enterprise, the efficient working of enterprises under market conditions, the processes of denationalization, and the formation of new organizational and economic forms of management.

The fund must promote the development of new economic and social relations in the countryside and assist the speediest resolution of the food problem and the creation of an adequate number of ecologically pure products. The fund must choose as one of its priority areas questions of ecology, the revival of our beautiful nature, and the creation of harmonious and healthy living conditions for all Soviet people.

The fund must promote the creation of favorable socioeconomic conditions for the fuller use of specialists and their creative potential in our country, finance charitable cultural, educational, and scientific research programs aimed at the consolidation and the spiritual and cultural development of society, and give all possible assistance to progressive forms of training.

The fund must help to revive local economic ties and to develop regional ones and contribute to the practical realization of projects for the creation of a modern, regional, social, and production infrastructure.

The fund will be able to play a big role in arranging efficient and mutually advantageous international ties between foreign and our own associations of industrial firms and enterprises, unions of employers, and public organizations.

It can actively promote exchanges of specialists and the instruction and practical training of specialists and students in developed countries. This is currently one of the biggest bottlenecks in the reform's successful progress.

The Economic and Social Reforms Fund will not be restricted to business people alone. A scientific and economic leader, a cultural figure and a minister of religion, a collective farm chairman, a businessman from abroad, and our entrepreneur will be able to participate in its activity on equal terms. Without this the economic reform will get bogged down.

The "Reform" fund and its local organizations can become strong information centers on questions of economic and social development and champions of progressive ideas and initiatives, regardless of who advances them.

We propose to establish the Economic and Social Reforms Fund in the very near future, and we hope that our fund will be given sincere assistance and support both in our country and throughout the world. We are ready to accept it gratefully, in whatever forms it is expressed.

Draft State Ecological Plan Outlined

LD0305103490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0330 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] The theme of ecology is of concern to everyone, without exception: rivermen, metallurgists, and journalists. For we all are inhabitants of earth, and every year it becomes more difficult to breathe because of the abundance of industrial giants that dirty the atmosphere with harmful emissions. Criminal negligence of nature has led to the need for the expenditure of many billions and for a statewide program to preserve the environment in which people live. The draft of such a document was examined at the latest session of the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium. Finishing touches will be put to it for a month, and then it will be passed on for nationwide discussion. What about this document? The details are given in an interview with the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers' State Commission for Emergency Situations. Our correspondent Valeriy Kiosa, met Aleksandr Pavlovich Tsygankov. Here is part of the conversation.

[Begin recording] [Tsygankov] In essence, the program is divided into two stages. The first stage is in the 13th 5-Year Plan, in which it is intended, and really desired, to avoid further deterioriation of the state of the environment in the areas and towns where the least favorable ecological situation has formed already, and to create in this period, the first stage, the necessary production base—some work in advance, so to speak—so that in the second stage, by the year 2000, the content of harmful components both in the atmosphere and at water sites will be brought to a tolerable level, so as to embark on improving the ecological situation in our country by the year 2005.

[Kiosa] The implementation of all the measures included in the program probably will require large funds. Where are they to come from?

[Tsygankov] The capital investment needed for implementation is reckoned at something of the order of R150 billion. In particular, it is intended to allocate R41 billion to science. Naturally, it is simply not very credible to speak of allocating this in a centralized way, from some common pocket of ours. Here we will need to rework in the future the whole economic mechanism for implementation of the program. It has to be remembered that every enterprise bears full responsibility for carrying out measures to avoid pollution of the natural environment.

[Kiosa] We have had many and various programs in the economy, but regrettably, not all of them have been fulfilled. Tell us, please, in your opinion, where is the guarantee that this program, which has importance first and foremost for people's lives, will be fulfilled?

[Tsygankov] Very well, a long-term state program of a union nature has to be based on the totality of all kinds of local programs that will set as their aim precisely those goals that are close and understandable for every person living in this or that town, rayon, oblast, or republic. [end recording]

Bureau Orders Replacement of Medical Supplies

PM2704122190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "USSR Council of Ministers Bureau Sitting"]

[Text] A routine sitting of the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for the Chemical and Timber Complex discussed the question of steps to increase production of medicines and provide the population and medical establishments with more of them.

The participants gave a detailed analysis of the progress made in fulfilling the USSR Council of Ministers resolution on this problem.

The country's medicine shortage has been caused not only by the closure of existing capacities but also by the refusal of local organs and a number of public movements to accept the siting of new plants producing such preparations as anticancer, cardiovascular, and psychotropic drugs and vitamins. Over the last two years construction of 21 medical industry enterprises has not been started or has been suspended for these reasons.

The bureau instructed the USSR Ministry of the Medical Industry, along with other ministries and organizations in the chemical and timber complex, the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee], the USSR Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply], and the councils of ministers in the union republics to elaborate and ratify measures to eliminate the lag in the creation of new capacities producing medical output, along with the raw materials and semimanufactures necessary for its manufacture.

Veterans Urge Reinstatement of Rights Activist

PM0205151290 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 17, 6-13 May 90 p 2

[Untitled report under the rubric "Moscow Diary"]

[Text] The Union of Democratic Afghan War Veterans named after Andrey Sakharov has called on people's deputies of the USSR to have the well-known human rights activist Petr Grigorenko reinstated as general and a memorial plaque paid for by donations from Union members to be put up on the Frunze Military Academy, where he was a professor. An honorary Petr Grigorenko Medal has been instituted and a fund named after him has been set up to help Soviet Army soldiers (or their families) persecuted for their democratic views. The call has also been signed by people's deputies of the USSR B. Yeltsin, Yu. Afanasyev, A. Obolenskiy, V. Tikhonov, Ye. Gayer, A. Murashev, I. Bisher, M. Bocharov, people's Deputies of the RSFSR G. Yakunin, A. Tikhomirov, V. Urazhtsev, authors A. Bitov, Ye. Popov, V. Lakshin, M Zwanetskiy.

MOSCOW NEWS Discontinues Press Digests

PM0205151490 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 17, 6-13 May 90 p 2

[Editorial announcement under the rubric "Dear Soviet Readers"]

[Text] Dear Soviet Readers,

Moscow News regrets that it can no longer publish English lessons and digests of the U.S. and UK press, due to purely technical reasons. Moscow News issued, until recently, two English editions—of foreign and domestic readers. The latter differed in that it contained English lessons and foreign press digests. The paper was prepared and printed at the Pravda printing plant. Today, the Pravda printing plant only prints Moscow News from page plates prepared at the APN printing plant which has limited facilities which allow us to publish only one variant.

The Moscow News registration double number is 50076, 50077.

Editors

'Controversial' SIBIRSKAYA GAZETA Under Threat

PM0205151090 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 17, 6-13 May 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Novosibirsk: How Not To Close a Paper"]

[Text] "After our break, comrades, we'll be closing the paper Sibirskaya Gazeta," Vitaliy Mukha, First Secretary of the Novosibirsk Regional CPSU Committee, told the plenary meeting. The first item on the agenda was the discussion of the Open Letter of the CPSU Central Committee to the Communists of the country. Unfortunately, both the tone and the content of the document were accepted at face value in many Party organizations.—split with those who criticize you.

Sibirskaya Gazeta, a publication of several Siberian cities in association with APN, is not to the liking of the Regional Party Committee. So, what was it in the new publication that attracted so many subscribers in 12 Regions, 4 Territories and 3 Autonomous Republics? Apparently, the fact that Sibirskaya Gazeta followed its programme—truthfully reporting problems and developments in the socio-economic, political and spiritual life of the region. The Party leaders accused it of excessive criticism and of supporting advocates of radical democratization of society and the Party. At the plenary meeting it was accused of populism, nihilism, and vulgar commericalism. The interviews with Boris Yeltsin, Tatanya Zaslavskaya and Vyacheslav Shostakovskiy, Rector of the Moscow Higher School and an author of the Democratic Platform, were mentioned. But some defended the paper. Ivan Indinok, President of the Association of Siberian Cities and Mayor of Novosibirsk, Valentin Koptyug, Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and others, said that the paper was feisty, interesting, and necessary to perestroyka, though sometimes to controversial. In any case the Regional Committee should not decide its fate, since it is a non-Party paper.

As a result, Sibirskaya Gazeta will not disappear from newsstands. But the threat of the Novosibirsk Regional Party Committee remains—in case of further "destructive" publications, Sovetskaya Sibir Publishers (property of the Regional CPSU Committee) will stop printing the peppy newspaper.

Economic

Abalkin Views Economic Changes

LD0305125790 Moscow World Service in English 0710 GMT 2 May 90

[Text] [Presenter] In one of his latest statements Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin, a leading economist and member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, said that the Soviet Union could no longer equilibrate [as heard] on two incompatible structures: the ruins of the outdated system of management, which is usually referred to as management by decree, and components of a controlled market. The government has made its choice in favour of that market, Dr. Abalkin said, and that transition must be now speeded up:

[Begin recording] [Abalkin—in Russian, with superimposed English translation] The country's leadership made that choice unambiguously at the end of last year. However, the deadlines set then were rather loose and smooth progress was going to be made. It was going to be given a boost no earlier than in 1993. However, life has tightened the schedule. [end recording]

[Presenter] Deputy Prime Minister Abalkin further said that a market will take a long time to establish and there has to be a number of transitional phases, but that a start must be made now:

[Begin Albalkin recording] The government is currently preparing a package of proposals to be presented to parliament. The best experts, managers and central economic agencies are involved in that work. The likely effects of transition to a market economy are being evaluated in order to switch on a system of social security in time. The government suggests the maximum easy conditions of the transition and measures to prevent the decline in the standard of living, in particular that of the low-income families, families with many children and people with fixed incomes. [end recording]

[Presenter] True, there is a certain resistance to the idea of a market economy in the country. It is felt on the part of certain groups of workers and apparatus of management. However, Deputy Prime Minister Abalkin believes that without a market economy the country has no future as highly industrialized power. He says:

[Begin Albalkin recording] If we fail to embark on that road and shift to new methods of economic relations we shall deprive ourselves and our children of the opportunity to live in a country of a highly effective economy, a country pleasant to live, a country one can be proud of. We have no other way. Everybody must become aware of this, no matter whether some may like this or not. Some losses will have to be sustained, that is inevitable. However, experience has shown that this is the sole way out of an economic crisis. [end recording]

[Presenter] Leonid Abalkin also believes that an early transition to a market will have not only great economic but political significance.

[Begin Abalkin recording] Transition to a market will create an economic basis for the integrity of the Soviet Union as a federation. Only economic methods, only mutually beneficial cooperation, can preserve a large federation intact. [end recording]

[Presenter] What are the goals the government seeks to achieve by abandoning management by decree in favour of controlled market relations? Deputy Prime Minister Abalkin:

[Begin Abalkin recording] Our goal is a highly developed and effective economy. We seek an economy that would readily accept scientific and technological achievements, an economy geared to meeting the needs of the consumer, and an economy of sound competition of different types of property and management. That economy would pave the road for enterprise, initiative and creative endeavour. We have already been able to learn from our own and world experience that such an economy is impossible without transition to a market. [end recording]

[Presenter] That was an interview with Leonid Abalkin, a leading economist who holds the post of a USSR deputy prime minister.

Gorbachev on Trade During Sverdlovsk Visit

904D0114A Moscow SOVETSKAYA TORGOVLYA in Russian 28 Apr 90 p 1

[Correspondent I. Dubrovkin report on Gorbachev visit to Sverdlovsk: "M.S. Gorbachev: 'Free Trade Without the Creation of a Dependable Commodity Production Base Will Not Solve Current Problems'"]

[Text] Sverdlovsk, 26 April (by telephone)—Morning. Day two of the visit of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to Urals territory began with his familiarization with the "Komsomolskiy" youth housing complex—one of the biggest in the country. But the president's motorcade made its first stop in the square in front of the "Kirovskiy" Supermarket. The choice of the leader of the country was not fortuitous: Trade is the mirror of the economy, and the stores, the focal point of today's social and political problems. Something else was noteworthy also: The store's board of directors and the city and oblast commerce leaders had resolved to depart from the invidious tradition of meeting high-ranking guests with sham abundance and feigned prosperity. On the supermarket shelves this day was the usual assortment. And the innovations, of which, incidentally, a sizable number have been assembled in the two years of the "Kirovskiy's" work, had been prepared exclusively for the customers. These included both new machinery for the manufacture of bakery products located directly in the sales area and an open stall for bread sales (the new decision makes it possible not only to make rational use of floor space but also to make shopping as convenient and pleasant as possible).

A quarter of ten. M.S. Gorbachev enters the "Kirovskiy" Supermarket. The first questions are, as always, to the customers. And the first answers, about problems of the shortage of food products and the lack of farm produce and early vegetables and worries connected with the increase in prices. Everyone is awaiting the changes in the country's economy hopefully, but anxiously. Both the ordinary customer and the people working in the sector need to be prepared for them. People visiting the "Kirovskiy" Supermarket and its director, I.I. Kovpak, participated in the dialogue with M.S. Gorbachev.

M.S. Gorbachev: Tell me straight out what the store has and what it does not have.

I.I. Kovpak: It has goods in daily demand—wrapped and packaged, of maximum convenience for sale and purchase.

M.S. Gorbachev: How much do you take in in a day?

I.I. Kovpak: R150,000 a day.

M.S. Gorbachev: A good store. And how about dairy and meat products? How well supplied are you with butter?

I.I. Kovpak: There are interruptions as concerns milk, although we bring it in four or five times daily. We receive up to two tons of butter a day. Meat products, up to eight tons, although there is a shortage of these supplies by evening, of course.

M.S. Gorbachev: Tell me, why are there so many complaints about fruit and vegetable products? About apples particularly. Is there a base enterprise in Sverdlovsk which supplies you with these products?

I.I. Kovpak: The "Sverdlovskiy" Agro-Industrial Works was formed in Sverdlovsk 18 months ago. But this enterprise is still building repositories and depots. We will have to wait a little, I believe, for the agro-industrial works to increase capacity.

SOVETSKAYA TORGOVLYA correspondent: Mikhail Sergeyevich, what do you think of the idea of free trade and do you see this as a way to saturate and stabilize the market with commodities and the abandonment of distribution in favor of free enterprise?

M.S. Gorbachev: I believe that no free trade without the creation of a dependable commodity production base will solve current problems. Although I have to say that trade should be reorganized more actively. And instances of products or commodities being held up somewhere and not reaching the customer must be completely excluded. This, in turn, will increase the involvement of the people working in trade themselves.

...The meeting between the country's president and residents of the neighborhood and visitors to the "Kirovskiy" Supermarket lasted about 90 minutes. And an hour later your correspondent's question to the country's president was developed comprehensively and in detail at a meeting of P.I. Kurenkov, minister of trade of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], with the staff of the oblast trade administration, at which a package of proposals and measures concerning the sector's transition to the tracks of a planned-market economy was discussed.

All-Union Economics Seminar Opens in Moscow

LD0305205390 Moscow TASS in English 1921 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 3 TASS—"Radical Economic Reform: Some Results and Prospects" is the topic of an all-union seminar of top executives of enterprises, organisations and offices, which opened here today.

It will discuss burning problems of the present economic development, including operation of enterprises in the conditions of the law on the Soviet enterprise, place and role of central planning in the regulated market economy, the present state of the Soviet economy and how to pull out of the crisis.

Reports will be delivered by Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin, Lawmaker Gavriil Popov, Academician Abel Aganbegyan and other prominent Soviet economists.

Seminar sponsors will organise roundtable discussions where participants will ask questions on restructuring organisational structures of management, the fundamentals of economic management, and the improvement of credit and settlements relations between banks and enterprises in the conditions of self-financing.

Finance Minister Valentin Pavlov will describe the reorganisation of the financial mechanism. A separate report will be delivered on the organisation of foreign economic operations at enterprises.

The seminar will last until May 8. It was sponsored by the USSR State Committee on Labour and Social Affairs and the All-Union Cost-Accounting Centre on Economic Education.

AUCCTU Urges Stability in Economic Reform

904F0141A Moscow TRUD in Russian 24 Apr 90 p 1

[AUCCTU Presidum appeal: "Market Relationships—With the Consent of the People"]

[Text] As instructed by the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] Eighth Plenum, the AUCCTU Presidium has addressed the following statement to the USSR Council of Ministers.

The participants in the AUCCTU Eighth Plenum expressed profound concern in connection with the intention of the USSR Government to accelerate the transition of the economy to market relationships. It is essentially a question of the biggest change in our country's socioeconomic system since October.

While recognizing the need for a radicalization of the economic reform, the AUCCTU at the same time believes that a transition to market relationships, particularly at the initial stage, will have serious negative consequences for society. The current monopolism of the manufacturers and the shortages on the consumer market will lead to an uncontrolled price "explosion," an intensification of inflationary processes, and mass unemployment and, in consequence, a decline in the living standard of an absolute majority of the population. Haste in the universal introduction of market relationships without an effective and dependable mechanism for the social protection of the working people could plunge a vast country which is unprepared for this into an abyss of dangerous economic and social upheavals.

It is for this reason that the AUCCTU believes that the transition to a controlled market is permissible only in the event of Soviet people's social protection being ensured to the maximum extent.

The AUCCTU states that under no circumstances can the most important social conquest of our society—the constitutionally guaranteed right to labor—be waived. The state must ensure full employment of the population and bear the responsibility for this. Everyone who wishes to work must be found work.

The AUCCTU believes that it is essential to create a system of social support for the population. The mandatory assurance of a subsistence minimum and regular compensation for price rises for all citizens, depending on income level, should be made the basis of it. As a first step, the governent should even this year establish the pertinent compensators for needy groups of the population, pensioners, war and labor veterans, large families, and students.

All this prior to the introduction of a controlled market will require the enactment of corresponding laws providing for a dependable, fault-free mechanism of social protection of the population. The AUCCTU has elaborated draft laws on the population's employment and income indexation with regard to a change in the price of consumer goods and services, and is submitting them to the USSR Council of Ministers for examination. Simultaneously the AUCCTU is proposing to the USSR Government the annual conclusion of agreements on the most important socioeconomic problems.

But even such measures cannot, of course, fully assuage the social tension and negative consequences of the scheduled radical changes. This is why the AUCCTU declares that such a change can and should be effected only on the basis of nationwide consent, a mandate of the people's trust having been obtained on the entire set of questions of acceleration of the economy's transition to market relationships.

[Signed] per instruction of the AUCCTU Eighth Plenum,
AUCCTU Presidium.

Scientific

'Kristall' Module Launch Set for 1 June

LD0405082590 Moscow TASS in English 0711 GMT 4 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 4 TASS—June 1 has been named as the deadline for the eventual launch, after a number of postponements, of the Kristall technolgical module, tass was told by Aleksandr Aleksandrov, chief of the Civil Cosmonauts Service.

Aleksandrov, who has been on space missions twice himself, recalled that it had first been decided to launch the module, which will work as part of the Mir complex, on April 18. The start was postponed, with the module sitting at the Baykonur space centre, because problems arose relating to its reception by Mir station.

Soviet cosmonauts Anatoloy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin, who have been working on board the orbital complex for nearly three months now, are looking forward to the arrival of the new module—a microfactory for producing crystals in weightlessness, which would considerably expand research prospects in the field of space technologies.

According to Aleksandrov, the two cosmonauts are now busy putting into service as new powerful on-board computer. It has been decided tht the cosmonauts should first receive another ferry-craft and then continue testing the computer. The Kristall module will be launched after that.

The present crew will have enough time to carry out some technological experiments before the term of their mission expires and another crew arrives to take over.

Mir Crew To Carry Out Research 3 May

LD0305093190 Moscow TASS in English 0921 GMT 3 May 90

[by TASS special correspondent]

[Text] Moscow May 3 TASS—The crew of the Soviet space station Mir will carry out astro-physical, geophysical and medico-biological research today.

Cosmonauts will also replace Mir's ventilators.

They will conduct a new series of experiments with the maria magnetic spectometer to study the generation of highly-charged elementary particles and their distribution in near earth space.

Under the program of geo-physical experiments, they will continue to study the earth's ionosphere and magnetosphere.

On Wednesday, the cosmonauts completed the growth of a high- quality monocrystal of gallium arsenide. On the same day, they began experiments with another semiconductor—zinc oxide.

Work aboard Mir is proceeding in accordance with the schedule. Cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovyov and Aleksandr Balandin are feeling well.

Flaws in National Space Policy Criticized

907Q0068A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by V. Postyshev, candidate of legal sciences and member of the International Institute of Space Law: "Hostages to Achievements. Why There Is no Unified Concept in the Country for Space Research"]

[Text] It is not by chance that during the years of perestroyka cosmonautics has been subjected to sharp criticism. Grandiose space projects combine poorly with the general shortage of top priority essential goods, and the definite prosperity of Zvezdnyy Gorodok with the lack of elementary order in production, transport, public health, education, services, and so forth.

Even more serious arguments are put forward. Academician R. Sagdeyev, for example, writes that we have not found an optimal relationship between manned and unmanned space research. In his only monograph "The Soviet Space program" the American expert R. Hamble notes the mismatch between basic and applied space research in the USSR. Lenin Prize laureate V. Istomin reveals defects within space science itself, in particular voluntarism in the selection of its priority directions. Cosmonaut B. Yegorov suggests that it is not possible to gain any quick return from industry in space in the near future. "Space research has maintained its monopoly of secrecy, nepotism, and political intrigue," is what Academician V. Mishin thinks.

So what is happening in space research in the USSR? Why have we so many times been the hostages of our own achievements?

The first thing that becomes obvious even from a superficial look at the state of affairs is the catastrophic imbalance of social interests focused in space research.

Thus, according to UN figures more than 75 percent of the USSR space budget is military. Could it be, perhaps, that this is why we have not very often encountered space research "products" in everyday life?

Almost 20 years ago the idea was put forward of trading services for launches of space vehicles in order to obtain a hard currency return. It was turned down on the pretext of keeping state secrets. In 1985 the Soviet Union nevertheless did go into the international space market with an entire series of launch vehicles. But time had been lost, and with it the favorable market situation. In the early seventies we would have been able to secure a monopoly in this direction. Now the United States, France, China, and India all have their own highly economical launch vehicles. It is difficult to compete with them.

The question of developing the INTELSAT global commercial satellite communications system had been raised even earlier. The USSR went on to set up an alternative organization. The end result was that INTELSAT was joined by more than 120 countries, and INTERSPUTNIK by 14. The American Comsat company, which plays a key role in INTELSAT, is obtaining considerable income, but we hear no reports about the activity of INTERSPUTNIK. Here, economic interest fell victim to foreign policy interests, which now of course have been fundamentally revised.

From the mid-seventies the USSR has been actively cooperating with the CEMA countries in the field of studying earth from space. Corresponding work is being done under the aegis of the State Committee for Science and Technology and is of a primarily scientific nature. The growing trend toward commercialization of this kind of applied space research has remained out of the line of vision. As a result, last year Hungary gave the French company "Spotimage" the right to trade satellite pictures in its own domestic market. Other East European states are orienting themselves increasingly toward Western sources for space information. It is even worse because in 1978 at the initiative of the USSR a convention on remote monitoring of Earth was signed, establishing restrictions on the use of information obtained from satellites. It is now being used as grounds for claims being made against the Soviet Union.

Another example. In 1987 the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs offered an initiative on setting up a world space organization. The main purpose of this step was to oppose the American SDI program. In order to secure international support, the corresponding draft laid emphasis on the needs of developing countries in the field of space research. But setting up new intergovernmental structures and help for the developing countries need money. Who has calculated the cost of this kind of diplomacy, and whether it can be realized in practice?

Unfortunately,it would be easy to continue with this list. Moreover, a close look reveals that the goals of Soviet space research are being set without comprehensive or—the most important thing—objective grounds. One is convinced of this particularly when comparing it with other countries' space programs. Thus, nowhere in the world is so much attention given to putting cosmonauts into space. But a manned mission is 10 times more costly than an unmanned mission per kilogram of payload. Here, more than 90 percent of scientific and practical tasks and virtually 100 percent of national economic tasks can be resolved with unmanned vehicles.

No one now sets as a goal in and of itself that of increasing the power of launch vehicles. In the United States a carrier vehicle that is superior to our "Energiya" in terms of this indicator vehicle was developed as long ago as the late sixties. After it had served its purpose (missions to the Moon and lofting the "Skylab" into orbit) it was withdrawn from production and no longer used. Japan immediately set aside the construction of heavy rockets, placing the emphasis on lighter-weight satellites through technological improvements and microminiaturization in radioelectronics. The result: the Soviet "Gorizont" satellite weighs more than two tons and offers eight communications channels, while in Japan work is being completed on a satellite weighing about 30 kilograms with 35 communications channels.

Abroad, the lion's share of the space budget goes to develop the ground infrastructure. Again in Japan they have started to produce cars equipped with satellite navigation and communications systems. We have nothing like that. The end user—industrial and agricultural enterprises, fishing fleets, geological survey parties, and transport—do not have operational access to space facilities. Space research is divorced from the general economic mechanism and in most cases does not offer any economic saving.

The present feature of world space research is the extensive use of space technology to resolve problems on

Earth, including to produce consumer goods. In the United States this is ensured by a quite complex organizational-legal mechanism that prevents monopolization of the achievements of space science and technology even by powerful departments like the Pentagon. Here, we have only just started this work, and not very well either. In the USSR conversion is understood in a vulgar way, as a reorienting of existing production facilities to produce consumer goods, and in practice amounts only to reducing allocations for the defense sectors. Under the conditions of an inadequate market for hi-tech output, the latter find themselves in a complex financial situation and are losing highly skilled personnel, and are at the verge of the start of an uncontrollable process of degradation.

Finally, foreign space programs are deeply pragmatic and calculated down to the last detail. But we are developing an obsolete version of the American "Shuttle" for which there are no payloads in the coming decades. It is even more amazing that among the 13 priority directions in the state scientific and technical program confirmed in 1989, all the polemic about space research notwithstanding, only one space project is mentioned, namely a Mars mission.

Mention should also be made of the "aggressive" foreign economic policy of the Western states in the field of space research. International cooperation in the field of space research under the aegis of the United States has been built totally on economic considerations. Some NASA projects are being financed 70 percent or more by their foreign participants. Here we have an exactly opposite picture. The "Interkosmos" program is based on the principle of absence of mutual accounts, which is leading to a situation in which the USSR provides the launch equipment while other participants provide particular instruments, which cannot be compared in cost terms. The decision to bring Soviet space research into the international space market without an adequate organizational mechanism, legal guarantees, and qualified personnel hides another danger, namely, a drain of high technologies, which in the era of the scientific and technical revolution constitute a very important factor in the might of any state.

The impression is being created that in the USSR there is no single concept for space exploration that would be strictly adhered to in the practical activity of departments and organizations in the space complex. It is not known who is responsible for the realization or derangement of any particular space project. Consideration of costs in realizing a project is very weak. There is no feedback or evaluation of final results. Managerial stupidity is what this disease is called. Neither is there any hint here of more or less well-considered managerial decisionmaking or competent realization of decisions. The now fundamental chain—goal-means-result-feedback-and so forth—is not considered.

The management of space science and industry in the USSR has been set up in a largely random manner. The logic of the space race, to which we were initially attracted with an enthusiasm that could better have been applied elsewhere, increasingly raised new questions. These questions were thrown out to the departments, and inside the departments space main administrations and subdivisions proliferated. Later the process acquired the nature of some end in and of itself. The space firms themselves started to set their own goals, and after they had received funding, to do the corresponding work without any proper state, or even less public, control. The numerous coordinating organs changed nothing because they are all representative and interdepartmental in nature and have no serious powers. Neither can we ask very much of the USSR Main Space Administration since it is merely part of a single department—the Ministry of General Machine Building.

Strictly speaking, this kind of management is not a system. Departmental dissociation and the monopoly of each department over its own little piece of space research are combined in an impossible fashion. The monstrous hybrid of departmentalism and monopolism in the management of Soviet space research also leads to the economic, political, and moral losses that have transformed it from the subject of deserving pride by Soviet people into a soup kitchen.

Whence stems logically the idea of centralizing the space activity conducted in the USSR within the framework of some special agency, as expressed in particular by V. Shatalov in IZVESTIYA. This idea, however, is at variance with the trend toward decentralization in management of the scientific and technical complex in the USSR. Consequently, the real task is to find an optimal relationship between centralism and decentralization in management, and to create flexible management structures that would not be "blocked out" by either side.

In world practice we do have an example of a flexible system to manage space activity, aimed in each case at establishing a balance between various kinds of public interests. Thus, in the United States the main government organ responsible for the civilian sector of space research is NASA, which carries out its functions by placing orders for particular work and manufacture of the necessary equipment and apparatus to private and government firms, universities, and research centers. Here scientific, production, commercial, and noncommercial institutions themselves may fulfill orders for another key American space organ within the system, namely the Department of Defense. There is a coordinating committee for NASA and the Department of Defense, and at a higher level there is the National Council on Space led by the U.S. vice president. The main directions of space policy, including funding for space programs, are discussed and confirmed by the Congress.

In the Soviet Union there is no need to copy the quite complicated American system for managing space research, which includes about 30 structural subdivisions. Obviously this is impossible both because of financial considerations and the difficulties that inevitably arise when existing management structures are disbanded and their powers transferred elsewhere. However, we can and must take basic steps that would gradually bring Soviet space research to a qualitatively new level. It is important to define clearly the powers of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers in the sphere of space research management. Establishing the principles and goals of Soviet space policy should be assigned to the competence of the Supreme Soviet, and naturally, confirmation of the space budget and of major space programs will require the creation of a sufficiently expert service. As the highest executive and administrative organ the Council of Ministers should be responsible for the implementation of space policy, taking steps of an organizational, material-technical, and financial nature to this end.

It is necessary to set up a state space concern—a voluntary association of interested scientific and production enterprises of various departmental subordination. It would seem that the concern should not infringe on the competence of organizations operating in the sphere of space research. Its main goal would be to coordinate, create and handle financial reserves, and provide expert assistance and legal support in the international space market. The concern should be based on cost accounting, and after creation of the initial capital should switch to self-financing.

Of course, work on space legislation also cannot wait. All the measures proposed above should be formulated legally. At this time we do not have a single open legislative enactment that regulates space activity, unless we count the 1961-1962 ukases of the Supreme Soviet Presidium on introducing "Cosmonaut Day" and the title "Pilot-Cosmonaut of the USSR" and the corresponding chest medal. In the United States the first law on space was passed in 1958. American space legislation is now numbered in the thousands of pages. Presidential directives on national space policy are extremely authoritative. Effective regulation of space activity carried out in the Soviet Union, and protection of the foreign economic interests of Soviet space firms, require first and foremost a USSR law on space policy and a USSR law on commercial space activity.

The institution of presidential power recently introduced in the USSR can play an important role in the restructuring of Soviet space research. Now is the time for advancing a new space policy for the USSR that would on the one hand be understandable by the broad strata of the population and on the other hand would meet the highest scientific criteria. Squandering the potential of so much work done by the vanguard directions of the scientific and technical revolution will be fatal.

Military

Kulikov, Biryukova on New Army Pensions Law

PM0205095190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 May 90 First Edition p 4

[Lieutenant Colonel V. Kosarev article: "Our Parliamentary Correspondent Reports from the Kremlin: 344 in Favor, 0 Against"]

[Excerpts] That was the result of the 28 April vote at the USSR Supreme Soviet session on the adoption of the USSR Law "On Pension Provisions for Servicemen." [passage omitted]

A press conference on the newly adopted USSR Law "On Pension Provisions for Servicemen" was held in the Kremlin the same day. Opening the press conference, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Kulikov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, thanked the government and the Supreme Soviet for adopting the new law on behalf of the Armed Forces and war veterans. It is highly symbolic, he said, that this event coincided with the celebration of the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War. It is also noteworthy that the law was adopted despite the difficult situation from the viewpoint of the country's economic position. It proves the concern of the party, the government, and the Supreme Soviet for servicemen and veterans and their social security.

Answering a question from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's correspondent, A. Biryukova, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for Social Development, noted that, among the major measures to implement the party's and the state's social policy, the laws on pension provision for citizens and pension provision for servicemen are among the most important laws, among the most significant measures, because they affect literally every single person. And no matter how much individual demagogues might criticize our Army, today's achievement indicates that it is loved by the people.

"I cannot fail to mention," A. Buryukova emphasized, "that I have the profoundest respect for our motherland's defenders. The Soviet Government is striving to ensure that the Army has all that it needs. We must show concern for the radical improvement of social and daily life conditions for those who are serving and for those who either have already retired or will be retiring as a result of the Armed Forces cutbacks. Even in our complex economic and financial conditions, we must find as much as possible so as to swiftly resolve the social and daily life problems of servicemen. This, in my view, is the main point."

While this article was being prepared for publication, TASS reported that the USSR Law "On Pension Provision for Servicemen" will be released for publication in the very near future.

Discrepancies in Data on Sunken Sub Explained

PM0205110790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 May 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Rear Admiral V. Aleksin, Navy chief navigator: "Necessary Amplification"]

[Text] On 3 March this year KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA carried the report "How Many Miles to Disaster?" The newspaper once again addressed events that had occurred a year previously—the loss of the Soviet nuclear-powered submarine Komsomolets as the result of a fire. And it tried once again to establish the Navy's guilt in some way. The thing is that the journal MORSKOY SBORNIK No. 6 for 1989 printed a table which pointed out that the tender A. Khlobystov had to cover 51 miles at 14 knots in 3.7 hours to rescue the submariners. But a letter from V. Korelskiy, general director of the "Sevryba" Association, published in the second issue of the same journal for 1990, cited different figures: four hours 24 minutes (4.4 hours); 59 miles; 13.4 knots. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA journalists saw this discrepancy as deliberate misinformation of the public and as a desire to conceal the truth. Is this so?

As long ago as 1 March, before this report appeared in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, we passed to central television a diagram (it was shown to viewers in the 4 March program "Serving the Homeland") from which it is clear to everyone with a real interest in this question how events developed. The diagram indicated the positions of all the vessels and ships and the main estimated and actual parameters.

The data in the table in MORSKOY SBORNIK No. 6 for 1989 were preliminary estimates. They showed on the basis of which initial data the Northern Fleet Command made the decisions to rescue the submariners. And this was pointed out in the journal. The figures in Comrade Korelskiy's letter are the final figures obtained as the result of an actual voyage.

The sunken Komsomolets lies on the bottom 5.1 miles, on a bearing of 310 degrees, from the point indicated by the submarine commander in his report of the accident. The current and the wind were not conducive to carrying out a rescue operation. They caused the submarine to drift away from the tender which was approaching it and carried almost one mile further the rafts to which sailors in the water were clinging after the Komsomolets sank. And so almost six miles were added to the estimated 51. The remaining difference (approximately two miles) is accounted for by the tender's maneuvering, the sum of the inaccuracies in the initial coordinates of the tender and the submarine, and the effect of the choppiness, the wind, and the current. All these factors inevitably affect navigation at sea.

It must be borne in mind here that the effects of the wind and the current on the tender and the Komsomolets were different. A tender is a large vessel with developed superstructures and, thus, greater wind resistance. The wind had a considerably greater effect on it than the current. The streamlined submarine, which is almost entirely beneath the water even when on the surface, was "dragged" along by the current. It is very changeable there, and it was impossible to accurately calculate in advance or foresee the drift.

'Presidential Flight' Details Revealed

PM0305101390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 May 90 Second Edition p 8

[D. Varskiy article: "Top Secret. Who Pilots the President?"]

[Text] It is easier to become a cosmonaut than a pilot with No. 235 Special Aviation Detachment, according to "Government Subunit" Captain Anatoliy Khomchenko. Anatoliy Khomchenko's crew—one of 10 flight crews that are prepared to take off in an Il-62M at any moment and fly the president of the USSR anywhere in the world—was elected for this interview on a multicandidate basis by the squadron collective of No. 235 Civil Aviation Special Aviation Detachment.

The pilots first spoke about their extremely responsible work: They showed us around the presidential airliner, frankly discussed flight details which were "classified" until only yesterday, and finally spoke about themselves and their detachment comrades.

There is no comparison between the Il-62M and the "Boeing" in which G. Bush flies. Our Il-62M is conventional, as if straight off the production line. There is no supersecret radioelectronic equipment in the flight deck, just like in all the other aircraft of this series. The first lounge—for lack of a better word—is for the use of the entourage and newsmen. The second lounge is also known as the president's working office—oval couches, small tables. Up to 18 persons can attend a conversation in the office-lounge. On the other side of the door is the security men's accommodation.

The crew must be on board and ready for takeoff by the time the "main passenger" walks up the ramp. As a rule, Detachment Commander Aleksey Grigoryevich Mayorov is at the foot of the ramp. Nobody at the airport—be it in our own country or abroad—rolls out any red carpets; the crew leave the aircraft only after the last passenger has disembarked. If a visit is scheduled to last several days, the airmen are housed in a hotel or the Aeroflot mission, which works out all travel details in advance. The rumor that the Il is accompanied in flight by missile-carrying MiG's is groundless. Air traffic controllers—to use their parlance—hand over the president's aircraft from one to another.... Some people might recall: At the time when the Caribbean crisis was building up, an aircraft carrying Khrushchev's envoy Mikoyan came under fire. Our pilots had to display considerable courage and professionalism to avoid disaster.

I asked Khomchenko:

"Anatoliy Ivanovich, your mind must of course run over, as it were, this situation whenever you are preparing for flight?"

"Not only this one, which is universally known.... As a matter of fact, the world's political climate has significantly thawed now, and none of us anticipates any such encounter—if I might use this word—with a combat missile in the sky. But of course, one must be prepared for anything.... Situations which we would describe as emergencies. Engine failure, for example, the undercarriage refusing to retract, fog at our destination, and so on. Every airman preparing to fly is aware of all this. We are no exception. I would rather talk about something else—the dual responsibility, as it were, borne by mine and other crews during such flights. And by the service personnel, of course.... This may not be the right occasion, but I must say: Unfortunately, the detachment is still not supplied with everything it needs—we do not have even a hangar. During the winter, the presidential aircraft has to be cleared of snow and ice almost by hand. Only two of the 10 commanders have telephones at home—messengers have to be sent from headquarters to their homes. Even though they are aware of this and other things, our neighbors at Vnukovo treat us badly, do not help us, and at times say that 'the Central Committee should supply you with everything.'

"Whereas Brezhnev and Khrushchev used to travel by train, the president's time is precious: Thanks to the aviation, one single visit could cover several countries. We switched to economic accountability as of January this year and have to earn our living like all other Aeroflot subdivisions.

"After a flight with Mikhail Sergeyevich, for example, my crew and I could be given orders to take an Il-18 or another aircraft and fly it to Omsk. We do not see anything shameful in this. Let our opponents gossip. Last year's average wage of flight and technical personnel amounted to R400."

"Excuse me for being blunt, Commander. Are you not one of Kacharov's favorites? Whenever the presidential aircraft takes off, it is Khomchenko...."

"The squadron commander treats us all equally. What he considers important are our proper professional training, accuracy, discipline."

"Usually it is you and the second pilot who fly the aircraft on presidential flights, but what happens if the flight lasts more than 15 hours?"

"On such occasions we also carry a senior flight officer who can perform the functions of both commander and second pilot."

"Could he intervene and remove you from the 'controls'?"

"Under no circumstances. The command method has not been abolished in aviation. If I ordered the undercarriage released, nobody would dispute it, this is law."

"What if the president suddenly decided to insist on it?"

"The president is an ordinary passenger while on board. And why should he, in any case? I believe that Mikhail Sergeyevich has confidence in us."

"Does the deputy commander for flight operation procedures 'keep an eye' on you?"

"He knows us inside out, as the saying goes. He is concerned with inspections, security, aircraft protection, equipment. But, as Burmistrov himself says, the time when everybody watched everybody else is past."

"Should the pilots of airborne aircraft give you precedence as presidential airliner?"

"Airports abroad have a time interval of about 15 minutes for the aircraft of heads of state. The same as in our country."

Second Pilot Sergey Artemov, Navigator Aleksey Ponomarchuk, Flight Radio Operator Viktor Ovsyannikov, and Flight Engineer Vyacheslav Yazykov were with the captain during our conversation. The flight radio operator is known to the crew members as "the old man." With their average age being 40, Viktor Nikolayevich is indeed senior in age. He flew in the Air Force and has worked in civil aviation for a long time. More than anything else, however, he is respected for his constant staunchness and his readiness to help, to give a hint, to help others out.

"Friendship is the main factor which keeps any crew together," was V. Ovsyannikov's laconic comment.

"Anatoliy Ivanovich," I addressed the captain again. "When the president is flying, is it necessary to arrive at the meeting point to the minute?"

"Yes, this is the detachment's image—arrival strictly on time."

"Nonetheless, running such a huge airliner to transport what is essentially a tiny group of people? Economist Yuriy Barkov is probably none too happy about this?"

"There is no question that it is high time a small, comfortable, superlong-range, supersonic aircraft was built for the president. But designers do not seem to be in too much of a hurry.... They have to think of the state's prestige.... Do you remember the Armenian earthquake? We were in New York at the time, having arrived just 24 hours earlier, and were due to fly on to Havana and then from Havana to London. The disaster occurred, and a few hours later we were on our way back home. A small special aircraft would have been very useful...."

The commander lapsed into silence.... Something had obviously distracted him.

"What are you thinking about, Anatoliy Ivanovich?"

"Did you notice a shy young man sitting on the edge of a chair outside the detachment commander's office? He wants to join us. He looks at us in admiration, as if we were gods. Time will pass, he will start flying. I and my comrades will have to hand over our seats on the flight deck.... If he thinks that this is manna from heaven, and if this is what he is after, the detachment is not for him. It will be a few years before he is entrusted with the 'controls' of the presidential airliner. I would like to make this clear to him: It is easier to become a cosmonaut than to join our detachment. And in general terms, so as to dispel all doubts: All who wish to do so can come and visit us. We will show them video tapes, we will offer them video recordings, we will share our knowledge. The only thing we are unable to share are privileges—there are none."

Defense Industry Chiefs Sign Obituary

PM3004102990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Apr 90 Second Edition p 6

[Lieutenant General Georgiy Aleksandrovich Tyulin Obituary]

[Excerpts] Lieutenant General Georgiy Aleksandrovich Tyulin, Hero of Socialist Labor, winner of the Lenin Prize, CPSU member since 1940, doctor of technical sciences, and professor, died 22 April 1990 in Moscow in his 76th year after a long and serious illness. [Passage omitted]

During the postwar period, Georgiy Aleksandrovich Tyulin held various leading engineering and technical posts in the USSR Defense Ministry, and then in defense sectors in industry, devoting his creative forces and talent, and his outstanding organizational ability to developing his fatherland's cosmonautics and strengthening the country's defense capability.

In recent years, he was actively involved in scientific research work at the M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University. [passage omitted]

[Signed] L.N. Zaykov, O.D. Baklanov, I.S. Belousov, V.Kh. Doguzhiyev, G.I. Marchuk, O.S. Belyakov, Yu.A. Pronofev, O.N. Shishkin, S.A. Afanasev, R.R. Kiryushin, V.V. Lobanov, A.S. Matrenin, V.N. Soshin. Yu.N. Koltev, Yu.P. Maksimov, V.L. Ivanov, V.L. Lapygin, Yu.A. Mozzhorin, A.A. Logunov, I.I. Melnikov.

Baltic Republics

Impact of Gas Cutoff at Lithuanian Plant Detailed

LD0305220290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1952 GMT 3 May 90

[Video report by correspondent S. Dorenko in Lithuania, date not specified—recorded: from the "Television News Service" program presented by Yuriy Rostov]

[Text] [Rostov] The situation in Lithuania today was calm. Landsbergis, the chairman of parliament, has sent a letter to Francois Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl. He has asked them to mediate in contacts with Moscow. Judging by everything, Landsbergis is ready in principle to agree to suspend the operation of a number of laws adopted since 10 March, except for the declaration of Lithuania's independence. [video shows brief clip of Landsbergis in parliament]

Now here is a report from Lithuania by our special correspondent:

[Dorenko] Sowing has already been carried out on Lithuania's fields. Now field work is being carried out, but fertilizer is required for the future harvest. [video shows field work]

Fertilizer is produced at the Azot Association in Jonava. The main raw material for the fertilizer is natural gas. There is no gas because of the economic sanctions. The Works is agonizing about it. [video shows Azot Association installations; video then cuts to interview with V.S. Gedvilas, chief engineer of the Azot Association in Jonava, identified by caption]

[Gedvilas] At present only a seventh of the Works is operating. I can list the workshops. They are one of the three ammonia workshops, the nitro acid shop, and the ammonium nitrate shop.

[Dorenko] Everyone here hopes that by the time the harvest is gathered in, the political conflict will be remembered as something in the distant past—but it is necessary to tend the fields now so that there is a harvest.

There has been a proposal from Moscow for additional gas to once again to reach the republic, especially for the Works, in order for the latter to carry out all the deliveries planned for this year. After all, it is not just fertilizer that is produced here. It also produces raw materials that are in very short supply for the manufacture of paints, furniture, and footwear for consumers extending from Magadan to Kaliningrad. All told, almost two-thirds of the output of the Works has been going to destinations outside Lithuania.

[Gedvilas] The fact is that, as I already said, activity in the carbamide and formaldehyde resins workshop has been brought to a standstill. This workshop is the main supplier of raw material for the furniture industry, both in Belorussia and in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

[Dorenko] Our fragile and already unbalanced economy cannot fail to react with pain to the loss of one of its links. Supplies from the Azot Association are awaited in many corners of the country. [video then cuts to interview with R.L. Skirkyavichus, the association's deputy general director for commerce, identified by caption]

[Skirkyavichus] After gas reaches us as a raw material, naturally the dispatching of our output to all our customers will be resumed, in accordance with the contracts that have been signed.

[Dorenko] Gas did not reach Jonava today. About a quarter of all the workers have been sent off on vacation until the second half of May. They hope that by then they will have some work to do. [video shows further pictures of Jonava Works installations]

Reports Indicate Blockade Affecting Production

LD0405103290 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 4 May 90

[Text] In the latest government communique published in Vilnius, it is noted that supplies of gas, raw materials, and materiel to Lithuania are being carried out in a reduced volume because of the blockade. Petroleum products have not reached the republic from the Soviet Union. As a correspondent from the independent INTERFAX agency reports from Kaunas, a large quantity of undistributed production has piled up at enterprises of the major industrial center of Lithuania, the reason being a shortage of fuel. A confectionery factory has also stopped work because of a shortage of raw material. The production of footwear has been halted for the same reason at the Inkaras works. If the situation does not change, factories of the large Kauno Baldai [Kaunas furniture association] will be shut down in two weeks.

Commission Examines Import-Export Situation

LD0405105790 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 4 May 90

[Text] The issue of the delivery of supplies from the Soviet Union, and from Lithuania to the Soviet Union, was discussed at a meeting of the government commission at the Council of Ministers today. It was decided to allow the export of produce and raw materials only to those republics and oblasts of the Soviet Union which supply Lithuania with needed produce.

During April, goods worth more than R9 million were not delivered to the Soviet Union by Lithuania.

Unfortunately, some enterprises in Vilnius and Klaipeda do not consult the Ministry of Material Resources concerning the supply of goods to the Soviet Union.

Landsbergis Addresses 2 May Council Session

LD0205120490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0919 GMT 2 May 90

[Speech by Vytautas Landsbergis, president of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, at the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] Good day, esteemed deputies. I would like to voice my remarks and reasoning on the political situation in Lithuania, or, as it is referred to in some official documents, around Lithuania.

Lithuania is in the vortex of international political events. [passage omitted] Realizing this, I think we also define our own point of view and our political decisions and choices. We should not allow these to be diverted to one-sided thinking. We should not expect answers or decisions to only come from this side or that side. The decisions which will be made will result from the interaction of numerous forces. [passage omitted] In the vortex of events, Lithuania is not a little boat with a single oar which is being tossed around by waves, whose steering we are trying to control. Lithuania is a participant among many and I think we realize this more and more every day.

We feared and still have grounds for concern today that Lithuania will only be an object for exchange and negotiations among other powers and superpowers. Now we have to realize, and I believe we do realize that Lithuania is in fact a subject in international politics, various manifestations of which we see and in which we also participate. [passage omitted]

I think that the world is watching the changes taking place in the Soviet Union, both with great concern and hope. We need these changes. However, some realize what may come out of this and because of their great concern they begin to think that it would be better if these changes did not take place for the time being.

However, life cannot stop and our participation in it is our contribution. We are taking part in the democratic processes of Eastern Europe. In some cases we have been doing this in a more expressive and explicit way than those countries which are still under stagnation or depression at this time. While participating and making this process in Eastern Europe more active, we are also reinforcing ourselves as Baltic states, Baltic countries, the Baltic movements, reminding the world that we are part of Europe.

Together with Latvia and Estonia, we are regarded by those looking in from outside as the propellers of USSR perestroyka, M. Gorbachev's laboratory, and so on. And now, having declared our independence, we are reinforcing it. Even though we are closely linked with all the processes taking place in the USSR here we are continuing to perform the above role because processes do not stop. Republic and nations demand rights and make efforts to get their rights back, to have them reinstated. We see that the Soviet Union's restructuring has turned into double-dealing. And this did not happen today, this happened earlier. Even the initiators of restructuring have now turned into braking forces. A clearly centrist tendency has been expressed: The central government should be urgently reinforced. We can see that this centrist tendency is loosing because life is not supporting them.

Lithuania's example is inspiring and motivating, and this has been said in people's movements and democratic movements. [passage omitted] We also see persistance among Estonians who did not break down under the burden of regulations banning help to Lithuania. They stressed that they would help under any circumstances, refusing to obey the ultimatums which are the same as those applied to Lithuania. [passage omitted]

And Latvia too will make its decision tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. Latvia has the advantage of considering the Lithuanian and Estonian experiences of the previous month. Even though these experiences are not extensive, they are of great importance. It seems that Latvia will use the experiences of both the republics, perhaps finding some intermediate formulations—their own methodical version—while expressing their aspirations and goals and marching toward the same goal we are aspiring for. We are waiting for Latvia to come and join us. From there we will move on together. [passage omitted]

Perhaps you have heard about or read Popov's assessment. He is one of the leaders of the interregional group of deputies and chairman of the Moscow Council. He said that the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet no longer reflect, no longer represent, the political forces existing in the Soviet Union today, especially when such organisations as the CPSU and the Komsomol, which are disintegrating before everybody's eyes, are being represented there. He claims that this parliament will no longer be able to perform its functions in Moscow.

Perhaps this is also one of the new dimensions of our problem, because according to Moscow, Lithuania has gotten stuck in a certain dogmatic jamming which is constantly repeated: Everything must only be done according to the USSR Constitution. This is said despite the fact that this Constitution was not enforced on Lithuania earlier, and has not been valid since 11 March. This policy was adopted at the Third Congress of People's Deputies in an atmosphere charged with intense anger and emotion. This was also inspired by the brothers of hatred, the Interfront people. [passage omitted] It seems that this new dimension will surface depending on changes in Russia.

We can see the growing topicality of the Lithuanian issue in the West, which is seen more in the context of testing political and moral intentions. [passage omitted] At the same time, we can see that the United States also did not retreat—even though concern of this kind is possible—

from active politics with regard to Lithuania. This can be testified to by the fact that K. Prunskiene will meet with President Bush tomorrow in the White House in Washington. [passage omitted]

It is very important to us that the attention paid to our borders should become, and I am sure it will, more topical within the interaction of forces that want to help us. Are the borders we have now our borders, and are we the country that wants and is able to be open to the world? Or is it being artificially locked up by a new iron curtain? [passage omitted]

A list of goods we already need this month so we can fight the main threat caused us by the economic blockade, which is artificially created unemployment. On the other hand, the help we will receive—small or more extensive—should grow into regular international trade, regular international relations. [passage omitted]

The Supreme Council Presidium did not immediately reach a common opinion on this letter which could be presented to the press. We assessed it as a positive step which we must analyze more closely stating that our position also should be regarded among other main issues, so that a dialogue between both interested parties may begin as soon as possible. We also indicated that the Lithuanian nation had expressed its will synonymously and that this should be supported. Therefore, Lithuania must not be reproached for this. [passage omitted]

On more than one occasion we had to comment on this letter. We said that supporting the formulation of suspending the consequences, in other words documents adopted later on, if such a need arises and if we start debating this issue. This first thing needed here is specification. What is the issue? What are these specific consequences because the formation and work of the Council of Ministers cannot be suspended. However, all this is also consequences: We are setting up a state of our own, based on the 11 March decisions.

Some acts or some decisions the Soviet Union regards as concerning its interests or the interests of Soviet nationals no doubt could be debated and discussed, corrected and suspended for the period of time needed to start concrete negotiations, if such period were to be envisaged.

So, in general terms this is the spirit in which our letter of response was written. We have been writing it for several days, and as you know, it was discussed at the Presidium. [passage omitted]

We have written and discussed a response that states the political intention, which is to accept everything that is acceptable and also to take the initiative of the great European states to participate in the solution of our problem. You must understand that their initiative is not a gesture made by two officials in passing and which can be dismissed without any attention being paid to it. I think neither of the leaders of the two states think about it in this way, and we have grounds to look at this situation as their wish to participate.

Therefore, I can read the text of the letter I would like to place for your attention and approbation because this answer must be sent. I will read the French variant because the versions sent to President Mitterand and Chancellor Kohl differ in some details. So this is the one that will be sent to President Mitterand

Mr President: A request has been expressed in the statements made by State Minister Roland Dumas and in your joint letter with Chancellor Kohl that a dialogue should begin between Vilnius and Moscow through which a solution acceptable to both sides could be reached.

Such also is Lithuania's profound desire. In striving for a dialogue, Lithuania confirms that it possible to hold negotiations on any issue except the restored independence of the state of Lithuanian on 11 March 1990.

Having confidence in France and Germany, as well as in other democracies of the West, that these will render support to the democracy of Lithuania, we ask you to inform the Soviet leadership about our consent to discuss the idea of temporary suspension of those consequences of the decisions adopted by the sovereign parliament of Lithuanian which affect the Soviet leadership most of all.

Please accept, Mr. President, assurances of my highest respect.

I would like to say a few words in conclusion. What is our task? Our main task is not to split and not to scatter. There is anxiety among us, there are questions, there are searches for thoughts and deeds. What whould we do in the face of the blockade and threats? Some people say that we should change our stance but nobody says anything concrete. [passage omitted]

We are going to discuss the political situation, as I heard, some other day. It must be discussed, if anyone has proposals, in a very concrete manner. But I do not think that anyone would propose abandoning the 11 March decision which Moscow constantly demands.

There is talk about a political maneuver. Indeed, we are doing a great deal. I think we are doing everything we can. Our maneuvers are facing a concrete wall. We can maneuver up to the wall and we are doing this. When we are asked, or they demand, that we return to a cage, to a juridical cage which will be worse than the previous one, when they say when or how we should be released, then, of course, it is unacceptable. I think that people who offer this know very well that it is unacceptable. [passage omitted]

I have more than once answered the question about a compromise: Compromise is what is possible, an impossible compromise is not a compromise. [passage omitted]

Wherein lies our strength? [passage omitted] We are strong when we advance without anger and hate, when we advance striving and creating, overcoming group ambitions and mistrust and believing in humanness and our common aim. [passage omitted]

Lithuanians Interviewed on Current Situation

90UN1695A Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by TRUD correspondents G. Konchyus and A. Repin: "Lithuania: What Next?"]

[Text] Vilnius—The economic situation in the republic becomes more and more alarming with each new day. After deliveries of oil were halted, the Mazheykyay oil refinery, which provides petroleum products not only to Lithuania but to the neighboring republics as well, came to a halt. According to a report from the government of Lithuania, with drastic economizing there is enough gasoline to last until 20 May. Owners of personal automobiles will receive only 30 liters by that date. The abrupt reduction in the supply of natural gas has practically forced a shutdown of the Ionava "Azotas" production associations, the Panevezhis "Edranas" factory, and several other enterprises. According to reports received here, some departments and enterprises have begun to apply their own independent measures against Lithuania which were not stipulated in the sanctions officially declared by the leadership of the country. The number of railway freight cars arriving in Lithuania is significantly reduced, and a shortage of metal, wood products, paper, and raw materials for light industry is making itself felt. But there are also examples of another sort. A council of directors of industrial enterprises from the city of Kovrov sent a telegram guaranteeing stable deliveries of tractors and spare parts and expressing the hope that Lithuanian enterprises would observe their obligations to the Kovrov garment factory.

Experts believe that if events continue as expected 35,000 people will be without work in Lithuania by 1 May. At present there are 10,000 people out of work.

In Vilnius there is an active search under way for measures to counter the sanctions. Preliminary talks have taken place with the new leadership of the Moscow and Leningrad city soviets concerning an immediate exchange of needed goods and resources. They are also looking at what can be purchased abroad in exchange for their goods. K. Prunskiene, chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers, reported that deliveries of meat and meat products to the USSR would be proportionally reduced in answer to the reduction of deliveries to the republic of raw materials for the food industry.

And what is the situation at the enterprises that are still working? The Kaunas radio factory, the largest enterprise in the republic's second-largest city, is a member of the "Banga" association of television equipment. Approximately 80 percent of the country's television dials are produced here, and the "Shilyalis" television set, in great demand, is made here.

"I am not a politician," says L. Yankauskas, general director. "I make my decisions as a business manager. I do not see Lithuania without ties to the USSR. Judge for yourself. We receive components from 500 sources in Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and other republics. Only 30 hours of labor goes into a 'Shilyalis' television, mostly in assembly. Of course we are actively searching for other supply sources, because monopolistic ties are rife with various problems. We have contacts with dozens of Western firms, and there are interesting projects for joint production of various units and television cameras. But again, the Western companies are interested in cooperating with us so that they can master the USSR market. And that would be profitable for everyone. But the current situation is not profitable for anyone."

In one of the factory's shops we talked with two workers. The friendly women smiled prettily, but at first they did not want to speak for the press, apparently interpreting the appearance of two correspondents from a central newspaper in their own fashion: They said, "You will write things in a certain way..." One of the women even said to us harshly, "We will be hungry, we will be barefoot, but we will be free." She then walked away, and we were unable to find out why she felt she was not free now. Her colleague, who also spoke Lithuanian, turned out to be a Belorussian from Minsk. Her husband was a Lithuanian. She had lived and worked in Kaunas for a long time. Do you feel that your rights are being infringed upon? Of course not, nothing of the kind. Everyone in the labor collective is equal. And beyond the gates of the factory? Everything is normal. How about the talk about occupiers? Yes, that is unpleasant and unfair. My son served in the Army and I understand how the young people in uniform and their parents might interpret it.

In Vilnius as well one often hears complaints about the "lack of objectivity" of the correspondents from Moscow newspapers. Certainly one should not distort the facts. But what happens if a journalist shares his impressions with his readers and they do not coincide with someone else's views? At the risk of attracting the dissatisfaction of some circles, we will speak of our impressions of one of the recent press conferences at the Lithuanian Supreme Council.

Journalists expect specific answers to specific questions at such meetings with highly-placed officials. However, what we heard this past Monday more resembled a meeting somewhere on a city square with the rash formulations characteristic of such events. Although even that would not be a great difficulty. But the leaders of parliament, where it would seem the concept of "correctness" is especially prized, did not restrain themselves in the choice of their expressions and worked themselves up in front of the journalists. Here are some excerpts from a recording of the speeches at the press conference. V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council: "Confrontation... Our homeland is in danger... Aggression, force... They are in a hurry to break

Lithuania as quickly as possible." K. Moteka, Landsbergis' deputy: "How much longer can the Soviet Union walk the path of lies and deceit?" "Even such a colossus, armed to the teeth, will be forced..." And more in the same spirit. One can only guess for what and for whom Landsbergis intended his statement: "We cannot guarantee that Klaipeda port will not be mined or blown up" (?!).

The problem is not just in this one type of statement. The leaders of "Sajudis," who are currently running things in the republic's parliament and government, demonstrate impatience and an unreserved intolerance for other points of view not only in relation to the politics of the Union's leadership but inside Lithuania as well. Here is one revealing example.

At a recent "Sajudis" congress A. Terlyatskas, leader of the "Lithuanian Freedom League," made harsh attacks on the independent Lithuanian Communist Party, hanging on that party the label of "Lithuania's most dangerous force."

"It is an alarming symptom," emphasized Yu. Paletskis, deputy of the republic's Supreme Council and secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, in a conversation with us. "Indeed, what is going to happen? Even people who themselves suffered in the past for freedom of speech, thought, and press, frequently speak now against the right to have one's own opinion. Today it is as though new dissidents are being created, and one sees the form of new 'enemies of the nation.' I believe that one of the greatest dangers is a habit, which has taken root, of the single-party system and of dictate, and as a result it is difficult for people to get accustomed to the thought that there may be several parties and that there should be respectful relations between people who hold differing points of view. In general, many see an ideal in the Lithuania of the 1926-40 period, when an authoritarian regime ruled (although it was incomparably gentler than totalitarianism under Stalin). But it would be impossible now. We could not enter the 21st century with such undemocratic attitudes and methods."

(We will note that on the day this conversation took place, the leaflets of some "anticommunist committee" were displayed in Vilnius.)

Regarding relations between Lithuania and the USSR, Yu. Paletskis said:

"I do not think that the situation is hopeless. With mutual understanding and good will we can resolve the conflict in principle. We can mind a mutually acceptable formula, although this will apparently require long and difficult discussions. What has happened in Lithuania is not a 'professors' plot' or a coup d'etat, but a genuine expression of the wish of the majority for independence. On the other hand, Lithuania obviously cannot live normally without strong, friendly relations with the Soviet Union. To live with our eye only on the West is an illusion. It is impossible for economic, political, and other reasons.

"In the interests of Lithuania, the Lithuanian leadership should think to a great degree about the international aspect and refrain from egocentrism and ethnocentrism. Yes, the Lithuanian people have the right to resent the 20th century. Suffering, blood—it has all happened. But we should not build our relations only on the memory of that. In the first place, other peoples suffered too. In the second place, it is already the past. We should look to the future. I will give you my personal opinion: A way out of the crisis is possible with Gorbachev at the head of the Soviet leadership, and a way out will be found despite circumstances that are extremely difficult for both sides."

S. Pirozhkov, deputy of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, engineer at the Ignalinskiy nuclear electric power plant, and representative of the Lithuanian Communist Party (loyal to the CPSU), gave us his view of the situation:

"No one disputes the right of the Lithuanian people to independence. However, what should have occurred at the end of the journey actually took place at the beginning. The act establishing independence led us to the current impasse. The attempts to master the situation through unpopular measures, which are skillfully being used by the local propagandists, often give the reverse effect. As a result there is an increase in peoples' uncertainty in the future, and interethnic communication becomes more difficult."

A congress of civilian committees of Lithuania is being convened on 28 April in Vilnius. People will gather in the hall of the Palace of Culture of Railwaymen wishing to guarantee the validity of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution, the USSR Constitution, and Soviet laws on the territory of Lithuania and to consolidate social and political forces oriented toward the renewal of socialism and the Soviet Federation.

Lithuanian Supreme Court Judges Elected

LD0405082690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 2045 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] The Lithuanian Supreme Council session continued its work in Vilnius today. The main item on the agenda was the composition of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania. From 33 submitted candidacies, 29 judges were elected. The Supreme Court Presidium was formed. The session will continue its work tomorrow.

Economic Questions Fuel Controversy in Estonia

PM0405114190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 4 May 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS correspondent A. Yurkin report under the "Estonia: View From Within" rubric: "Against Whom Has a Claim Been Made?"]

[Text] Tallinn—The explosion of a news bombshell, the echo of which has reached the most remote villages in the republic, has boomed out amid the political disputes in Estonia. R. Hagelberg, adviser to the chairman of the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet and academician from the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences, lit the fuse. Using comparative calculations and taking a certain foreign country as standard, he concluded that Estonia has allegedly failed to receive $150 billion in gross national product over the last few years. Making this "impressive" figure public in the republic's mass media, the scientist asked the following question without beating about the bush: From whom can Estonia claim this money?

The academician's question is not a rhetorical one—it is the source of the political debates at the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet session which has just ended over the fourth item on the agenda, which was included for discussion by People's Front deputies. Press organs have described it as a "General Political Debate on the Economic Sanctions Applied by the USSR Against the Lithuanian Republic, With the Adoption of a Corresponding Political Resolution."

T. Maade, who is particularly well-known for his racist views and as the writer of foreign articles, stressed in his proposed resolution that "President M.S. Gorbachev and the USSR Council of Ministers have begun an unprecedented process in the international context." Speaking on behalf of the "Russian faction" (that is how those people who disagree with the positions held by Estonian People's Front leaders are described here), S. Petinov pointed out that the "leadership and some Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet deputies are deliberately presenting the actions taken by the USSR president and the union government as antidemocratic and antipopular.'

While the debates were under way, Premier E. Savisaar had already promised Lithuania comprehensive "economic aid." On learning of this, deputies asked him the following question: Who gave him the right to conclude an agreement without coordination with the parliament? There was no answer, but another fact became known: At a government sitting chaired by Prime Minister E. Savisaar, the Estonian Railroad was instructed to fulfill all deliveries to Lithuania regardless of orders from Moscow.

The Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet session just failed to adopt a political resolution—it lacked a quorum on its last day of work. At a sitting of the Estonian Committee—the Estonian Congress' think tank—one of its leaders—the same T. Maade—said that there is a chance of influencing events in Lithuania via the Western press and, as he put it, "conservative states."

It is clear now that Victory Day will not seem a historic one for the leaders of Estonian "democratic" movements. Privileges for veterans of the Great Patriotic War have been abolished in the republic and former fighters from the 20th SS Division and bandits from the "Erna" group, whose hands are stained with the blood of Estonian, Belorussian, and Russian children and old people, are demanding pensions at the tops of their voices. Their complaints are supported by leaders M. Titma and I. Toome, who are well-known in the republic.

The names of these and other people from the top echelons of power in the republic who have deprived frontline soldiers of their deserved privileges unexpectedly surfaced in the "hard-currency pool" scandal. From documentary evidence submitted by the chief of the Tallinn Internal Affairs Administration Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation Department, first the youth newspaper, then IZVESTIYA OSTK [Estonian SSR United Council of Labor Collectives] described how T. Maade, E. Savisaar, M. Lauristin, Yu. Nyugis, and others increased their affluence.

A sharp discussion of the financial position arose at the last session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. Deputies asked the government: Where is the money obtained as a result of the price hikes on consumer goods, including those which Estonia receives from the country's other republics, going? No answer was forthcoming, but it is quite obvious that considerable funds are being used to maintain the managerial apparatus, which is growing very rapidly.

So, from whom is Academician R. Hagelberg making a claim? According to Hagelberg, the "occupiers" must pay. Neither the academician nor his comrades in arms admit any other opinion.

Riga Radio Carries 4 May Latvian Supreme Soviet

Independence Declaration Debated

LD0405082890

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 0655 GMT on 4 May is intercepted in progress carrying live reportage from the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga. Correspondents Busa and Tabuns report that the People's Front had held discussions late into the night, deciding that the independence declaration should be the first item on the agenda today.

At 0700 GMT the Supreme Soviet session is declared open. Gorbunov is in the chair. Gorbunov says that allowing the press to be present at the session would hinder work, but he states that there would be a press conference later. He goes on to talk about procedural matters and counting equipment, and notes that there are 184 deputies present.

At 0710 GMT Gorbunov moves on to a discussion of the agenda. He says that the task is to restore all the power structures, and then to appoint the government. The abandonment of the old government's authority and the appointment of a new government will be one of the first tasks, he says.

At 0714 GMT Deputy Ozols announces that 131 deputies request that the discussion of the restoration of independence declaration and a number of other items, nine in all, be placed on the agenda.

At 0716 GMT Deputy (Beletayev), speaking in Russian, submits a brief proposal.

At 0718 GMT Dimanis, speaking on behalf of his faction, says that the independence declaration cannot be decided today. Several other deputies strongly defend the independence declaration.

At 0725 GMT Deputy Berzins suggests on voting on whether the independence declaration should be examined.

At 0726 GMT a Russian speaker complains about a lack of documents.

At 0727 GMT a Tukums Rayon deputy says that everything is known.

At 0728 GMT Gorbunov says that the discussion of the discussion of the document itself has not yet begun, only whether to include it on the agenda.

At 0729 GMT several speakers discuss procedural matters.

At 0733 GMT Gorbunov suggests ending the discussion and conducting a vote on whether to include the item on the agenda, but a few more speakers intercede.

At 0735 GMT Gorbunov proposes voting on discontinuing the discussion.

At 0736 GMT the deputies register—there are 188 deputies present.

At 0738 GMT, with 132 votes for and 51 against, the deputies vote to end the discussion. Gorbunov continues to discuss procedures.

At 0741 GMT Gorbunov reads the proposed agenda. The first item on the agenda is the restoration of independence declaration.

Procedural Matters Debated

LD0405085990

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 0742 GMT on 4 May continues its live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga.

At 0743 GMT, Strogonov, speaking in Russian, complains about the change in procedure, and Gorbunov replies.

At 0747 GMT Plotnieks speaks of the dangers of becoming a part of a unitary state as opposed to a federated state.

At 0750 GMT a Russian speaker says that the deputies should not discuss procedures but rather, the essence of the question.

At 0752 GMT voting begins on the proposed agenda. A Russian speaker interrupts and Gorbunov repeats his explanation of the agenda and procedures.

At 0758 GMT the vote on the proposed agenda is held. (?146) vote in favor of the agenda, and 53 against.

At 0804 GMT the deputies vote again by a show of cards: 139 vote in favor, 56 against, for a total of 195 votes.

At 0805 GMT a Russian speaker discusses procedures. Gorbunov proposes forming a commission for dealing with proposals and similar matters, and suggests that it be composed of three members from the majority faction and two from the minority faction. At 0810 GMT this commission is approved. A Russian speaker complains about changing the procedure, and Gorbunov explains how the parliament works.

At 0814 GMT Gorbunbov discusses the proceedings. He proposes that an editorial commission could be formed, discusses the factions and the government. At 0819 GMT his proposal is adopted with 140 votes for, 52 against, and two abstentions.

At 0820 GMT proposals for the members of the Editorial Commission begin. A Russian speaker refuses to take part in the Editorial Commission, because, he says, the rights of parliamentary factions have not been established.

At 0827 GMT a vote is held on the establishment of the Editorial Commission, by a show of cards: 137 vote for, (?30) against, with no abstentions.

At 0828 GMT Alksnis, speaking in Russian, complains that this procedure runs counter to the Latvian Constitution. Another Russian speaker reads out an appeal to MP's [members of parliament] against adopting a declaration restoring Latvian independence, complaining about the undemocratic nature of parliamentary proceedings. Gorbunov rejects these complaints.

At 0833 GMT a Russian speaker stresses the importance of including the minority in government decisions, but urges the session to get on with its work rather than engaging in constant procedural wrangling.

At 0835 GMT a 30-minute break is declared, with the question of factions to be discussed after the break.

Rules for Factions Debated

LD0405105890

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 0900 GMT on 4 May resumes its live relay from the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga with interviews by reporters.

At 0908 GMT Gorbunov opens the proceedings, saying that the question of factions, or provisional regulations on them should be dealt with. Deputy Zotov, speaking in Russian, discusses the formation of commissions.

At 0910 GMT some points and proposals on these regulations are made. One deputy suggests that a faction should not have less than 20 members.

At 0913 GMT Dimanis says that provisional regulations have been worked out, but these are probably not adequate.

At 0920 GMT Gorbunov states that independent deputies should be included. There is a suggestion by another speaker that the deputies not belonging to the major factions should all join together to form another faction.

A series of Russian speakers then make the following proposals on rules for factions: not only faction members should have the right to take part in parliamentary debates; the Supreme Soviet chairman and deputies must not be faction members; faction leaders must belong to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet; debates cannot be concluded until all faction representatives have spoken; every faction must have equal access to premises and facilities; on request of a faction leader, up to five minutes' debate can be demanded before any vote; secret voting on any matter can be demanded by any faction leader; factions should be represented in commissions in proportion to their parliamentary strength.

AT 0927 GMT Gorbunov remarks about civilized countries, where the majority faction forms the government. He indicates that there are no factions in Moscow.

At 0928 GMT this debate concludes, and Gorbunov discusses procedures and the independent deputies' faction.

At 0932 GMT there is a count of deputies present: 188

At 0934 GMT a vote is held on the faction proposals, with 165 votes in favor.

At 0941 GMT the deputies vote to create a presidium to ensure the working of the factions.

At 0946 GMT Gorbunov says he wants to clarify the wording. After a contribution by Alekseyev, Gorbunov discusses procedural matters. At 0949 GMT a proposal is rejected. Various points are discussed and voted on. The suggestion that a faction may demand a secret ballot is rejected.

At 0954 GMT a deputy suggests that the faction size be limited to 10. Gorbunov explains that 20 had already been accepted.

At 0955 GMT the discussion concludes.

At 0956 GMT Gorbunov discusses a report from the Council of Ministers on ending its authority.

At 1000 GMT Stroganov, speaking in Russian, expresses gratitude to the former Latvian prime minister, although he had criticized him in the past.

At 1001 GMT Gorbunov says he must react to the proposals. Another speaker suggests that the situation in the republic is important, and says that activity of the government should be discussed before the declaration of independence.

At 1003 GMT a Russian speaker complains for the third time that Article 108 of the Constitution is being violated. He suggests that a lawyer be asked to explain it.

AT 1006 GMT a Russian speaker complains that Article 5 of the Constitution demands that most important decisions be submitted for nationwide discussion and vote, i.e. a referendum. Another Russian speaker suggests a break to allow deputies to familiarize themselves witht the document.

At 1010 GMT Bojars says that there is no law on a referendum, but a majority of people support the declaration.

AT 1011 GMT a Russian speaker says that before discussing the declaration, the deputies should listen to the views of the prime minister. He says his constituents in Daugavpils insist that there be a referendum.

At 1012 GMT there is a proposal that the deputies should vote on whether to accept the resignation of the government.

At 1014 GMT Gorbunov says there will be a vote on whether to accept the resignation of the government or not.

At 1018 GMT the deputies vote to reject the resignation: 132 vote for, 35 against, with three abstentions.

At 1020 GMT the commissions propose to deal with the package of documents after the lunch break.

At 1023 GMT Dimanis says that the package is not acceptable.

At 1024 GMT information is read from the Secretariat.

At 1025 GMT a lunch break is announced until 1200 GMT.

Referendum Urged

LD0405132190

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1155 GMT on 4 May resumes its live relay from the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga.

Correspondent Anta Busa talks about the messages received and the festive mood of people walking through the streets. Correspondent Tabuns agrees, also mentioning an Interfront meeting held at 1200 GMT at Doma Square.

At 1200 GMT Gorbunov introduces discussion of the independence declaration, saying that Rubiks is to speak first.

At 1201 GMT Alfred Rubiks begins to speak. He says that the independence declaration would make everything stand on its head and says "they" would not agree with it. He recalls the establishment of Soviet Latvia in 1910, the 1922 Constitution, and the Ulmanis' suspension of it. There were no grounds for qualifying the note of the USSR in 1940 as a crime, because the Ulmanis' Government had agreed to it, he says. He discusses the battle against fascists, and asks: what would the Red Riflemen who are still living and the others wronged by the Ulmanis' regime think about the reestablishment of unemployment. He describes the USSR as the most deadly enemy and talks of the Western bankers' interests. In the name of the members of the Communist Party of Latvia, Rubiks says that they had received authority from the electors only to ensure their well-being, not to establish political goals. He says there is only one solution: a referendum on this question. Rubiks says that the people have not had the opportunity to discuss the independence declaration, as some have asserted. Such a declaration should not be adopted, he asserts.

At 1210 GMT Alberts Bels talks about the extreme poverty that the people have been reduced to, the deliberate murder of several well-known writers, and the damage to nature, asserting that genocide is being concealed. Only despair has driven the people to rise, he says, as a mouse would attack a cat. Referring to the Lithuanian declaration of independence, Bels says that this was the last chance for survival as a people. He refers to all three Baltic states, discusses ecological damage, and asks for God's help in securing independence.

At 1221 GMT Apsitis talks about election by the entire people. He says the people of Latvia should never give up their right to sovereignty. A retreat from the demand for independence would mean the end, he says. By adopting the manifest, nobody would be threatened and it would increase cooperation, he says.

At 1227 GMT Kozakevica refers to the previous discussion about 1940 and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. She says that people had placed their hopes on 1940. She says she knows from the experience of her people, the Poles. According to Kozakevica, the majority of people give them the authority to adopt the declaration of independence. She concludes her speech at 1239 GMT, with a discussion of the attitude toward minorities.

Landsbergis Addresses Latvian Supreme Soviet

LD0405085590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 4 May 90

[Speech by Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis at the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga on 3 May—recorded]

[Excerpt] Esteemed Chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, Esteemed Deputies and Guests:

Latvia has been waiting for this day to come for a long time. The world also has been waiting for it, and now the world is looking at Latvia. Among all the countries of the world, Lithuania has been waiting for this day most of all. We are convinced that we must stand firmly together on our Baltic road. This is a chain of life. If this chain is broken, the spiritual vitality of the three countries and all the people who live there will be endangered.

I believe that what must happen will happen. After the Baltic road, we noticed a very moving phenomenon: Many Latvian flags appeared at our demonstrations, carried by groups of people who had arrived from various Latvian rayons, cities, and small towns.

We noticed this with great pleasure when M. Gorbachev visited Vilnius to find out what Lithuania wanted. A large group of Latvian flags in Vilnius that night indicated that Latvia also wanted the same. [passage omitted: telegrams of support received from Latvia after the 11 March declaration of independence]

For myself, I would like to wish for Latvia that its rebirth and self-determination do not stop equivocally, halfway, and are not broken down by any intimidation. [passage omitted]

Riga Radio on 3 May Latvian Parliament Session

Candidates for Chairmen Nominated

LD0305151890

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1221 GMT on 3 May continues its live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga. However, at 1222 GMT the telephone link-up breaks again.

AT 1240 GMT the relay is restored, with a discussion in progress on a proposal concerning the election of the Supreme Soviet chairman, which is then voted on item by item.

At 1250 GMT the proposal is adopted as a whole.

At 1251 GMT the procedure for the election of the Supreme Soviet chairman is adopted by a large majority.

At 1253 GMT the nomination of candidates for Supreme Soviet chairman begins.

At 1254 GMT Deputy Vulfsons nominates Anatolijs Gorbunovs.

At 1255 GMT, to the accompaniment of much booing, a Russian speaker, later identified as Alekseyeu, nominates himself as a candidate. There are no more nominations.

At 1258 GMT Gorbunovs begins to speak, but there is a lot of noise. The session chairman notes that it is impossible to work owing to the noise, as well as to the commotion outside. The uproar abates, and Gorbunovs continues by discussing the restoration of Latvia's statehood, guarantees for the security of Latvia's citizens, and the necessity of adopting the necessary laws.

Gorbunov says that the idea of a federation within two years provides no guarantees, so the only way is that of sovereignty for Latvia. He admits there will be complications because of the economic crisis and says that external relations will be important. People will want full shelves in the shops, he notes, going on to enumerate the measures that will be necessary. Nothing has been done to reduce Soviet armaments in the Baltic region; there should be a coalition-type government; there should be new relations between Latvia and the USSR which are based on the will of the peoples. He says the Baltic states have a common cause. Noting that the first invitation to the new parliament was received from Sweden's Rikstag, Gorbunov outlines the difficulties in expectations of help from the West, and stresses cooperation among the Baltic states.

Finally, Gorbunov describes what he sees as the task of the deputies, as well as his own task. His remarks are greeted with applause.

At 1320 GMT a 30-minute break is announced, and the relay is suspended.

It resumes at 1350 GMT, with Gorbunovs replying to a question in Russian, then to a question on the alternative service; and then on the 1939 treaty on the military bases.

At 1355 GMT Gorbunovs replies to a question in Russian on citizenship; and how it can be guaranteed. He says that he favors any permanent resident of Latvia being granted citizenship. At 1358 GMT Gorbunovs replies to a question in Russian on which party he belongs to. He says that he filled in on the card that he was a supporter of the Independent Communist Party of Latvia. He goes on to answer another question on his attitude toward Citizens' Committees.

At 1401 GMT Gorbunovs replies to a question on what compromises he would be ready to strike with Moscow in order not to have a situation like Lithuania's by referring to the principles set out in his speech.

At 1403 GMT Gorbunovs replies in Russian to a question concerning languages and equal opportunities for studying them, and to another question concerning Ulmanis rescinding the Constitution, and the nature of the sovereignty Gorbunovs has in mind.

At 1409 GMT Gorbunovs replies to Deputy Alksnis' question in Russian concerning Gorbachev's refusal for further talks should independence be declared, and to another question on the dangers of closing the door to talks with Moscow.

To a question on the use of Russian as a state language in independent Latvia, Gorbunov replies that he hopes for equality. Answering a question on nationwide discussion of a draft independence declaration, he says that in one draft he has seen various possibilities, and is simply setting out his own views.

At 1417 GMT a question is asked about the dangers of a possible single-nationality government. Gorbunovs replies that the interests of all sides must be taken into account by government.

At 1420 GMT Gorbunovs continues with replies on how to insure social stability. He speaks of the need to maintain contacts with all social groups, even those outside the law. In response to a question on the nature of legislation to be taken under his presidency, Gorbunovs disagrees with the assumption that all previous laws were bad. He says he hopes for more expert help in future.

At 1426 GMT a question is asked about military service, and the possibility of boycotts or alternative service. Gorbunovs replies that he enjoyed his military service, although there were no problems. The republican law on alternative service still applies. The mechanisms of this must be worked out.

At 1429 GMT a question is asked about parliamentary democracy and ignoring minorities, particularly the Russian-speakers. Gorbunovs says that things are difficult now, but world practice should be followed, in that a majority vote is right. Naturally, it would be offensive if voting went along ethnic lines. At 1431 GMT a question is asked about the practice of choosing a vice president. The provisions of the Constitution apply, Gorbunovs says.

Alekseyev Speaks

LD0305163390

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1432 GMT on 3 May continues its live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga.

At 1433 GMT Janis Peters asks about Gorbunovs' intentions about participation in various international bodies. Gorbunovs thinks the establishment of statehood would have to come first. Another question is posed concerning the title of either chairman of supreme soviet presidium or of the supreme soviet. The latter, as in Lithuania would be the title.

At 1435 GMT Berklavs wants clarification on Gorbunov's opinion on the procedure of becoming a Latvian citizen.

At 1437 GMT a question arises about the constitutional court and powers of deputies and their terms of office from previous sessions. Gorbunovs starts to reply, and the chairman appeals for order in the crowd outside. The noise abates, and Gorbunovs continues by saying that the latest elections were in order. There is a further reminder and concern by Gorbunovs about the behavior of people outside, he asks what this would look like to those abroad.

At 1443 GMT the last question from speakers at microphone number one is asked in Latvian, about the development of Latvia inside or outside Russia. Gorbunovs replies that establishment of statehood comes first.

At 1449 GMT there is a proposal to discontinue discussing the candidate chairman. A vote is taken, with Russian speaker interrupting. The result of vote: 58 against, two abstentions. The decisions on discontinuing the debate is adopted.

At 1455 GMT the speaker is the second candidate, Alekseyev.

At 1455 GMT Alekseyev begins speaking, in Russian. He speaks of the importance of the decisions to be made and the need to carefully weigh decisions. He represents the internationalist Front of Working People of Latvia and had set out his election platform in the movement's declaration. He sees the main task for members of parliament and other people is the restoration of civic agreement. The law must be observed. If one side uses its majority to oppress the minority, there will be trouble from the injured party and injury breeds injury. The main issue must be a law of referenda. No one must speak in the name of the people in the future as they did in Stalin's time: The people themselves must speak about what we are saying. Crowds are heard chanting outside, an appeal for quiet from the chairman to the crowd is heard. He attacks some recent draft laws, such as the law on languages, the draft law on citizenship, and the Riga City Soviet voting rules, which engender simple majority vote in Riga soviet, and calls for new elections. He reminds the people of what had happened before 1940: unemployment, lack of education. Further sounds of chanting from outside, and an appeal for quiet are heard. He speaks of the importance of understanding what a renewed federation would entail. He complains that one member of the delegation sent to Moscow failed to take part in the talks. He mentions private property, and rejects is as unfair. Collective property is best, he declares. Finally, he says all our decisions are important but that now people are living in wretched conditions, and that we must work out emergency measures to get food and housing to the people. He deals with the law on language and complains that the government has done nothing about it.

At 1509 GMT Alekseyev concludes his speech.

At 1510 GMT the session is allowed to ask questions of Alekseyev, no questions are posed. There was the chairman's reminder that more time could have been taken, more candidates could have been nominated and discussed. It is noted there will be a secret ballot, and procedural matters concerning the ballot, where to receive ballot papers etc., are discussed. At 1515 GMT the session adjourns for an unspecified period of time. Before transferring to the radio studio, the correspondent notes that a People's Front demonstration will be held at 1600 GMT on 4 May in connection with the independence declaration. No further details are given.

Gorbunov Elected Chairman

LD0305170590

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1528 GMT on 3 May resumes its live relay from the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga. Hallway interviews are being conducted.

At 1555 GMT a musical intermission is heard.

At 1627 GMT the relay resumes from the session hall; results of the vote for chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet chairman are not known yet. The correspondent continues with interviews.

At 1643 GMT Zotov announces, in Russian, the death of Moscow Patriarch Pimen.

At 1645 GMT the election of Gorbunov as Latvian Supreme Soviet chairman is announced. The vote was 153 in favor, and 43 votes against.

Ivans Elected Deputy Chairman

LD0305185190

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1646 GMT on 3 May continues its live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga. The election commission results are again announced: Gorbunov receives 153 favorable votes, 43 against. Alekseyev receives 20 repeat 20 favorable votes, 76, repeat 76, votes against.

At 1650 GMT the decision of the Supreme Soviet on electing Anatolijs Gorbunov chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium is adopted to applause.

At 1652 GMT Gorbunov delivers a one-minute acceptance speech. Wishes and congratulations are lauded on Gorbunov.

At 1656 GMT the session's work proceeds, with Gorbunov chairing. Prolonged applause then greets the Lithuanian delegation headed by Vytautas Landsbergis.

At 1700 GMT Landsbergis delivers an eight-minute address to the session. Prolonged applause follows.

At 1709 GMT Gorbunov reads a telegram, in Russian, from Czechoslovak President Havel, wishing success to democratic Latvia. After prolonged applause after the reading Deputy Kalnberzs, a prominent surgeon, speaks briefly.

At 1714 GMT Gorbunov, not wishing "to remain in this house alone," asks for continuation of the session's work. This is approved by 140 votes. After constitutional questions Gorbunov suggests these should not be discussed, that this evening only other top officials of the Supreme Soviet are to be elected.

At 1722 GMT a question is posed, in Russian, about the secret open ballot. There is another question by Alksnis, also in Russian.

Procedural matters are discussed.

At 1733 GMT Dainis Ivans is speaking. He is discussing his candidacy for the post first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet. He says his work in the People's Front would suffer and those who had nominated him knew that. To a question, in Russian, about Lenin's writings on nationalities Ivans replies, in Latvian that Latvia never joined the Soviet Union. A questioner says the troubles begin when people forget their nationality. Ivans says the policy of minorities in the republic of Latvia would continue. He further answers questions on elections, citizenship, on the danger to the House of the Press. He notes the House of the Press had been taken away and it should be returned to the government. He answers questions on the attitude toward the Citizens' Committee and on contacts with fellow countrymen abroad.

At 1758 GMT Ivans continues answering questions concerning cooperation with the other Baltic republics, the Federation, the nationality composition of the Council of Ministers, on educational inequality, on why he had refused candidacy to the chairman's position. He also answers questions on agriculture. To a question in Russian, Ivans notes that Latvia must build a civilized country because there is currently chaos.

At 1812 GMT the questions conclude. An unidentified speaker, in Russian, delivers a one-minute opinion speech concerning Ivans.

At 1815 GMT the discussion of Ivans candidacy concludes. The open ballot vote is taken.

At 1823 GMT Dainis Ivans is elected first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet. There were 54 votes against, and two abstentions. Applause follows.

Citizenship Law Discussed

LD0305201390

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1824 GMT on 3 May continues its live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga.

At 1825 GMT Ivans delivers a brief acceptance speech.

At 1826 GMT Andrejs Krastins, a jurist, is introduced as a candidate deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet. He talks about how he would see his task at that position, especially concerning legislative work. He says the ideas formed by the National Independence Movement had won. The most important question, the law on citizenship, should be solved politically, he notes. He regards the demilitarization of Latvia as his task, and also mentions protection of the country's citizens from doing military service.

At 1838 GMT questions are posed to Kratins, the question of Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] citizenship connected with existence of the Latvian SSR is broached.

The de jure republic of Latvia is discussed. There follows questions, in Russian, in connection with the citizens' committee and language discrimination. There is a question concerning Army call up; the Supreme Soviet's task is to defend its citizens, by way of alternative service. There is a question on the Communist Party. The two communist parties could operate as long as it is possible for them. There are common points in the activity of the Supreme Soviet and the citizens' committees; they can cooperate realistically. There is a question on the multiparty system. To a question on an alternative government, Krastins says there is no citizenship law yet, or an undermining of the state system. Krastins is asked about the principle of democracy. To a question of the independent republic, concerning the return of fellow countrymen, he notes citizenship is not complicated, but property rights are. To a question of pollution by international air routes across Latvia, Krastins notes a valuable source of income.

At 1910 GMT the questions conclude. A Russian speaker talks about Krastins, saying that he was not that well known. A Latvian speaker tells there were only a few jurists among the deputies, and thinks it woud be good to have him in the leadership. The Russian writer Dozortsev praises Krastins.

At 1919 GMT the discussion concludes and a vote is taken.

At 1924 GMT Andrejs Krastins is announced as deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet. The vote was 136 in favor, 50 votes against, and four abstentions.

At 1925 GMT Imants Daudiss speaks on behalf of his candidacy for the Supreme Soviet secretary.

At 1941 GMT the election of Imants Daudiss as Supreme Soviet secretary is announced. He won with 157 votes in favor, 23 votes against, and three abstentions.

At 1942 GMT the session concludes. The session is to resume at 0700 GMT on 4 May.

Career of Chairman Gorbunov Examined

LD0305191990 Moscow TASS in English 1820 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] Riga May 3 TASS—By TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaitsev:

Anatoliy Gorbunov, 48, was elected chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet by the new Latvian parliament today. He held this post in the previous parliament.

Gorbunov, his name and surname are Russian, was born into a peasant's family. He is an ethnic Latvian, a building engineer by profession and member of the Soviet Communist Party since 1966.

He was a party functionary for over ten years, worked as secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee on ideology. In October 1988 Gorbunov was elected chairman of the presidium of the Latvian Supreme Soviet.

He was elected to the all-Union parliament and is a member of the Council of the Federation.

According to Gorbunov, he is an "advocate of a collective style of work." He sees the main task of the new parliament "in creating an independent legal Latvian state."

"We should not drag our feet with proclaiming official guarantees for Latvian citizens of other nationalities and should clearly declare throughout the world that Soviet citizens and their descendants who arrived in the republic after World War II should not be apprehensive of their future and the future of their children [word indistinct] Latvia restores its independence."

TASS Reports on Latvian Supreme Soviet Session

LD0405132890 Moscow Tass International Service in Russian 0920 GMT 4 May 90

[Text] Riga, 4 May (TASS)—There are 50 percent more journalists covering the first session of the Latvian parliament than there are deputies, so great is the interest in its work. The leading news agencies and publications of many countries have sent their own correspondents. Not only local deputies, but visitors, too, are endlessly interviewed. Among these is the Lithuanian delegation, led by Vytautas Landsbergis, the chairman of that republic's Supreme Soviet.

Addressing the Latvian parliamentarians, he read greetings from the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania. Then a torch that had been lit in his republic was carried into the hall. Greetings to the session were sent by Vaclav Havel, president of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic.

Two deputy chairmen of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic were elected. They are Dainis Ivans, a 35-year- old publicist and chairman of the Popular Front, and Andrys Krastins, a 39-year-old lawyer and member of the board of Latvia's national independence movement and of the Duma of the Popular Front.

Today, it is proposed to accept the resignation of the government and to confirm the agenda and working procedures. The adoption of a manifesto on the restoration of the Latvian republic's independence is expected.

RSFSR

Vorotnikov, Yeltsin Preview RSFSR Congress

LD0305182590 Moscow International Service in Czech 1500 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] [Announcer, in Czech] Esteemed listeners, today we would like to acquaint you with the views of important state and political figures on a number of events and problems that worry our society. Their views are either absolutely different, or they are at least very different. For example, the first Congress of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] People's Deputies will start in Moscow on 16 May. It is the biggest Soviet Republic; it has the highest number of inhabitants and most extensive economic potential. The views of the future work of the congress and the tasks it will have to tackle are different here. We will acquaint you now with two of them. They are Vitaliy Vorotnikov, the current chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and Boris Yeltsin, RSFSR people's deputy, member of the CPSU Central Committee and one of the leading figures of the Democratic Russian Bloc. So, first of all, here is Vitaliy Vorotnikov.

[Vorotnikov, in Russian fading into Slovak translation] With regard to the fact that in keeping with the Constitution it was the current Supreme Soviet that was instructed to organize the congress, we in (?its leadership) have decided to establish a preparatory commission. Each oblast, kray, autonomous republic, autonomous oblast, or autonomous okrug has nominated one deputy to it. The deputies were elected at the meetings of deputies' groups in their electoral districts. The commission was working in a very active and fruitful manner. It is obvious that its members did not always agree on approaches to the questions. Various standpoints existed because its members were not only the deputies representing various oblasts, but also deputies maintaining differing standpoints.

[Announcer] Now, Boris Yeltsin.

[Yeltsin, in Russian fading into Slovak translation] Preparation is carried out quite actively, and at the same time it is carried out in two directions. The task of the first direction is to set up an official organizational committee. This also involves the Democratic Russia Bloc representatives. The deputies who belong to this bloc are also drafting their own alternative proposals to be discussed at the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies. According to the preliminary proposals of the Supreme Soviet, apparatus it was envisioned that the congress would look into organizational questions only. We think that in no case can we allow this because we would disappoint our Russian voters. This is why it is necessary to discuss, already at the first congress, the topical questions that concern our voters.

[Announcer] Vitaliy Vorotnikov agrees in essence with this. However...

[Vorotnikov] Yes, I would like it to happen precisely in this way. I would like the deputies to devote more time precisely to the specific problems that worry the people. For example, the question of Russia's sovereignty will undoubtedly be tabled at the congress and it will have to be discussed. However, Russia represents an enormous state and its role rests not only in achieving its own independence, but also in promoting, together with other republics, the unification of the whole union. It is therefore natural that at the congress, when discussing the question of Russia's sovereignty, we will also have to appeal to other republics to cooperate with Russia and contribute to the strengthening of our Union and Federation.

[Announcer] And Boris Yeltsin.

[Yeltsin] The issue of first rate importance is the spiritual, national, and economic rebirth of Russia, which has been for long decades an appendage of the center and which in many respects lost its independence. Thus, there would be sovereignty and independence for Russia after the signing of agreements with each of the 14 other union republics. Russia, as a participant in a union agreement, would gain a maximum guarantee for its sovereignty and independence from the center. Russia itself would give a certain part of the power to the center, and not on the contrary.

[Announcer] When answering the question whether the election of a Russian president is evisioned at the first congress, Vitaliy Vorotnikov answered:

[Vorotnikov] Different proposals exist. In any case, within the framework of the current Constitution, no election of the president of the Russian Federation is envisioned. However, I cannot rule out the possibility of someone tabling this question at the congress. However, I think there should be one president in the country and that in the Russian Federation it should be a chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

[Announcer] Boris Yeltsin

[Yeltsin] I think the office of the president of Russia, which is inhabited by 140 million people, is necessary but not at this very moment. I was against solving this question in a hasty manner, even during the election of the president of the country at the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies. I have not changed my view and I think that, say, in the course of one year it would be desirable to draw up and pass a whole number of laws concerning the post of the president. Only when these laws are passed will it be possible to announce direct elections by all people of a president, who will be elected from more than one candidacies, which will be submitted at the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies.

[Announcer] Propositions were voiced that Boris Yeltsin could be among the candidates to the post of chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. This means that to a certain extent he would be Vorotnikov's successor. He was asked if this would really be the case.

[Yeltsin] When my nomination was put forward, and also during my meetings with the voters, it was stressed to me that I should not repeat what I did in the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies. This means that if my nomination is put forward, I should not give up at any cost. I promised this to my voters and this is why I am getting ready. My chances are below fifty percent, but all will obviously depend on the work with deputies in the period before the congress, on the policies, and on other factors.

Report on Preparation for Congress of Deputies

90UN1474B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 10 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with G.P. Vyatkin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, rector of the Chelyabinsk Polytechnic Institute, by a TASS correspondent; date and place not given: "Common Sense is the Foundation"]

[Text] At the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] House of Soviets a deputies' commission is working on preparations for the First Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation. RSFSR people's deputies from Chelyabinsk Oblast sent G.P. Vyatkin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and rector of the Chelyabinsk Polytechnic Institute, to the preparatory commission as a delegate. A TASS correspondent talks with him.

[TASS] German Platonovich, how has the work begun?

[Vyatkin] In a tense atmosphere and without any breaks. After the first plenary session all the basic work was transferred to subcommissions. I work on a subcommission to prepare motions for draft laws which would be submitted to a congress of people's deputies of the Russian Federation for evaluation.

A discussion raised the question of the status of our commission. Not all the deputies, when they were delegated to the commission from the regional meetings of deputies, knew that its status had already been defined by a decision of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, which was legislatively entrusted with the responsibility for the preparations for the first congress. As a result, several interpreted the rights of the commission broadly whereas others, on the contrary, believed that this position was just like any of the other deputies' associations on convictions or professional interests which are being actively created today. It seems that now the problem of the status of our commission has been cleared up.

Like all the other subcommissions (and there are six of them), we spent the first three days examining proposals concerning provisional regulations for conducting the congress. There were many demands, questions, and remarks.

[TASS] And on the basis of what documents is the subcommission working?

[Vyatkin] The initial materials for our subcommissions, and for the others as well, was suggested by working groups of specialists created by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. I want to make sure I am understood correctly. There must be some kind of primary document at the base of any discussion. Otherwise the deputies' time might be simply wasted irrationally. Must we really refuse the qualified help of the specialists just so we will not have to hear accusations of playing "apparat games"? Anyway, no one keeps us from inserting our own ideological and political content into the documents. And of course we introduce many changes and amendments. But I must say that the drafts are prepared in a qualified manner. And even if we deputies have an a priori desire to change something, it is difficult to object to professional skill, where there is true expertise of course.

[TASS] About which problems has there been discussion?

[Vyatkin] If we speak of the regulations which we and the members of the first and second subcommissions have discussed, then there were many demands concerning organizational features. For instance the question, which concerns all the deputies, of who will sit where in the hall of the Great Kremlin Palace.

[TASS] That is not just an organizational question. As the experience of the Union congress demonstrated, the closer one is to the tribunal the more "access" one has.

[Vyatkin] The representatives of Moscow and Leningrad usually sat in the first rows. But the majority of the deputies insist that seating in the hall be in alphabetical order in accordance with the name of the territories. There is a proposal to seat us alphabetically according to the names of the deputies themselves.

I believe that the alphabetical-territorial principle for seating the delegations should be used. Although there were also suggestions to seat us according to political and professional interests, and even according to party interests. But in this case we are getting ahead of ourselves. With the present composition of the RSFSR people's deputies, 86 percent are members of the CPSU. Someday we will mature to the point of a multiparty principle for conducting work in the parliament. But we should not anticipate events.

Nonetheless, common sense predominates in the discussion of this question too. Incidentally, I would like to stress that we are working sufficiently correctly. But some of my colleagues a priori feel that "they might be cheated." That is probably explained by the fact that people still have not cooled down from the election contest. The marathon has ended, and everything is gradually returning to normal.

[TASS] What other issues is the subcommission examining?

[Vyatkin] The second question which we have begun to discuss is a proposal to change the RSFSR Constitution.

There have been proposals for global changes. But after a long and stormy discussion we arrived at a consensus. We agreed that our task was more modest. We need to discuss whether the changes proposed by the legal specialists in the drafts correspond to the latest changes in the USSR Constitution.

I will stress once more that the workers of the Presidium and the specialists have prepared qualified materials. The deputies acknowledge that.

Our commission has also begun preparing other proposals to change the republic's Constitution which are not related to changes in the Union Constitution. However in this case we are still only working out the material.

I am pleased at how the work of the deputies in the commission is organized. We are receiving all the necessary materials.

If we create a working mood and polish specific articles of a draft law, then I believe we will have successfully carried out the functions entrusted to us by our deputy colleagues.

Formation of Factions in Moscow City Soviet

90UN1474A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA in Russian 29 Mar 90 p 1

[Article by K. Yurov under the rubric "Before the First Session of the Moscow Soviet": "Factions Are Created: A Meeting of the Deputies Is Today"]

[Text] **Preparations for the first session of the Moscow Soviet of the 21st convocation are beginning. A special meeting of people's deputies of the Moscow Soviet elected on 4 and 18 March is taking place this afternoon.**

At a past meeting S.B. Stankevich, people's deputy of the USSR and the Moscow Soviet, declared the creation of the "Democratic Russia" bloc of deputies. More than 280 deputies joined it (we remind the reader that there should be a total of 298 deputies in the Moscow Soviet after the repeat elections of 24 April). They will have to decide to vote in accordance with instructions from a general meeting of the deputies' group with regard to a specific set of issues.

The day before yesterday a group of deputies supporting the position of the preelection platform of the city party committee met under the chairmanship of Yu.A. Prokofyev, people's deputy of the Moscow Soviet and first secretary of the CPSU Moscow Gorkom [city committee].

It was noted that in the election campaign the party gorkom upheld the principle of "it is not important who nominated a deputy, but it is important who was nominated" and consequently pursued a policy directed at consolidating the forces of the entire body of deputies for the quickest possible solution of the capital's social and economic problems.

However the organizationally formed "Democratic Russia" bloc raised the necessity for those deputies of the Moscow Soviet who had not joined it to define themselves organizationally. It was decided to create the "Moscow" deputies group. The meeting's participants expressed their readiness to cooperate creatively with all the deputies of the Moscow Soviet. For the present, 93 people's deputies belong to the "Moscow" group.

The "Democratic Russia" bloc and the "Moscow" group have elected their representatives to the organizational committee for preparations for the fist session of the Moscow Soviet. At the first general meeting of the deputies it was decided that each group of deputies would nominate its own representatives—one for each 10 deputies—to the organizational committee.

Apparently representatives of one more newly created group of deputies—"Fatherland"—will join the organizational committee which is supposed to be formed today. The new group is made up of 10 people. The organizational committee will also be joined by representatives from 30 independent deputies (this is how they have declared themselves).

Perhaps today's meeting will resolve a number of other issues concerning preparations for the session.

More on Moscow City Soviet Proceedings

90UN1685A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 90 p 1

[Report by V. Nechayev and M. Polyatykin: "The Moscow City Soviet Session Continues"]

[Text] The start of yesterday's meeting was quite brisk In any event, the agenda was swiftly approved.

An appeal of a large group of deputies in connection with an acceleration of the pace of discussion of questions and the adoption of decisions was similarly approved. But approving was one thing, and this was then immediately forgotten, seemingly. Because there was a swift turnoff onto the path, well-trodden over the three days, leading to prolongation of the session. But one event we shall mention specially. The deputies were addressed at the start of the meeting by Yu. Luzhkov, acting chairman of the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee. He communicated the decision of the 20th Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee as a whole to relinquish its authority. However, in the interests of catering for the city's vital operation and day-to-day management of the diversified economy it would perform its duties until the 21st Moscow City Soviet First Session had completed its business. The deputies expressed gratitude to the executive committee for the work it had performed, and the decision was adopted practically unanimously, what is more, with one abstention.

The main debate developed yesterday during examination of the provisional regulations concerning the chairman and presidium of the Moscow City Soviet. The "Moscow" group of deputies proposed that the chairman of the soviet be elected not at the session but by direct secret multiple-choice ballot with the participation of all Muscovites. A city-wide referendum on this issue was proposed. However, this viewpoint encountered a sharp protest from the "Democratic Russia" bloc. Passions became heated to such an extent that an early break was announced. The interval in the meetings dragged on, and in the meantime the problems were discussed by a deputy group.

The question of a reduction in the television coverage of the scheduled intervals, which could save air time, also evoked heated arguments. Voices saying even that these tricks of the "apparatchiks" were well known and that the people should be allowed to see everything were heard. It seems to us, however, that Muscovites have already had time to form an opinion on the session as a whole and on many deputies in particular. What?

Unfortunately, no one has his finger on the pulse of our life and the swift passage of time. The polls of sociologists, political scientists, and psychologists are for some reason or other catastrophically late.

The credentials commission is nowhere near completing its business and is reporting the results piecemeal. Even yesterday the authority of all deputies had not been confirmed—prior to the break, at least. Commission members are not ruling out attempts by some voters, former candidates, to cast a shadow on those who have been elected. Although justified censure cannot be ruled out either—the electoral commissions locally did not always react in opportune and skilled manner to warnings concerning violations of the Election Act.

A group of deputies put forward the idea of the creation of a so- called conciliation commission which, given serious disagreements within the city parliament, would find intelligent compromise. Opinion was divided. G. Popov, people's deputy of the USSR and the Moscow City Soviet, vigorously objected to its creation. His reasoning was as follows: There is already an organizing commission, an editorial commission, and other bodies of the session which could, if necessary, act as arbiters. As a result of a ballot it was decided that there would be such a commission. Preparation of its status, rights, and duties was commissioned.

...The evening meeting began with the report of a working commission in which representatives of all groups had participated. The deputies had attempted to find a common language. And then the item-by-item discussion continued. However, it did not, as the agenda had intended, get as far as the election of a chairman.

RSFSR, Moscow Election Results Viewed

90UN1467B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Mar 90 pp 1, 2

[Report by Moscow City Party Committee Secretary A. Ya. Nemtinov at 21 March Plenum of the Moscow City Party Committee]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Comrades!

Permit me to inform you of the results of the Moscow elections to people's deputy of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and of the local soviets.

There were 64 people's deputies elected in the elections to RSFSR people's deputy in 65 districts. Elections did not take place in one of the districts of Lyublinskiy Rayon.

Among those elected, 44 are members of the CPSU (69 percent), two are women, and one is a worker. Joining the body of deputies will be 28 scientific workers, 12 journalists, and seven officials of law enforcement organs.

As for the Moscow Soviet, 463 people's deputies (93 percent) were elected in all, which permits the first session of the new convocation to be held.

Elected were 12 workers, 44 women, and 36 deputies younger than 30 years of age, and 270 (58 percent) are members of the CPSU. Seven first secretaries of the CPSU raykoms [rayon committees] and five chairmen of the rayon soviet executive committees were also elected.

Four hundred of the deputies of the Moscow Soviet (86.4 percent) were not deputies during the last convocation and have no experience working in soviets.

There were 3,561 deputies elected to the rayon soviets including the city of Zelenograd. Runoff elections are being held for 1,265 deputy positions.

Of those elected, 63.8 percent of the deputies of the rayon soviets are members of the CPSU, 22.8 percent are women, and 11.2 percent are workers. Of the deputies, 83 percent have no experience in soviets.

Among those elected to the rayon soviets, 22 are first secretaries of party raykoms, and 17 are chairmen of rayispolkoms [rayon soviet executive committees].

According to the results of the 4 and 18 March elections, the first sessions of the rayon soviets may be conducted in all the rayons except Volgogradskiy, Kalininskiy, Lyublinskiy, Sovetskiy, and Gagarinskiy Rayons.

Obviously we would like to see more people on the staffs of the soviets, especially the local soviets, who are familiar with work in the soviets and who have experience with organization and control. However, the people have made their choice, and a great responsibility rests upon the communist deputies, especially under these circumstances, to see that the renewed soviets begin showing results as soon as possible.

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium established a deadline of 7 April for the rayon soviets and 14 April for the Moscow Soviet to conduct their first sessions. There is very little time. Therefore it would be an inadmissible luxury to waste effort on empty conversations and criticism in the soviets and provoke the disappointment of the voters instead of doing some solid work. In any case, in the end one does not make a true evaluation of what has been done according to how things were labeled beforehand.

These are, briefly, considerations and suggestions concerning the agenda of our plenum and the present moment.

I invite you to discuss them.

(An account of the discussions at the CPSU Moscow Gorkom Plenum will be published in the next issue.)

RSFSR Trade Union Council Discusses Ufa

LD1404143890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 14 Apr 90

[Text] As we have already reported, a Federation of Independent Trade Unions of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] has been set up. At its first meeting in Moscow, the presidium of the Federation's Council examined the situaton in Ufa, capital of Bashkiria. The council called on the republican government to take decisive steps to eliminate the consequences of the ecological disaster. Mass meetings and rallies have been held in the city to discuss the emergency. Working people have lodged claims against union and republic departments which, in their view, have been leading this industrial center toward a disaster for many years and which displayed inertia and indifference when the crisis occurred. The Bashkir Oblast Trade Union Council reacted enterprisingly to the situation by arranging a supply of drinking water to hostels accommodating students and workers. They arranged screening of water and food served at kindergartens, health centers, and catering establishments.

We remind you that the Presidium of the Council of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of the RSFSR supported the demand of the Bashkir Oblast Trade Union Council for emergency assistance to be given to Ufa.

Tomsk Radiation Situation Termed 'Very Dangerous'

LD0305204390 Moscow TASS in English 2020 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 3 TASS—Having examined 38 city residents who ate wild animals meat and fish, phsycians in Tomsk, Siberia, discovered that the content of radioactive substance in their organisms exceeds the admissible limit. Seven people—four adults and three children—are put into hospitals, the IZVESTIYA newspaper reports today.

These radioactive birds' and animals' habitat is well known. It is the restricted Tomsk-7 (sometimes called Seversk) area. In the beginning of the 1950s one of the first nuclear power plants in the Soviet Union was constructed there.

The plant supplies the Siberian chemical integrated works, agricultural complexes and apartment blocks with heat and energy.

No reports have been published about the state of the nuclear plant. There are only assertions that everything is all right there. But radioactive wastes' burial places are badly fenced in and animals often run there and transmit radiation all through the neighbourhood. Contaminated reservoirs are also open for everybody.

The situation is very dangerous, the newspaper points out.

Russian First Quarter Economic Statistics Issued

LD0305163690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] The results of the socioeconomic development of the Russian Federation in the first quarter of this year have been summed up. As we promised our listeners in a previous bulletin, we will give some data from the report of the republic's State Committee for Statistics.

In comparison with the same period for last year, produced national income and social labor productivity fell by 1.4 percent. The situation in industry, agriculture, capital construction, and transport worsened. The state of finances remains complex. Inflation in the consumer sector because of the growth of prices on goods and paid services, and also the increase in non-satisfaction of solvent demand, of hidden inflation, in comparison with the first quarter of 1989, ran to 7.1 percent. The implementation of measures for financial improvement have not yet yielded tangible results. Profits are 6 percent less than for the same period last year. The average monthly monetary wage of blue- and white-collar workers in the first quarter ran to R281 and rose by nine percent, while the labor payment of collective farm workers correspondingly is R210 and it rose by 13 percent. The general volume of the production of consumer goods rose by R4.5 billion. Meanwhile, the growth rates of the production of foodstuffs and light industry goods lag behind the planned rates. The retail price index ran to 102.5 percent. Eight million square meters of housing have been commissioned, which is eight percent less than in the first quarter of last year.

In many cities and regions of the republic, the ecological situation remains complex. Nature protection bodies have suspended the work of individual works polluting the environment, including those manufacturing products in short supply.

In the first quarter, over 384,000 crimes were registered in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR], which is more than the corresponding period for last year. Slightly more than half of them have been solved. The general volume of industrial production fell in comparison with the first quarter of last year by 0.4 percent. The production of consumer items rose by almost six percent.

In the agro-industrial complex, the volume of production of meat and eggs fell and purchases of hothouse vegetables have been considrably reduced.

The results of the socioeconomic development of the republic in the first quarter bear witness to the need to accelerate implementation of the economic reform aimed at improving the financial and consumer market and at forming conditions for the economic independence of enterprises, the report of the RSFSR State Committee for Statistics says.

Western Republics

Further Reportage on Ukrainian Party Plenum

Text of Ivashko's Speech

90UN1661E Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 3 Apr 90 pp 1, 2

[V.A. Ivashko report at Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum on 31 March 1990: "Program Documents for the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress and on the Convening of the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress"]

[Text] Comrades! Practically three months remain until the 28th CPSU Congress.

The situation currently is characterized by a diversity of moods and opinions and, finally, actions both within the CPSU itself and surrounding it.

On the one hand there is growing recognition that at the present, pivotal stage of perestroyka our party remains the guarantor of the irreversibility and socialist nature of the revolutionary transformations. For this it will be necessary, of course, to fundamentally renew the CPSU itself.

On the other, the attempts by certain forces to prompt the party to abandon communist ideals, deprive it of the vanguard role, transform it into a parliamentary party or some kind of debating club and ultimately remove it from the political scene entirely are becoming increasingly perceptible.

Under these conditions some party committees and organizations and many communists are, unfortunately, in a state of uncertainty and are losing perspective. We saw this yesterday also at the meeting of gorkom and raykom [city and rayon party committee] secretaries.

In this situation, as the bitter experience of the Lithuanian and Estonian Communist Parties and a number of Communist Parties of East European countries testifies, it is essential first of all to clearly determine one's position on fundamental issues and not follow political events but forecast and, what is most important, actively influence the course of their development.

We have for this currently, comrades, a sure foundation. The draft platform and rules of the CPSU provide reference points for a solution of the most acute socioeconomic and political problems, determine the fundamental aims of the renewal of our society, and reveal the principal directions of the precongress work of all components of the party.

Most important in these documents is the fact that they, first, unambiguously confirm the communist perspective of our development and determine as a practical goal the building of humane, democratic socialism and, second, that they substantiate the paths for a cardinal renewal and the democratization of our party.

Proceeding from this, we need in the period of preparation for the congress even primarily to emphatically dissociate ourselves from those who do not share communist ideals and principles, step up the activity of each party organization and each communist to surmount the crisis phenomena in the party and consolidate all healthy forces in the solution of acute problems of the republic's socioeconomic and spiritual development.

We must go to the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress closely united ideologically and organizationally and with collectively prepared program documents which will determine the place and role of our party in the political life of the republic.

I. Social Reference Points of the Economy

Comrades!

The core of the practical activity of any party is socioeconomic policy. A party which only conducts debate of this issue or the other is of no use to anyone. It is therefore no accident, most likely, that our opponents are "tossing up" the idea that the party should no longer interfere in economic life and the formulation and implementation of social programs. All communists must understand that a departure from economic issues would mean the party's political demise.

The Central Committee Politburo is sure that the Ukrainian Communist Party, while not substituting for the state and economic authorities in operational management of the economy, is duty bound to shape a strong socioeconomic policy and realize it through the communists working in the soviets and economic authorities and through the party committees and primary party organizations.

The socioeconomic policy of the Ukrainian Communist Party should be geared to the creation of an efficient economy, a high level of public well-being and people's maximum social and ecological protection. The Central Committee Politburo considers the strategic direction of the achievement of this the republic's transition to the principles of economic sovereignty and independence.

What does this mean? Primarily:

the ownership by the people of the Ukraine of the land, the interior, mineral and raw material resources, forests, inland and territorial waters, and other natural wealth and the basic means of production;

independence in determining the structure of the economy and the forms and methods of management and control of social production, in implementing taxation policy and distributing the national product and income, and in establishing economic relations at the interrepublic and international levels.

All this must not simply be proclaimed. A great deal of work needs to be done to formulate a precise mechanism for the functioning of the republic's economy under the new conditions.

Many home-grown radicals are accusing us of lagging behind certain regions of the country on this issue. These charges are devoid of serious logic and sense. Economic independence cannot be regarded as an opportunist end in itself geared to the acquisition of political dividends.

We pose the issue primarily thus: What actually does any innovation do for the people of the republic and what effect will it have on the well-being of each individual?

What are needed primarily are profound and balanced calculations and the formulation of new principles of economic relations with the center and other republics. Nor do we here intend to join in a political game and facile competition to see who can distance himself from the "center" the quickest.

It needs to be emphasized in this connection that, as true disciples of perestroyka, we do not conceive of it being successful without the international unity of the peoples of the USSR and without decisive opposition to the forces concealed behind perestroyka slogans, splittist, separatist designs and intentions.

Draft laws and enforceable enactments, with which the republic's economic sovereignty will be secured in practice, are being drawn up currently. We hope that the Supreme Soviet and the government of the Ukraine will perform this work more actively.

As you know, we are moving increasingly rapidly toward a market economy with state regulation. And such a transition is without balanced approaches, as experience testifies, accompanied by abrupt price increases, a decline in the working people's living standard, the social stratification of society, the emergence of unemployment and so forth. For this reason the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee sees as a priority task the assurance of a direction for development of the economy which makes it possible to really enhance the people's well-being given a dependable guarantee of the social protection of the citizens, children, the youth, needy families, invalids, and pensioners primarily. This will require the elaboration of the appropriate package of laws and decrees and the highly painstaking work of the new Supreme Soviet, the government and all organs of administration.

A priority place in the socioeconomic policy of the Ukrainian Communist Party should be occupied by questions concerning the protection of people's health and the solution of ecological problems. The last session of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet showed how many difficulties there are here. They need to be overcome with use being made for this of the entire available potential and resources and by reliance on the public at large.

One material observation in this connection. The Central Committee Politburo believes that the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers and the Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions should reexamine their ordinance of 14 December last year on protecting the health and improving the material position of the population in the areas which suffered from the Chernobyl accident with regard for the observations and proposals expressed following its publication and also at the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet session.

Comrades!

Considering the specifics of the restructuring processes in our republic, the Central Committee Politburo is submitting for the plenum's examination certain, in our opinion, fundamental propositions for the formation and implementation of a new agrarian policy of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

First, it is necessary at all costs to find the essential capital investments for reinforcing the material-technical base of agricultural production and, particularly, the social rearrangement of the countryside. It is intolerable that the decision to transfer 10 percent of the capitalist investments allocated industry to the installation of facilities of the agro-industrial complex is not being fulfilled. Only R42 million or one percent were allocated to this end last year. It is necessary that the leaders of the Gosplan [State Planning Committee] provide explanations on this issue today. Let people hear who personally is to blame here.

We have opportunities to increase supplies to the countryside of pipes for gas and water mains. We also need to build up capacity more vigorously for the manufacture of bricks, gravel, and other local building materials. It is the duty of the Ukrainian SSR Gosplan and the oblispolkoms [oblast soviet executive committees] to ensure the priority allocation to the individual rural developers of all they need.

Second, a principle of agrarian policy should be the maximum balance between the amounts of the purchase of agricultural products and the material-technical resources behind their production.

We defend a just, economically substantiated correlation between the price of agricultural and industrial products and will continue to decisively counter an unwarranted increase in the cost of equipment, fertilizer, building materials, and other products for the countryside.

Third, guided by the USSR laws on land and property, it is essential to create everywhere every opportunity for a diversity of management methods for the land and the development of various forms of ownership: individual and collective leasing, peasant farms, cooperatives of peasant farms and others. It is necessary, finally, to "emancipate" the kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] to realize their actual potential in full.

Of course, the right of choice should belong to the peasants themselves. The natural regulator here may only be economic interest.

And, finally, it is necessary to accomplish in practice the preferential development of the processing industry and the farm product storage and sale facilities and sharply reduce the huge losses which we have currently.

Among the most acute problems of the present moment the Central Committee Politburo notes the financial recovery of the economy. The Ukraine managed last year, as you know, to make up the budget deficit, reduce by one-third the outflow of money, and by one-fourth, the number of unprofitable enterprises, and to obtain R2 billion in profit over and above the plan. But these are only the first steps. The situation remains complex. We need to move decisively toward the creation of a securities—stocks, bonds—market and the use of nontraditional sources of profit such as the sale to the population of apartments and so forth.

Thought should be given also to an enhancement of the role of credit and the banking system as a whole, and we must erect a dependable barrier against instances of the unchecked transfers of noncash to cash resources.

Restructuring the price mechanism is extremely important now. It must reliably protect the Ukraine's economic interests in relations with the other Union republics and the center. We will not, otherwise, in our view, escape the negative consequences of both the monopoly diktat of enterprises, ministries, and departments and group egotism at the regional level.

Enforceable enactments which put a stop to the negative processes on the consumer market are extremely necessary today also. But the main path toward its stabilization is, nonetheless, a sharp increase in the production of commodities. Yet a state commission for consumer goods to the tune of R3.9 billion (more than half the increase planned for the current year) and R167 million worth of chargeable services has yet to be placed at republic enterprises. People should know that industrial managers and the soviet executive committees are directly responsible for this.

The housing problem in the republic remains very complex. Although the plans for housing construction have been overfulfilled in recent years, the waiting list for an improvement in housing conditions has grown and now runs to more than 2.5 million families. In order to keep its promise to the people the republic government must immediately adjust the "Housing 2000" program and specify the ways in which it will be implemented.

It is essential to activate all the available potential and possibilities of the construction organizations, industrial enterprises, and cooperative and individual construction. It is necessary to revise local programs in the direction of an increase in the extent of self-provision with construction materials, structures, and articles and, what is most important, put their fulfillment under the strictest supervision.

In order to solve all these questions and ensure the success of the economic reform in general it is necessary primarily to restore order on the job. It is no secret that the prestige of conscientious labor and professionalism, discipline, and organization are declining currently. An unscrupulous attitude toward office, production, and public duties is becoming habitual. This is one reason why losses of work time grew by a factor of 1.4 and amounted to 5.3 million man-days in industry and construction.

The republic did not reach the targets of four years of the five-year plan in terms of growth of the social product and national profit, and the rate of increase in production in industry declined to 2.8 percent. This year this increase has declined to one percent.

Without absolving the communist leaders working in the soviet and economic bodies and heading labor outfits of responsibility, I would like to call the attention of the primary party organizations to this problem. It is they who can and should reveal to people the negative consequences of anarchy and permissiveness on the job and raise the responsibility of the work force for the results of its work.

It will be necessary to collate all proposals pertaining to the solution of problems of the republic's socioeconomic development which come from participants in the plenum and the communists and working people of the Ukraine at the time of discussion of the program principles of the activity of the republic party organization and at the 28th congress to determine the comprehensively substantiated socioeconomic policy of the Ukrainian Communist Party for the future.

II. En Route to the Power of the People

Comrades!

The Central Committee Politburo believes that it is necessary to determine in a separate section of the Ukrainian Communist Party Program the basic directions of our policy for the development of socialist democracy and the people's self-management.

And a key issue here is undoubtedly an enhancement of the role of the soviets of all levels as the spokesmen for the interests and wishes of the people and plenipotentiary institutions of the real power of the people and the creation of a firm personnel, legal, economic, and financial base for their activity.

The new soviets have already been formed, in the main. The recent elections permitted an appreciable renewal of the corps of deputies. Mention should be made primarily of the fact that, for example, members of the CPSU constitute over 85 percent of the Ukrainian SSR people's deputies. At the same time, however, one notices that there are among the deputies only 26 workers (less than six percent) and the same number of kolkhoz members. Not a single ordinary kolkhoz member was elected. There has been a sharp diminution in the number of women in the Supreme Soviet—there are only 13 of them (less than three percent). There are only five members of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] (1.1 percent). Of course, elections are elections, and there can be no question of any schedule of allocations here. But it has, after all, to be seen that the newly elected parliament far from corresponds to the social composition of the republic's population.

In addition, reality today is such that in some oblasts, Lvov and Ivano-Frankovsk, for example, politicized associations (which could shortly become parties) have secured for themselves a majority in the local soviets. Under these conditions the party committees must revise the forms and methods of work in the organs of people's power. It is necessary to operate as actively and purposefully as possible through the members of the party who have been elected deputies or who work in the executive bodies. Merely the fact that the communists constitute a minority in the corps of deputies in places makes it incumbent upon us to make use to the maximum effect their possibilities as political fighters and proponents of the party line and to orient all constructive forces toward cohesion in the organs of state power.

And there should undoubtedly be an appreciable growth here of the organizing and consolidating role of the party groups.

We, of course, are in no way oriented toward some confrontation with deputies who are not members of the CPSU. On the contrary, the art of establishing mutual understanding and cooperation with all who take really close to heart the interests of the electorate and feel keenly for the cause will stand us in better stead than ever. There will have to be reasonable compromise also, of course.

But none of this means linkage with those who will use their deputy credentials to destabilize the social and political situation and rock the very foundations of our system. It needs to be clearly recognized that the times of populist camouflage are passing and that our ideological opponents have become political opponents, who have already quite openly adopted antisocialist, separatist positions. And there can be no illusions here either. The communist deputies must emphatically counteract the destructive forces, dissociate themselves from them on the basis of principle and show people their true character and aims.

Together with the broadening and assurance of civil rights and liberties it is essential to persistently strengthen legality and law and order. It is, after all, obvious that unless the democratization of society goes hand in hand with the increased responsibility of each member of it to observe the Constitution and current legislation, it will become its antipodes—anarchy or dictatorship.

Slogans of democratization and glasnost have long been unconditionally manipulated also by groupings and persons who are in fact endeavoring to turn democracy into political license, and glasnost, into slander, name-calling, and unconcealed moral terror. Respect for the law and the organs of state power has sunk to a critical level and crime, organized included, has risen sharply in a number of oblasts and cities.

The seriousness of the political situation in the republic's western oblasts is being complicated appreciably by the religious factor and the conflict which has arisen between Orthodox and Greek Catholics. Petty politicians from religion are frequently attempting to impart a nationalist, anti-Russian, extremist nature to it, and slogans of religious-territorial separatism are being advanced. There are extra-ecclesiastical forces attempting to push the conflicting parties onto unlawful paths for a solution to the problems. There are instances of interethnic conflict in the Crimea, which are assuming an increasingly dangerous nature.

Under these conditions it is essential that the party and soviet authorities firmly pursue a policy aimed at observance of legality and a strengthening of law and order. It is very important here to combine practical measures, which the actual situation demands, with well-conceived, plan-based work on building a state based on the rule of law. Only a strong state, in which the unconditional supremacy of the law and the equality of all before it are ensured, can effectively confront the destructive processes and reliably protect the life, health, rights, and liberties and honor and dignity of its citizens.

At the same time, however, and the draft program principles for the activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party emphasize this particularly, the responsibility of the state to each citizen is inseparable from the responsibility of each citizen to the state.

The Ukrainian Communist Party will implement its policy through the active participation of the party masses and the party organizations in law-making activity.

In the immediate future we will have to perform much responsible work on preparation of the draft new Ukrainian SSR Constitution and other legislative enactments. We see this as an important direction for the practical realization of the republic's political sovereignty.

Without going into details, I would like to emphasize that these documents should, in our opinion, unambiguously state the right of the republic to independently determine the forms and structure of the organs of state power, administration, justice, and the procuracy. They should guarantee the territorial supremacy of the Ukrainian SSR, that is, not only the integrity and inviolability of its territory but also the impermissibility of its use without the republic's consent.

All these and other fundamental issues should, in our opinion, be reflected in the new Union treaty.

The Central Committee Politburo considers an urgent task the assured due legal and social protection of workers of the law enforcement authorities and the enhanced social prestige of their professions. We are emphatically opposed to the defamation of the USSR Armed Forces, the internal forces, the KGB and the police and all attempts to drive a wedge between them and the people. We support the policy of the CPSU Central Committee Platform geared to the assurance of the reliable defense capability and the internal and external security of the country on the principles of reasonable sufficiency.

Thus the program principles for the activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party provide for the establishment of the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws and the law-based nature of our republic as a Soviet state in which the sovereign will of the Ukrainian people and real people's power must be predominant.

At the same time it should be emphasized once again that the Ukrainian Communist Party will decisively counteract attempts to use this process for nationalist, separatist purposes. After all, throughout our people's history their aspiration to sovereignty has always been inseparable from the idea of fraternal alliance with other peoples.

III. Sphere of Special Attention—Nationality Policy

Comrades!

Realization of the propositions of the CPSU platform pertaining to the nationality issue is proving considerably more complex than was foreseen initially. On the one hand problems which have built up over decades are making themselves felt. On the other, the endeavors of extremist elements to inflame national enmity and play on difficulties and unsolved questions are destabilizing the situation.

The absolute majority of the communists and working people condemn the attempts to cancel out all that is great and worthy that was achieved in the national sphere as a result of the victory of the October Revolution.

To speak of the Ukraine, this means the acquisition of statehood and the historic unification of the nation within the single Ukrainian SSR. This means, granted all our miscalculations, the surmounting of economic, social, and cultural backwardness. The Ukrainian people really felt themselves to be involved in the great family of peoples of the world and were a founder of the United Nations. Ignoring these achievements would be unjust.

As can be seen from the draft program principles for the activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party, the right of nations to self-determination is made the basis of its nationality policy. We regard it as the establishment, on socialist principles, of state sovereignty, determination by the people themselves of the priorities in economic and social policy, and the development of national self-awareness, which should be dialectically combined with internationalist morality.

Of what do we speak here primarily? Of the republic's right to choose the forms of organization of its national life and establish the institutions of statehood. Of the assurance of state integrity and the territorial unity of the republic and the inviolability of its borders. Of the above-mentioned economic independence of the republic.

The extension of economic and cultural ties and migration processes have brought about the fact that for many decades the Ukraine has been developing as a multinational community.

Our fundamental line in nationality policy is to preserve and enrich the national distinctiveness of the Ukrainian people and seek harmony in interethnic relations and the equality of all citizens, regardless of their nationality, language, attitude toward religion, and length of time that they have lived on republic territory.

We are profoundly convinced that a real upsurge of society is connected with the revival and development of national culture and the spiritual and intellectual potential of the people. It is to this that the comprehensive programs for the development of culture in the Ukrainian SSR and the development of historical research and an improvement in the study and propaganda of the history of the Ukraine, which are being drawn up currently on the initiative of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, are geared.

The Central Committee Politburo believes that it is of fundamental importance to instruct the communist people's deputies of the Ukraine to raise in the republic parliament, by way of legislative initiative, the question of the elaboration and enactment of laws on science and culture in the Ukrainian SSR. They should affirm contemporary new principles of state support for the development of science, literature, art and the aesthetic upbringing of the population, and provide for nonstandard, modern approaches in questions of cultural building.

It is essential to embark more vigorously on the solution of the problem of the national-cultural development of all peoples of the Ukraine. The communists working in the state authorities need to step up work on the organization of the publication of newspapers and on the release of radio and television programs in the national languages and the creation of the necessary conditions for study of the history, culture, and languages of different nationalities. Big and important tasks are entrusted to the Ukrainian SSR State Committee for Nationalities which has just been formed.

The formation of national-cultural societies has become a manifestation of the growth of the national self-awareness of the peoples of the Ukraine. Six republics and dozens of local associations of this type are operating currently. A republic council coordinating this entire work began its activity recently. The party and state authorities should render them all-around assistance, particularly at the formation stage.

The heart of national culture is language. We recall the ferment of passions surrounding the problem of the official status of Ukrainian. The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet passed the corresponding law, and work on its realization has begun. However, a considerable divergence of views has been manifested here already. There are people who are dissatisfied with the pace, so to speak, of implementation of the law. But extremes are impermissible here. Consistent, painstaking, and composed work on the unswerving implementation of the Language Act is needed.

And one more thing. We have today found ourselves faced with the fact of certain members of the CPSU and individual party committees, having succumbed to a negativist, all-denying mood, having altogether absented themselves from education of the working people in a spirit of patriotism and internationalism. The old forms of this work have been abandoned, and a search for new ones is not being conducted.

The patriotism of the Soviet people and their inherent internationalism are unique phenomena in the history of mankind. They are today being put to a severe test. We must preserve these sacred feelings, come what may. We cannot permit national revival to rise on the yeast of discord and, at times, bloody strife also. It is the duty of every communist and every honest man to defend perestroyka against those who are inflaming nationalist sentiments and sowing distrust and hostility between people.

Patriotism, international fraternity and the friendship of the peoples—such are our political and civic reference points.

IV. To Accelerate the Party's Renewal

Comrades!

The dismantling of the command-administrative system and the CPSU's renunciation of political monopolism, which was legislatively enshrined in the new wording of Articles 6 and 7 of the USSR Constitution, have placed our party in a fundamentally new social and political situation. Hence forward the CPSU will have to fight for the implementation of its program goals on a par with other political and public organizations.

There are still in the republic today no officially formed other parties. But if account is taken of the presence of implacable political opponents and the tough course of political struggle, we are essentially already living under multiparty conditions.

All this has brought about the need for a fundamental renewal of the party itself. This is the main idea permeating the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress and the party rules.

Perestroyka in the CPSU is being manifested also in the broadening of the independence of the communist parties of the Union republics, which are acquiring within the framework of the single CPSU a qualitatively new status. It is this which afforded us grounds for the formulation of draft program principles for the activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party and its rules. These documents should afford extensive scope for a display of the initiative and assertiveness of the republic's communists and their independent solution of all questions of their activity, up to and including the formulation of their own political line and choice of tactics for realizing all-party decisions.

What kind of renewed Ukrainian Communist Party do we envision?

This is a fundamental question. And it should be stated quite unequivocally here that we adhere and will continue to adhere to Lenin's concept of a vanguard mass party. A vanguard party developing as a result of consolidation on the platform of the restructuring of the most progressive representatives of all strata of our society. A mass, nationwide party relying on a broad social base and expressing the interests of the working people and the people of the republic.

We see as the main meaning of renewal of the party the profound democratization of its entire life and activity, the supremacy of the party masses over the elective bodies and the apparatus and a real opportunity for each party organization and each communist to actively influence the formulation and implementation of the party's policy line. This can only be achieved given a revival of the principle of democratic centralism in the Leninist understanding and its purge of deformations and extraneous features of the past.

It should be emphasized that the democratization of party life cannot be an end in itself. It must serve to develop the party and strengthen it.

It is, after all, obvious that under multiparty conditions, factionalism in the party is the direct route to its demise. This is why we today see as an urgent task emphatic dissociation of ourselves from platforms and groupings which aspire to destroy and split the party from within. The determining criteria for such delineation should be, in our opinion:

in the ideological sphere: fidelity to Marxist-Leninist teaching and communist ideals;

in the organizational sphere: defense of the unity of the party ranks on the basis of the principle of democratic centralism.

It is by proceeding from these criteria that the so-called "Democratic Platform," which essentially presents an alternative to the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the congress, is unacceptable to us.

Unfortunately, the dubious ideas of the "Democratic Platform" have found supporters in some of our party organizations also. And the Central Committee Plenum should make a scrupulous evaluation of these actions, which, in our view, should be seen as nothing other than factional.

I also have to mention the behavior of certain leaders and activists of "Rukh," who quite recently even were perfectly content with membership in the CPSU. They have now declared their intention to create a new party. And have immediately hastened to descend on the CPSU with sweeping charges.

The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat expressed its attitude toward this in a decision published in the press. For actions incompatible with membership in the CPSU the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Party Control Commission expelled a number of "Rukh" activists from the party.

We are convinced that the more quickly the party frees itself from people who do not share its ideals and who are attempting to split it from within, the better it will be for the party. And this policy needs to be pursued firmly and consistently everywhere. The more so in that this entirely corresponds to the principles of the democratization of our life. If we disagree in our political views, let us separate into different parties, not destroy one party from within.

I would like once more to caution against a frivolous attitude toward a variety of "questionable" innovations regularly being tossed up by the overt and covert opponents of perestroyka. The calls for the elimination of party committees in production, in state establishments and educational institutions, in the Armed Forces and in the law enforcement authorities, say, are becoming increasingly insistent. Such attempts should be emphatically rebuffed. And this should be done primarily by the communists who are members of collectives. Capitulation in the political struggle is impermissible. Nor can we justify in this connection, retreat in the face of mass-meeting pressure on the existing party structures.

We understand that an "anti-apparat" mood, so to speak, has to be reckoned with locally. But the main thing for us should be the interests of the cause. Of course, the party structures need to be perfected. But it is necessary to proceed here from the fact that a vanguard mass party simply cannot operate without its own structures and apparatus.

Also disturbing is the fact that recently certain primary party organizations, ignoring the current CPSU Rules, are making decisions on not surrendering collected membership dues in full. They are opening savings accounts for these resources and are arbitrarily transferring some of them to various funds. All these actions are a violation of party and financial discipline and could lead to the squandering of party assets.

The proposals of primary party organizations concerning an increase in the deductions from dues for their needs are supported by the CPSU Central Committee and the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee. They have been taken into consideration in the draft new party rules. We believe that we should not display haste and allow the primary party organizations arbitrary actions on these matters prior to the CPSU congress.

We are convinced that our party will emerge from the complex process of perestroyka strong and ideologically and organizationally cohesive.

We hope that in discussion of the draft program principles for the activity and rules of the Ukrainian Communist Party the participants in the plenum will not only submit their proposals and observations but specify the ways and methods for their practical realization.

The discussion by the communists and nonparty persons of these drafts following their publication in the press should also enrich us with new ideas. This work should be performed in close connection with the report and election campaign in the party and the preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress.

You all know what an animated discussion developed in the republic in connection with the dates of the report and election campaign in the party organizations. This was confirmed also by yesterday's meeting with gorkom and raykom first secretaries. Some advocated it being held after the CPSU congress, others defended no less heatedly the opinion that it should take place before the congress.

There are sufficient arguments on both sides. But whatever the case, it is necessary by the time of the congress to have unfailingly dissociated ourselves decisively and uncompromisingly from those who do not share the draft CPSU platform and party rules on fundamental matters of principle.

From this viewpoint it is extremely necessary that we hold the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress prior to the CPSU congress.

We believe that the congress' main task is the discussion and adoption of the program principles of the Ukrainian Communist Party and its rules.

Proceeding from this, it is proposed to begin the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress on 19 June and to receive at it:

the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee report, "The Political Situation in the Republic and the Main Directions for the Ukrainian Communist Party's Activity at the Current Stage"; and

the report of the Ukrainian Communist Party Auditing Commission;

examining draft program documents of the Ukrainian Communist Party;

electing the executive authorities of the Ukrainian Communist Party and adopting, if necessary, a number of resolutions and statements.

As far as the congress representation quota is concerned, it could be determined thus: one delegate per 2,000 party members.

There is every reason to hope that the forthcoming CPSU and Ukrainian Communist Party congresses will be really pivotal events, will make qualitatively new changes to the life and activity of the party and will collectively formulate a new political course which will enable us to move more energetically along the path of socialism.

CPSU Election Policy Noted

90UN1661C Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 3 Apr 90 p 1

[Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum decision: "Reports and Elections in the Ukrainian Communist Party"]

[Text] 1. In accordance with the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee March (1990) Plenum, to deem it expedient to conduct report and election meetings and conferences in the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1990.

In the course of the elections to employ the approaches provided for by the CPSU Central Committee March (1990) Plenum, the procedure for the election of delegates to the 28th Party Congress and the provisions of the draft new CPSU Rules.

2. To elect delegates to the oblast and Kiev city party conferences by secret ballot by party electoral district, and in the primary party organizations, according to a single list or at rayon and city conferences of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

Resolution on Sovereignty Issued

90UN1661D Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 3 Apr 90 p 1

[Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum resolution: "Political and Economic Sovereignty of the Ukraine"]

[Text] The plenum considers a most important task of the Ukrainian Communist Party: The consistent assertion of the political and economic sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] in a renewed Soviet Federation. This course should be a dependable basis for the consolidation of all progressive forces, the surmounting of the crisis phenomena in the sociopolitical and economic spheres and the creation of worthy living conditions for all people inhabiting the republic.

The plenum determines the following fundamental features of the political and economic sovereignty of the Ukraine:

the sovereignty of the people of the Ukraine on their territory, the spokesman for their wishes being the soviets of people's deputies;

the state integrity, territorial unity, and territorial supremacy of the Ukrainian SSR;

independence in the determination of the institutions and symbols of statehood and the administrative-territorial arrangement;

the right of the republic to determine the solution of which questions it passes on to the jurisdiction of Union bodies;

the priority of the laws of the republic over enforceable enactments of organs of administration of the USSR;

the creation of a legal basis and mechanism for the protection of the republic's economic interests and a broadening and strengthening of ties to the Union republics;

the formation of the Ukrainian SSR as a real subject of international law; creation of the necessary conditions for the extensive development of economic, scientific, and cultural ties to foreign countries.

The plenum instructs the communist USSR people's deputies from the republic and the Ukrainian people's deputies to participate actively in the elaboration of the new Union treaty of the USSR and the law on the jurisdiction of the Union republics and the USSR.

With regard for the importance of realizing the decision of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee February (1990) Plenum on elaboration of the draft law "Economic Independence of the Ukraine" the plenum advocates its examination in the new Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet and instructs the communists working in the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers and official bodies of the republic to prepare the necessary proposals.

While supporting the political and economic sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR, the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenum is opposed to all attempts by separatist forces to take advantage of this situation for nationalist ends and for inciting national egotism and enmity.

The plenum is emphatically opposed to the calls by extremist elements for the republic's secession from the USSR. The republic's communists will strengthen the friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance of the peoples of the USSR and will not retreat from Lenin's principles of internationalism.

The Central Committee plenum calls on the party organizations to engage in extensive canvassing and explanatory work aimed at strengthening discipline and organization and excluding anarchy at work and irresponsibility in management of the economy as an important condition for the increased well-being of the people of the republic.

Party Congress Agenda Proposed

90UN1661B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 3 Apr 90 p 1

[Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum decision: "Convening of the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress"]

[Text] 1. In alteration of the decision of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee October (1989) Plenum, to convene the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress on 19 June 1990.

To propose the following agenda for the congress:

The political situation and the main directions for the activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party at the current stage. Report of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee.

Report of the Ukrainian Communist Party Auditing Commission.

Program documents of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

Elections of executive authorities of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

2. To determine as the representation quota for the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress one delegate per 2,000 party members.

In the course of the election of delegates to the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress the obkoms [oblast party committees] and the Kiev Gorkom [City Party Committee] will employ the approaches provided for by the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee March (1990) Plenum, the procedure for the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the provisions of the draft new party rules.

To elect delegates to the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress in the oblast and Kiev city party organizations by secret ballot from several nominations by party electoral district, and in the primary party organizations, according to a single list exceeding the number of seats or at the oblast and Kiev city party conferences.

To instruct the obkoms and Kiev Gorkom to determine the procedure for electing delegates with regard for the proposals of the communists and the conditions of the work of the party organizations. To consider the need to provide for the representation of young communists.

Delegates from communists in party organizations of the Soviet Army and Navy and the internal and border forces will be elected at party conferences of the military units and associations.

The lists of delegates elected to the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress will be submitted to the congress by the oblast and Kiev city party conferences.

To determine that the party organizations may, simultaneously with the election of delegates to the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, submit proposals pertaining to candidacies for the executive authorities of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

New Members Listed

90UN1661A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 1 Apr 90 p 1

["Information Report on the Plenum of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Excerpts] A plenum of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee was held on 31 March 1990.

Executives of the republic and the oblasts who are not members of the Central Committee and also a group of gorkom and raykom [city and rayon party committee] secretaries, party committee secretaries, leaders of enterprises, kolkhozes [collective farms] and research establishments and educational institutions, representatives of the working class, peasantry, research workers, and the artistic intelligentsia and people working in the press, television, and radio were invited to the plenum.

The plenum examined the following questions:

Program documents for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress.

Convening of the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress.

Reports and elections in the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The Central Electoral Commission for the Election of Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress.

An organizational matter.

The report was delivered by V.A. Ivashko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee.

[passage omitted]

Closing remarks were delivered by V.A. Ivashko.

The plenum adopted decisions, which will be carried in the press, on the questions discussed.

The resolutions "Political and Economic Sovereignty of the Ukraine" and "For a Strengthening of the Unity of the Party Ranks" were adopted also.

The plenum examined an organizational matter.

The plenum relieved V.A. Sologub of his duties as member of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo in connection with his tendered resignation.

In connection with his appointment as member of the USSR Presidential Council and his departure from the republic, G.I. Revenko was relieved of his duties as candidate member of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo.

The plenum elected G.P. Kharchenko, first secretary of the Zaporozhye Obkom [Oblast Party Committee], member of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo.

N.V. Bagrov, first secretary of the Crimea Obkom, was elected candidate of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo.

V.I. Nakonechnyy, head of a division of the CPSU Central Committee Party Building and Cadre Work Department, took part in the plenum.

The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenum herewith concluded.

Grigoriy Petrovich Kharchenko, member of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo

Grigoriy Petrovich Kharchenko was born in 1936, a Ukrainian, member of the CPSU since 1962, higher education—graduated in 1959 from the Moscow Railroad Transport Engineers Institute, in 1981, from the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences—railway engineer-economist.

He began his working life as a plant foreman and was subsequently a junior staff member at a mechanical engineering institute and went into Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] work. As of 1968 he has been performing party and soviet work—first secretary of Zaporozhye's Leninskiy Raykom, then chairman of the executive committee of the Zaporozhye City Soviet of Workers' Deputies. In 1974, secretary and second secretary of the Zaporozhye Obkom. In 1986, inspector and deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Organizational-Party Work Department.

In October 1988 he was elected first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Zaporozhye Obkom.

A people's deputy of the USSR and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Nikolay Vasilyevich Bagrov, candidate of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo

Nikolay Vasilyevich Bagrov was born in 1937, a Ukrainian, member of the CPSU since 1962, higher education—graduated in 1959 from the Crimea Pedagogical Institute, candidate of geographical sciences, senior lecturer.

He began his career as a high school teacher, worked as a senior lecturer and was elected secretary of the party bureau of the Pedagogical Institute. In 1970, head of the Department of Science and Educational Institutions, and in 1978, secretary, and 1985, second secretary, of the Ukrainian Communist Party Crimea Obkom. He was as of 1988, head of a division, and as of 1989, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Party Building and Cadre Work Department.

Elected in September 1989 first secretary of the Crimea Obkom.

Ivashko Interviewed on Perestroyka

PM0305113090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 May 90 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with V.A. Ivashko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, by M. Odinets; date, place of interview not stated under the rubric "The Party and Perestroyka": "A Time of Difficult Decisions", first paragraph is Odinets introduction]

[Text] Not long before our meeting V. Ivashko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, visited Donetsk and took part in the oblast party conference. The Donetsk party organization is the biggest in the Ukraine, and naturally its communists—workers, people who work in the fields and at the livestock units, specialists in various sectors, and scientists—have a great influence on the life and affairs of not only the oblast, but the republic as a whole. What were his impressions of the mining district, what is new and interesting there?—that was the question that began our talk.

"In the few days I spent in the Donbass," Vladimir Antonovich said, "I was able to visit not only the conference, but also a mine and a metallurgical combine and to meet with rural workers and economists. In short, there were interesting, frank conversations. In brief, the following general conclusion can be drawn: People seek the fruitful renewal of life in general and want real changes. And that requires a good political and economic basis on which it would be possible to resolve the complex problems that have accumulated in the Donbass over many decades. The party conference took place self-critically, in a businesslike way, without too much verbiage or emotionalism. The most diverse opinions and views were expressed, and you can agree with them or not, but this is a normal phenomenon and this is how the party should live today."

[Odinets] How did the elections of the obkom [oblast committee] and its first secretary go?

[Ivashko] The discussion was stormy. During it, I suddenly received a note: "Please express the view of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee: whom it recommends for the post of obkom first secretary." You see how the habit of expecting instructions from above still lives on! I replied that if I were to submit such a proposal now, it would basically mean a return to the old practice. In which case, what is the use of all our talk of democratization and renewal in the party? It turns out that people think about the matter and spend several hours discussing it, but then someone stands up and says—that's enough, you've had your say, and now listen to what I say!

Naturally, who is to be the party obkom first secretary is not a matter of indifference to the Central Committee. But there can only be one approach here—not to command from above, but gradually to train people who are capable of working under the new conditions. And let the communists themselves weigh up, by their strict criteria, who is the worthiest.... No, I did not name any names, but in my view those who were elected are precisely the people who can undoubtedly be trusted with such responsible work.

[Odinets] And how are things going in the republic economy? What were the results of the first quarter?

[Ivashko] The quarter ended with an increase in production volumes, but the growth is so insignificant (less than one percent) that it cannot, of course, be seen as gratifying. At the same time the republic has great potential, but it is by no means being used in the best way. And naturally communists cannot tolerate that. Economic questions were and are constantly in our field of vision. For us, as for any political party, socioeconomic policy is the pivot of all our activity. Of course, this does not mean that party workers should decide how much wheat to sow and where or how to organize the fattening of cattle. The committees are resolutely avoiding that kind of "leadership." But who needs a party which is incapable of proposing an effective solution to basic socioeconomic problems? A party is not a club of people who share, say, professional interests.

[Odinets] The republic is moving toward sovereignty, in particular, through economic accountability. What prospects and difficulties do you see here? By all appearances the task is as yet advancing only slowly.

[Ivashko] Well, instant changes cannot be expected in such matters—there is no such thing as an economic miracle. Nonetheless it seems to me that by following this path, in the new Soviet Federation, each republic, including the Ukraine, could certainly become a sovereign state making its contribution to unionwide affairs and receiving the corresponding equivalent both through the Union and on the basis of direct links with other Union republics. We also see this path as an opportunity to eliminate the imbalance that has grown up in our republic's economic development in favor of heavy industry and ecologically dangerous industries.

I would like to stipulate that this path does not necessarily mean the formation of republican ministries instead of unionwide ministries. It is my profound conviction that a republican industrial ministry is no better, and is more likely to be worse, than a unionwide ministry: Our bureaucrat is the same, only he has less opportunities for maneuvering. It is by no means a question of moving the signboards from Moscow to Kiev, but of creating a new economy on the basis of different management principles. Enterprises organize links through the production of the necessary output, rather than on the basis of a large management organ.

Naturally, by this means we are eroding, and have already begun to erode, the departmental approach in management. And the departments will, of course, resist. Here it is necessary to show patience and, most important, to ensure an economic approach. Because replacing one administrative edict system with another will change precisely nothing in essence. True, we lack experience, we are only taking the first steps. For instance, there are, in general, quite good results in the matter of balancing finances. The republic government and economic organs have tackled this persistently, and in the first quarter of this year it had already proved possible to markedly strengthen the financial system and to eliminate certain mistakes in cadre policy.

[Odinets] I would like to hear your assessment of the sociopolitical atmosphere in the republic.

[Ivashko] In brief, it differs little from the general atmosphere in the country, although it has its peculiarities. You know that for a number of years some people have accused the Ukraine of adherence to stagnation and called us all kinds of names, and indeed are continuing to do so. Yet, for all the defects, our political reform is, we believe, going fairly intensively, and the democratization of various aspects of society's life is continuing. Our party is also being renewed. You yourself have been to meetings of communists and have doubtless seen for yourself: Both the spirit and the content is changing. Yes, like everywhere else today, we do have conservatives, we have radicals, we even have people who would like... a constitutional monarchy. In short, the spectrum of opinions and convictions is wide. Naturally it is not easy to work in this situation. We see it as our task everywhere to smooth out contradictions and enmity, to unite people on the principles of humane, democratic socialism, and to attract them through an intelligent policy enabling everyone to build a new life.

There are many problems, but if they are approached from these standpoints, progress could be achieved. Here in the Ukraine, for instance, there are people of many nationalities, but we have managed to avoid an ethnic confrontation. I think the policy persistently pursued by the republic Communist Party Central Committee has helped achieve this. True, we give priority to and promote the revival of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian national culture, but never to the detriment of any other nationality. It is no accident that there are in the Ukraine a whole series of national associations and cultural centers—for instance, for Poles, Jews, Hungarians, Greeks, and so forth. Does this mean that there are no nationalist or other such currents at all? No, it does not. So there is still concern to ensure that the distinction is clearly drawn between the national and the nationalist, between what is directed toward the preservation and enrichment of the Ukrainian national culture and the individuality of history, policy, and so forth, and aspirations to isolationism, up to and including separatist ideas.

[Odinets] It is nearly two weeks since the publication of the CPSU Central Committee open letter to the country's communists. How was it received and what thoughts has it prompted?

[Ivashko] Very diverse and mixed, you could say. It is rather sad, because the communists are now having to deal with matters which, to be frank, cannot be called productive. Let me say frankly: It would be nice not to have to waste time and effort on debates and disputes instead of concentrating on understanding and resolving social, ecological, cultural, and scientific problems. And this is, of course, not the most important idea in the Central Committee letter. The main point is that communists have to live and work in completely different conditions from before. An active process of democratization of society is in progress and the diversity of political and social currents and movements is becoming increasingly broad and rich—this is a reality that must be reckoned with. Formerly, the emergence of some other party would have been regarded as a mortal sin, but now we see parties springing up one after another like mushrooms after rain. This process cannot be stopped or held back. So it must be studied and taken into account in our work. And that means that we ourselves cannot remain unchanged and hide behind the old dogmas.

We communists are a party of like-minded people. People may object: There are not even two people who think identically. True. But we are like-minded on the most important point—commitment to a Marxist-Leninist platform. If you agree with it and support, in the main, the party's organizational principles, then you are like-minded. And what if you do not share the ideas and basic principles? In that case, why should you remain in this party? A democratic society allows you to join with the people whose ideas you share. And why make a fuss, saying that people are expelled from the CSPU for dissidence. That is what we are accused of now. But it is clearly stated in the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat's resolution that people who form another party are putting themselves outside the CPSU! Is that not clear? I think it is unseemly, at best, to be in two parties at once.

Incidentally, it was not in our party's documents that the term "demarcation" ["razmezhevaniye"] first appeared. Take the text of the so-called "Democratic Platform" which was published in PRAVDA, and there you will find words about the need for demarcation. True, they are talking about "radicals" and "conservatives," but what difference do names make? Today, for instance, some people, in their letters and speeches, call me a radical, while others (equally heatedly) call me a conservative. When you get to the crux of the matter, the main thing now is ideological and organizational unity.

[Odinets] Nonetheless criticism has appeared in the local press in connection with some remarks at the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenum on the subject of demarcation. It is said that people are virtually calling for the return of Stalinism.

[Ivashko] Well, everyone has the right to express his view and criticize what he disagrees with. But should people hurry to pin labels on others?—that is another matter. Unfortunately we have plenty of people who excel at doing that. I have heard it said repeatedly, even by some USSR people's deputies, that we now have a...Stalinist-Brezhnevist Constitution. But the curious thing is that none of the critics elected on the basis of that Constitution refused his deputy's seat. So on the one hand, it is Stalinist-Brezhnevist, and on the other, it is fine...

[Odinets] All the same, I would like to go back to the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenum. You think it went quite well and called for consolidation. But I repeat, some of the mass media are giving it a negative assessment, and the speeches are being criticized. Are wishes being confused with reality?

[Ivashko] It is now the rule for television relays to take place from Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenums. And therefore everyone can judge everything for himself, on the basis of what he sees and hears, and not only from press reports. Anyway, some commentators will describe you in such a way that your own mother would not recognize you. That is why we conduct our plenums openly. At the same time, I think the following observation should be made here. The discussion at the plenum may take different forms, but all the same, the main thing is what decisions it adopts and what results it produces. In this case I am convinced that the results were positive and constructive. Incidentally, it is a pity that PRAVDA did not report this.

In the Ukraine today there are many organizations uniting the so-called informals. They are very diverse, there are some that openly come out against the party and socialism. As far as I can tell, here too the Central Committee is in favor of seeking paths to consolidation...

[Ivashko] I think "informals" is a rather unfortunate term. But that is beside the point. The range of these organizations is indeed wide, and it is important not to approach the task of assessing them on the basis of the principle: These are white and those are black. This dualistic criterion is in appropriate here. We are in favor of seeking and finding points of contact with social movements and establishing constructive cooperation. Life shows that this path is fruitful. This is what happened, for instance, during the preparation of the electoral law, and of the law on languages in the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], and in a number of other cases. Precedent is important here: By finding one point of contact you set the best possible example. Naturally, it is not a question of principles. As you know, compromising on matters of principle can do no good, but carries the risk of losing your own standpoint. With this reservation we have sought and will seek cooperation with all who want the Ukrainian people's good. We are not blinkered or afraid of something new, we are open to debates and dialogue. I do not think confrontation will do anyone any good now.

[Odinets] PRAVDA published a report from Lvov that communist teaching staff and teachers of Russian are being banned from the schools.

[Ivashko] We are well aware of what is happening in the republic's western oblasts, and sensible approaches are needed here. In practice, in recent years, arbitrary actions that could provoke a reaction have sometimes occurred. Violations of the law are, of course, impermissible, and measures are being adopted on the basis of the facts described by the newspaper. A statememt of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and republic Council of Ministers has been published, resolutely rebuffing political extremism.

[Odinets] It is obvious now that the policy of flirting with extremists which was pursued by the former Lvov party leadership has failed. Some communists say openly that Ya. Pogrebnyak, former first secretary of Lvov party obkom, betrayed the cause of socialism and should have been relieved of his post at the time when he lost the elections for USSR people's deputies.

[Ivashko] The situation here is complex, and the opponents of the party and of socialism are tyring to exploit it for their own purposes. True, the former party leadership showed itself to be politically infantile, to put it mildly. As you know, the obkom plenum gave an objective assessment of this, and a new leadership was elected. Of course, everything illegal that is being done in the western oblasts will be revoked. It will also be necessary to adopt other measures of a political and economic nature. But haste is unnecessary here, everything must be studied objectively. The events taking place in the Western Ukraine contain elements of euphoria. At the same time there are among the leading party workers, some real chameleons who have managed to "reorient" themselves. True, they have not earned any laurels. They have abandoned their party positions, but have not been admitted to the other camp. Let this be a lesson: That always happens to unprincipled people.

[Odinets] What can you say in general about the election results in the republic, in particular the elections of chairmen of soviets? These are curious, in my view.

[Ivashko] Judging by the figures, the results are not bad: 85 percent of the deputies of the republic's new Supreme Soviet are members of our party. True, having said that, I would avoid excessive optimism. In the party, as in society, there is a process of stratification taking place, and it is necessary to see in practice who is who. Nonetheless the fact that the slogan "For Soviets without communists!" which was zealously propagandized by our political opponents failed to get through is important in itself.

I regard it as a serious shortcoming that there are very few workers on the Supreme Soviet. Here, I think, the "idea" instilled by our political opponents played its part: Today, they say, it is hard for a worker to exert an influence in the Supreme Soviet. This is, if you like, a highly perfidious move, and unfortunately we failed to refute it. Although basically the "idea" is totally false. Practice itself shows something quite different. True, in the first instance, on entering the soviet, a working person who lacks political experience and skills may for a time remain in the background, gaining his experience. But then the situation changes, experience comes, his outlook widens, and in addition he has his own, authentic, unborrowed knowledge of the workers' life. The same can be said of kolkhoz [collective farm] members.

Incidentally, there are not many important scientists in the present Ukrainian Supreme Soviet either. Women and young people are underrepresented. In my view this displays a feature of today's social mood. And the Supreme Soviet has a difficult task—given its present composition, to reflect as fully as possible the interests of all social groups of society. If we succeed in this, the people will support the body of deputies.

Miners Hospitalized in Toxic Seepage Incident

PM0205155590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 90 p 1

[Report by V. Kosyak: "Incident at Mine"]

[Text] Yenakiyevo, Donetsk Oblast—Coal production has come to a halt at the "Uglegorskaya" mine, which is part of the "Ordzhonikidzeugol" association. During the night shift an unknown chemical seeped into one of the longwalls. Nine people were hospitalized and dozens are undergoing careful medical examination. The circumstances are being investigated by a special commission.

Following the mass poisoning of miners at a neighboring mine, for which the Gorlovka chemical plant was to blame, it is the second incident of this kind in the Donbass. The source and composition of the toxic substance are being identified. Mine trade union committee chairman Valeriy Torshin, who visited the victims in the hospital, told your correspondent that the miners were complaining of severe headaches.

Group Formed To Protect Ukrainian Orthodox

90UN1628D Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 30 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by N. Protsenko: "Passions at the Lord's Temples... or Why a Republic Committee To Defend the Rights of Believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Is Needed"]

[Text] At the Lvov temple the crucified Christ watches sadly as the local Christians break his commandments. And he would give them a new sermon, in the spirit of the 20th century, but he is compelled to remain silent—he is a statue.

The church doors are firmly shut until it is finally decided who may use the ancient Cathedral of Saint Yur in Lvov—the Orthodox, as they did since the 17th century and for the last 40 years and more, or eastern rite Catholics who have made their own claims on it. The clergymen feel exactly as though they are in a besieged fortress. And the faithful pray out on the street.

Not so long ago—on Sunday—dozens of Orthodox gathered at the wall of their sacred place in order to carry out their Christian duty. But they were not given peace to commune with the Lord: The parishioners were surrounded by an aggressive crowd acting in the name of the Catholics. Men and women who left kindergarten many years ago stuck out their tongues at those who were praying, tapped their foreheads with their fingers, insulted the priests, waved flags and placards, and drowned out the lines of the gospel with their shouts and songs. In a word, they did not conduct themselves in a way that was at all pleasing to God.

When the faithful separated to go home, escorts insisted upon accompanying some of them and threatened the defenseless old men with violence: They said that they might have time to cook their "paska" [traditional Easter dish], but they would not have the opportunity to taste it. They said in general that soon there would not be a single Orthodox believer remaining in the Ukraine, even in Kiev itself. And that it would be better to "banish all the Orthodox beyond the Urals because they are Turkish janissaries, members of the KGB, and Moscow pigs."

This news would have been considered completely unbelievable, ridiculous, and stupid if it were not for the tears in the eyes of Lvov Orthodox residents who heard it. They went to Kiev to find out the truth, and they learned that in the capital of the Ukraine there are preparations for a constituent conference to create a Republic Committee To Defend the Rights of Believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. And what can one say about the women who were frightened to death when the voices of even the venerable priests from Transcarpathian, Ivano-Frankovsk, and Lvov Oblasts trembled from agitation as they spoke about the violence and moral terror endured by thousands of common people today in the Western Ukraine.

Pogrom thugs have already seized dozens of temples in the name of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The expropriation is being conducted quite arbitrarily, according to delegates from Ternopol. A bus with 20-30 young people drives up to a rural church during services. Waving banners, they burst into the temple, seize the praying old men and the priest by their arms, and literally throw them out onto the street. Sometimes they put a knife to the throat of some old fellow and demand that he make an immediate conversion to the Catholic faith. Often the temples are seized along with all the property of the parish. At night people break into the homes of the priests. After such "Christian" visits, some of the priests end up in the hospital with extensive injuries.

True, for now the religious soil is watered for the most part with tears. But it will be worse, assert the conference's participants in one voice.

In Lvov itself and in the other cities of the Western Ukraine there are many inactive temples which could become Catholic. In Uzhgorod alone there are three of them, said a priest from Transcarpathia at the conference. In Christian fashion, the Orthodox are prepared to help the Catholics bring the temples to functioning condition or, more simply, to restore them. But representatives of the Ukrainian Catholic Church have demanded that they specifically be given the cathedrals. Here the issue is not so much to have one's own facilities as it is a wish to forcibly take back temples leased by the state to the Orthodox Galicians. (According to law, all religious structures are the property of the state and not of the church organizations.)

For the time being one thing is clear: A proposal that Orthodox and Catholics pray in the same temples by turns, according to religious reasons has, unfortunately, not garnered any responses from either side. Too many offenses have accumulated to extinguish the coming flames of passion through good will.

And the issue is not that "a Russian boor and a Ukrainian boor," squabbling in a line or on the streetcar, are inevitably calling each other "Bandera thug" and "Moscow pig," as some of the leaders of Lvov try to represent the situation in Galicia in speeches on Ukrainian television. What do the Russians have to do with it when the conflict bleeds amidst the Ukrainians themselves, when national and religious espousal of the Black Hundreds is not a poetic outburst of emotions but a carefully considered and well organized action? The majority of the participants of the conference came to just such a conclusion. And forces outside the church lead the actions of the religious pogrom thugs and extremists.

What kinds of forces outside the church? An address by the conference's participants to USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, deputies of the USSR and Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviets, the secretariat of the People's Movement of the Ukraine for the Defense of Perestroyka—Rukh, and the preparatory conference of "Helsinki 2" spoke about this openly:

"Various politicized organizations or their members (People's Rukh, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth, 'Memorial,' The Committee for the Defense of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and others), violating the USSR Constitution and the internal laws of the church communities and of the Orthodox Church, are meddling in an exclusively religious sphere, declaring the language of the divine service of the church communities and their confessional property to be the object of their interests, which arouses numerous protests from the faithful. These forces from outside the church encourage the creation of groups of fighters or take a direct part in the seizure, picketing, blockading, or closure of Orthodox temples in Galicia."

At the conference mention was also made of the position of the local powers which either openly protect extremists or observe what is happening with Olympian detachment, not interfering in the conflict under the premise that the church is separate from the state here. Let it be that way, but at the same time they forget that the honor and dignity of our own Soviet citizens—not "some foreign" believers—are being trampled and that the citizens are making a fair demand for the defense of state organs.

The Orthodox are demanding that there be a legal investigation into specific instances of violence and that criminal proceedings be instituted against specific pogrom thugs and those who instigate them by propagandizing national and religious discrimination. If they are not stopped, a new category of citizen will soon emerge in the Ukraine—refugee for reasons of religion.

It is SAD and funny that, along with the tricks of the hooligans, a certain "ideological" lining is being constructed from recycled historical material. Ignorant people who have never looked into the archives or done scientific research on the history of Christianity in Rus are now crying at all of Lvov's crossroads that Prince Vladimir of Kiev accepted not Orthodoxy... but Catholicism, although no one ever objected to the Byzantine origins of the homeland's religion before, at least in the last thousand years.

The conference's participants were surprised that the Ukrainian intelligentsia, especially the writers, who consider themselves "the nation's conscience," do not offer a proper evaluation of all these "historical discoveries" and hooligan tricks. Why doesn't Drach or Pavlychko, or Yavorivskiy raise his voice in defense of the rights of man in this specific instance? Can we expect that Aytmatov, Rasputin, or Adamovich will finally do it?

L.N. Lutkovskiy, president of the "Path to Truth" world outlook association, became executive secretary of the Republic Committee To Defend the Rights of Believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The parishioners of the church of Rogozov village in the Borispolkomskiy Rayon of Kiev Oblast know him as Father Leonid. And readers of the journal LITERATURNAYA UCHEBA know him as a translator of the Gospels. Such a versatile personality has headed a new social formation which has been joined by believers and atheists, priests and workers from the soviet and trade union organs, and scientific intelligentsia, students, and workers.

Speaking before the conference's participants L.N. Lutkovskiy said:

"The very fact of the creed of Christ raises a challenge to nationalism, because each Christian who belongs to his own people also enters, through the church, a united people of God...

"No matter what noble and humane goals it might pursue," continued Father Leonid, "the committee which has been created will only be a public organization without any real rights in practice. We must face the truth. Therefore I would like to address the conference with a proposal to entrust the leadership of the electoral commission with preparing everything necessary for the formation of a League of Ukrainian Christian Unity. This organization should exist outside the church and not aspire to power but rather to representation in the parliaments of the republic and the country with the goal of defending and upholding the rights of believers. It should pursue rigorous observation of the Law on Freedom of Conscience and the Law on Religions, it should take constructive positions, and it should oppose any manifestation of religious extremism."

THUS, the committee has been organized, and a fund for the aid of the believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has been created.

Moldavian Front Official on Links With Romania

LD0105194590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1200 GMT 1 May 90

[Telephone interview with (Georgiy Dimpu), secretary of the Council of the Moldavian People's Front in Kishinev, by unidentified correspondent; time and place not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [(Dimpu)] My name is (Georgiy Dimpu). I am secretary of the Council of the Moldavian People's Front and I am the people's deputy of the republic.

A session of the Council of the People's Front was held to discuss the issue of 6 May. On 6 May we are planning to organize a symbolic venture when Romanians on both banks of the river Prut i.e. the Romanians from Bessarabia and Romanians from Romania will meet on the banks of the River Prut and make a symbolic bridge of flowers across the River Prut.

The point is that we are of course people who share common roots which are centuries old; the ethos, history, the language and traditions are common. We have a common past and we believe that we will have a common future too. [passage omitted]

Moldavia is one-third of the territory of Romania. We want to fill in this wound with flowers, to demonstrate our attitude to this wound [of being torn apart by Molotov-Ribbentrop pact] by people from both sides. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] [passage omitted] You are a people's deputy, can you describe what happened at your parliament session. You know we heard that your parliament session started with a sermon which was read by a people's deputy.

[(Dimpu)] This is true. This is how it began and it continued very well. On 27 [April] we elected our president, chairman of the Supreme Council of the republic, he is Mircha Snegur. This is a great victory.

[Correspondent] Did the People's Front support his candidacy?

[(Dimpu)] Yes, yes, otherwise he would not have succeeded, because the other side, i.e. the Russian speaking side, supported Piotr Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee. As a result of the support and unity of the People's Front and the agrarians, 196 votes were cast in favor of Mircha Snegur. So he was elected while the first secretary received only 160 votes.

[Correspondent] [passage omitted] You told me that at last your national flag has been lagalized, i.e. its legal rights have been reinstated. [passage omitted]

[(Dimpu)] We did it on the same day. I personally climbed 75 meters to hoist the flag. It is six meters long and three meters wide. Following this a huge demonstration took place; it was a demonstration of celebration all over the city. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] How are the people of Moldavia reacting to the current events in Lithuania?

[(Dimpu)] Here in front of me I am holding information about the events in Lithuania. On 24 [April] I read a declaration on Lithuania. In this declaration we wanted to put to the vote. I proposed recognizing the independence of the republic of Lithuania and stating that the republic of Moldavia does not have any claims, neither territorial, economic, financial nor any other. [passage omitted] The democratic part of the parliament, which comprises almost two-thirds, thinks that on 3 May a vote will be taken on all I have spoken about. [passage omitted] You must hold on. We are with you and we believe that your freedom is our freedom.

Moldavian Political Roundtable Issues Statement

LD3004115290 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 18 Apr 90 p 2

["Joint Statement by Organizations Participating in the "Roundtable" of Moldavian Public and Sociopolitical Organizations and Movements"]

[Text] There was a "roundtable" of Moldavian public and sociopolitical organizations and movements in Kishinev between 9-16 April 1990 on the initiative of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau. Taking part in elaborating the joint statement were representatives of the Moldavian Popular front, the 'Unitatea-Yedinstvo' Intermovement, the 'Gagauz Khalky' popular movement, the Bulgarian 'Rebirth' Society, the Moldavian Jewish Culture Society, the Association of Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Historians, the Moldavian Union of Working People, the Moldavian Democratic-Christian League of Women, the 'Limba Noastra Cea Romana' Association, the Kishnev Humanist Club, the organizing committee for setting up a Moldavian Social Democratic Party, the Moldavian Peace Defense Committee, the Union of Veterans of the Armed Forces, the Charity and Health Fund, the 'Drokiya' Social and Cultural Organization, the Moldavian Peasants' Union and 'Libertatea'.

A representative of the military-sociological laboratory "public opinion" (Kishinev) took part in the "roundtable" as an observer.

The task of the "roundtable" was to have a broad exchange of opinions on questions put forward, to clarify the sides positions and find points of contact and common interests on the basis of striving for civil peace and national accord and using as a starting point the priority of common human values.

Noting the complexity of the sociopolitical situation in the republic resulting from slow implementation of perestroyka processes, from economic crisis, worsening relations between the nationalities, breaches of the law and the growth in the crime rate, those taking part in the "roundtable" agreed on the following:

We recognize our responsibility for stabilizing and harmonizing relations between the nationalities and the sociopolitical situation in the republic.

We are convinced that discussion of questions involving the political and economic sovereignty of Moldavia, republican citizenship, migration, unemployment and further socioeconomic, political, cultural, and other problems must take place in a spirit of goodwill and in a constructive way without confrontation and while taking into consideration the opinions of national, public and sociopolitical organizations and movements. Having discussed the question of the sovereignty of the Moldavian SSR in the context of the new political thinking on the future of the European home we recognize the need to implement the right of the Moldavian people to self-determination, which is expressed in an aspiration to achieve full political and economic sovereignty for Moldavia. The mechanism for implementing this must be worked out within the framework of international law and the Moldavian SSR Constitution to include safeguards for the social, spiritual, and cultural rights of all citizens of the republic.

We believe consistent implementation of the language laws is necessary, while striving to avoid both groundless politicization of language problems and social confrontation in the course of implementing the demands and clauses of the laws. This will promote improvement in relations between the nationalities in the republic. At the same time, we note the language laws are a necessary basis on which to revive the cultural and spiritual values of the Moldavian people and representatives of other peoples.

We express concern at the slow fulfillment of the state comprehensive program for safeguarding the functioning of languages on the territory of the Moldavian SSR and at slow elaboration and implementation of practical steps to fulfill the language laws.

We believe it necessary to bring the relevant normative documentation and practical programs for implementing the laws regarding Hebrew, which was not included in the state comprehensive program for safeguarding the functioning of languages on Moldavian SSR territory, into line with the language laws.

We believe there is a need for further work by the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet to perfect the language laws and the relevant programs for implementing them.

We stress the need for legislative reinforcement of the principle of the existence of many parties in the sociopolitical life of the republic and of the equality of all parties, public organizations and movements before the law and of their rights to create new and use existing mass media organs. At the same time, we view as intolerable the activity of parties, public organizations and movements that propagandize or use violence and that inflame dissent between the nationalities (chauvinism, nationalism, anti-semitism, and so forth) or that are geared toward dictatorship by any particular social group and reject the right of Moldavia to territorial integrity and sovereignty.

An important condition for national accord is observance of Moldavian SSR laws along with recognition by all who live in the republic of the right of the Moldavian people to self-determination and respect for their history, culture, and traditions. At the same time, all citizens of Moldavia, regardless of nationality or religious or other allegiance, have a right to social support and guarantees under the law, including the right to work and to school, professional and higher education, and to satisfy their cultural and spiritual needs.

Those taking part in the "roundtable" feel a sovereign Moldavian SSR should guarantee the equal right of all national minorities to free national-cultural development and to maintain their natural and uninterrupted national-cultural ties with representatives of their nationalities outside the republic and also with the national communities and state systems of these nationalities.

We believe Moldavian citizenship should be granted to all people living in the republic who recognize its Constitution.

We are in favor of satisfying the request of our compatriots who are outside the republic for political or other reasons to keep or be granted Moldavian citizenship.

Those taking part in the "roundtable" welcome the dialogue which has started between Moldavian and Ukrainian historians and are in favor of continuing and expanding it.

We acknowledge the existence of the Gagauz national problem and believe that it must be resolved at the same time as Moldavia gains true sovereignty.

Participants in the "roundtable" share the concern expressed by the Moldavian Jewish Culture Society at the lack of representation of Jews in the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet and propose that further improvement of Moldavian SSR election legislation should envision the possibility of providing representation for national minorities and groups that do not live in compact groups.

We note the need both to develop pluralism in the mass media and to raise its responsibility for observing the norms of political and journalistic ethics. We express the hope that these aims will be served by the Supreme Soviet of the republic adopting a Press Law in the very near future.

In opposing both the open and the covert political monopolization of Moldavian SSR Gosteleradio and other state mass media organs we are in favor of free and equal access to them for public and sociopolitical organizations.

Noting the common cultural and spiritual ties of Moldavia and Romania we believe there is a need further to expand comprehensive cooperation between these states and to make entry and exit regulations considerably easier. We are also in favor of developing this kind of cooperation with other countries.

We condemn the increasingly frequent violations and desecrations of historical and cultural monuments and express profound anxiety at the continuing poisoning and destruction of the environment. We call for stern legislative measures to be adopted and for responsibility to be stepped up for damage done to the republic's natural environment. We propose the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet should examine the question of making the Moldavian SSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature and certain other committees which fulfill a monitoring role directly subordinate to it.

We believe the whole range of problems of effective and ecologically safe development of the economy, science, and culture in the republic can only be resolved on the basis of social justice and on real equality of rights for citizens.

We favor steadfast observance of the republic's laws during mass, mass-political, and other demonstrations and oppose violent methods and ultimatums. We call on all organizations, movements, and organs of authority strictly to observe existing laws in accordance with the norms of international law.

Participants in the "roundtable" decided to set up a permanent republican forum of public and sociopolitical organizations and movements as a continuation of the "roundtable."

Caucasus

Armenian Deputies View Azerbaijan Decree

LD0305150990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] An extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia is taking place in Yerevan. The deputies are discussing the exacerbation of the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] in connection with the adoption by the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan of a decree on partial changes in the administrative and territorial division of a number of rural rayons of the NKAO and Stepanakert.

Azerbaijani Workers Paid After 'Serious Talks'

NC2404115790 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
0440 GMT 20 Apr 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The [word indistinct] workers of [name indistinct] town in Mardakertskiy Rayon in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, which is inhabited by Azerbaijanis, were not paid their wages for more than six months. The residents of the town [words indistinct] savings bank in Mardakert since (?1988). The command headquarters in the region intervened to rectify the situation. According to Captain [name indistinct], very serious talks had to be held with the leading officials of the savings bank in Mardakert. As a result, more than R100,000 have been paid to the town's residents so far.

Article Discusses Anniversary of Tbilisi Shootings

PM3005164090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 16, 17-23 Apr 90 pp 28-30

[Aleksandr Pumpyanskiy article: "The Bronze Horseman on a Tbilisi Square"]

[Text] Strangely, this argument has passed kind of unnoticed. Ours are eventful times - recall, for instance, the last-Friday mini-revolution at Leningrad's TV station, which rejected all the universally recognized canons - the rules of hierarchic subordination, the insistence of the ethics commission of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet and, perhaps, the arguments of common sense for the sake of asserting the freedom of speech principle and the public's uncurtailed right to information. But even in these stirring times, the public debate between Eduard Shevardnadze on one side, and Aleksandr Katusev, the Chief Military Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., on the other, - is an extraordinary phenomenon.

Strictly speaking, this has been no argument at all. It began with the ORGONEK correspondent Leonid Pleshakov asking the U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister, in the course of an interview, without beating about the bush: what had actually happened in Tbilisi on the night of April 8, 1989, and why. How would have you acted, he asked him, in place of Georgian leaders on that tragic night? Shevardnadze took up the gauntlet.

He called the nightime operation "a punitive action against demonstrators" and condemned it outright. He firmly worded the following principle: "If there is no threat to the life, health and dignity of citizens, if meetings and processions do not transgress the law, then action should be restricted to exclusively political means. All the more so when women and children constitute a no small proportion of the demonstrators."

He said he could not "understand" the behavior of the generals who had masterminded the operation. "In our times," he said "the military as high-ranked as that cannot be merely soldiers. They should also be politicians." The military are supposed to be able to get along with the people. He accused General Rodionov, the then Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, of being unable to do that.

Shevardnadze is worried about the alienation between the leaders and the people, between the military and the people. "This must be overcome," says he. "Otherwise there is no avoiding other stupid decisions like that of using force in Tbilisi."

He also pointed to the dense smokescreen of lies following the tragic events in Tbilisi. "The masterminds of the operation and those who conducted the investigation," he said, "lied without batting an eyelid." They lied about the entrenching shovels. About the bases. The fact that both had been used was recognized much later, by no means on the first day after the event, when it was too late to deny it. Lies were told even to them, Shevardnadze and Razumovskiy, representatives of the higher echeons. All accusations were rejected. "I can't understand why," Shevardnadze said. "The murder will out anyway. They knew that, and still they lied. It's terrible."

Little has been said about Katusev. Asked by the interviewer why it was the military prosecutor who denied the findings of the Sobchak Commission, Shevardnadze replied: "Much baffles me here. Since it had been decided to hear out the Sobchak Commission of the Congress of the U.S.S.R. People's Deputies, no supplementary reports were required. If anyone disagreed with Sobchak's conclusions, he was free to speak in the debates that followed. As to Katusev, let me put it straight - his speech amounted to an indictment. Frankly, I had to muster up all my restraint to hear out the military prosecutor to the end. He was outrageously nonobjective, I would even say dishonest. This is inexplicable from the viewpoint of a normal human being, just as many of his arguments and accusations are."

"It shouldn't have been left to the military prosecutor's office to investigate this crime. Being the military prosecutor, Comrade Katusev cannot remain objective... Whether he wants it or not, 'the honour of the regiment' compels him to gloss over the facts."

How General Rodionov and other servicemen who had taken part in the Tbilisi operation responded to the above remains unknown, but Lieutenant-General Katusev's reaction was as follows: (it is certainly worth quoting):

"It has become a tradition with us for the people in high places to pull rank on those on lower rungs of the hierarchy... This is taken for granted as much as the practice of the superior unceremoniously addressing his subordinates by first name, and the latter being obliged to 'sir' him. I have been under the impression that the processes of perestroika have been ousting this style of relations in our society over the past five years, but your interview, appearing in the Ogonek magazine (No. 11, 1990) under the heading 'Convince by the Truth', goes to show that, unfortunately, little has changed - as far as you personally are concerned, anyway..."

There is no denying the daring of this caustic message - its author is hardly afraid of anything, and has the nerve of picking on a member of the government.

The powers-that-be throwing their weight about, the party and government bigwigs being immune to any court, the press reserving only eulogy for executives from a certain level up as if they were demigods, not human beings... All these are long-standing features of our political reality. So when a little man clenches his fists and, like Pushkin's Eugene, challenges the Bronze Horseman, our sympathies, naturally, lie with the little man.

However, I find it difficult to see Lieutenant-General Katusev as a little man: his title and his position rather "qualify" him for the role of the Bronze Horseman. The workers of the law- enforcing agencies are in duty bound, of course, to protect little man against arbitrariness from above. Nevertheless, as far as I know, our hero has first raised his voice to defend the little man when the latter happened to be none other than himself. Although this circumstance depreciates the act somewhat, it is quite indicative of the present-day social situation. Now even some big shots resort to populist arguments ("What else could you expect from the authorities?", "All of you up there are so-and-so"). And although "carping" and "mud-slinging" have been repeatedly fulminated against as secret passions of the press, just stop and think how much bitterness, not to say venom, some military prosecutors bottle up until they get a chance to vent it on the system as a whole. Even perestroika has not lived up to Comrade Katusev's radiant hopes - and won't for as long as some dare to criticize him.

And then any means come into play, including toxic agents of, I should say, the most primeval kind - poison shafts. It has turned out, you see, that Katusev is not the only victim, that the whole system of military prosecutors has been undermined!" ("Unhealthy sentiment is instigated as regards their law-enforcing activity"). Shevardnadze remarked, in passing, that the tsar's Governor-General of Georgia was a clever person and a diplomat; Katusev lost no time in exposing the "idea of military viceroyship as untenable nowadays" and demanded a "public answer." That's how easy it is to trump up charges (political, of course) even against a member of the Politburo. So what can we expect of two modest investigators if the person responsible for the nationwide criminal investigation system stoops to methods like these?

Katusev refutes his opponent's judgements by the following concrete arguments.

He could not interfere with investigation and cover up the actions of the military for the simple reason that on those days in April, when he, Katusev, had been in Tbilisi together with Shevardnadze, he wasn't Deputy Procurator-General of the U.S.S.R. and the Chief Military Prosecutor yet, but Deputy Procurator-General of the U.S.S.R. in charge of investigations. Katusev clams he "was the first to suspect that servicemen might have used entrenching shovels and toxic agents, whereupon he immediately instructed a body of investigators to find out whether such actions had taken place."

Although interesting, this argument is hardly 100-per cent convincing. Let us believe the sore prosecutor that he was actually the first to see the scars left by the shovels and to smell gases, and then ordered an inquiry. One would like to know, however, at least now, a year after the tragic events: what have the investigators found out? Who is to blame and at what level? Who has been punished for criminal acts - and for covering them up, for lies?

Or was that a case - alas, all to frequent in our reality - of the whole thing being dropped after Katusev got a new appointment? Could his successor engage in sabotage? Don't the instructions issued by Deputy Procurator-General of the U.S.S.R. in charge of investigation apply to the military prosecutor whose job is to investigate relevant crimes (the point Katusev especially insists upon in his polemic letter)? In other words, today's Comrade Katusev takes no instructions from yesterday's comrade Katusev, these are two different comrades. On the other hand, the two comrades are actually one, and if you tell him that at the Congress of People's Deputies he made an awful speech, trying to defend the attackers and insulting the attacked (both dead and alive), he will immediately object that it was precisely him who ordered an inquiry into the use of shovels and gases.

The discussion of the Tbilisi tragedy at the Second Congress of People's Deputies was blacked out. Neither Sobchak's report, nor that made by Katusev was published in the papers, but the deputies I interviewed were clearly indignant at the military prosecutor's speech. According to him, the tragedy was caused not by the military who dispersed, at night, the unsanctioned meeting of thousands of citizens by methods which cost many demonstrators their lives, but by the citizens themselves, who had perfidiously lured the army into the trap of a city square and then attacked it, causing a fatal stampede. One of the deputies told me he was haunted by the following sample of the prosecutor's eloquence: "unarmed, totally unprotected soldiers, our children, yours and mine, who guard our peace, found themselves confronted with hundreds of hoodlums on the rampage."

Eduard Shevardnadze had the will power of hearing the military prosecutor out to the end. But half of the deputies did not and walked out in protest in the resolution passed on the issue there is, fortunately, not a trace of Katusev's pronouncements which were clearly found unworthy of the honour, which does not prevent him today, in the atmosphere of democratization, from upholding his far from democratic position.

By the way, what paper does he send his writings to? Sovetskaya Rossiya, of course.

Those who uphold the honour of the regiment do not necessarily belong to one. Rather, they belong to a clan.

(Just a small digression. There is a vacancy for Editor-in-Chief in the Izvestiya newspaper, and rumours have it that the present editor of Sovetskaya Rossiya may step in to fill the void. However, these two papers are of different trends. The Izvestiya takes a democratic, progressive stand, ever more pronouncedly so. The Sovetskaya Rossiya is a mouthpiece of conservative quarters and conveys their views ever more aggressively. Brain transplantation is a hazardous operation and may be fatal if the donor and the recipient are incompatible. It is absurd to expect rumours to be rational, but the very fact that this peculiar rumour has been set afloat goes to show that society has got accustomed to the administrative system staging any experiments.)

But let us go back to our subject.

Two logics have clashed in a polemic exchange. Two logics underlie the views of the Tbilisi tragedy even now, a year later. Two logics are contesting the future of all events and decisions. I mean the habitual authoritarian logic and the new democratic logic.

The authoritarian logic rejects a priorithe possibility of the government, the state and the army being wrong, and if the facts bear evidence to the contrary, well, so much the worse for the facts. Hence the denial of the obvious: the use of shovels and gases, the unlawfulness of the decision to resort to armed force, the elementary rashness of certain commands. Hence the invention of chimeras to intimidate society with. Already in the following morning, official sources started spreading stories about clandestine criminal conspiracies, and gangs of terrorists prepared to go to any lengths...

The democratic logic tells us that the people who have gathered in a square - men and women, adults and children, hunger-strikers and protesters - shouting out different, often extreme slogans, are not a mob or a gang of violent desperadoes. They are people. And every effort must be made to understand the people. They have to be talked with. It is necessary to find a common language with them. YOu don't fight your own people, you win them over. Or you lose them, and then you are no longer in control.

It hurts to hear hotheads reviling the authorities. But does that give the authorities - people vested with power, ideological institutions and the official press - the right to cast aspersions on people? We are told that this is acceptable and even normal. After all, the authorities have to prove that the punitive operation, like a surgical one, was necessary. It is a tall order. Therefore, the authoritarian logic does not stop short of defaming the people. It's no use expecting it to apologize and to repent, even a year later. It will stand its ground to the end.

The democratic logic is no panacea. Pluralism and tolerance in a society tormented with problems may pave the way for extremism on the part of individuals and unofficial organizations. This extremism kept the temperature on the Tbilisi square high for weeks, right until April 8, 1989. On the night of April 8, the square saw something much worse than that - the extremism of uncontrolled state power. Tragically, the authoritarian logic prevailed. Still worse, state extremism neither called off, nor even suppressed the extremism of individuals and informal organizations. It only served to rekindle it, to turn the smoulder into a blaze.

We often hear talk about the "strong arm" as the best means of making decisions and putting things in order. In the Georgian case, decisions were made in the authoritarian way, in the "strong arm" spirit. The result was an equal lack of responsibility at different levels: not a single decision was controlled either by social institutions or even by the decision makers themselves. The trigger mechanism worked.

No matter how the instructions were worded - "To clear up one square", or "To restore law and order in one republic," - these instructions, far from being fulfilled, made the situation much worse. The square will never be cleared up any longer. The law and order situation in the republic will hardly ever come back to what it was before April 9, 1989. In other places - Lithuania, for instance - the view that Moscow is to be stayed away from, perestroika or no perestroiuka, has become firmly established.

The people like Katusev consider themselves the defenders of the army, the state and society against anarchy and permisiveness. As a matter of fact, they are doing a disservice to the army, the state and society. The blame for the mistakes and crimes which took so many lives in Tbilisi on that tragic night goes to concrete individuals, in uniforms and civilian clothes. They have not been named and exposed for the whole nation to see; therefore the blemish automatically goes to all the army, all the state and all society. this cannot be helped. There is an apt expression, which goes back to the Middle Ages - "the devil's advocates" - which appies in this case.

The "strong arm" can cause only tragedies and nothing else. The Bronze Horseman had better stay on its historical pedestal. If he climbs down, an imminent disaster will follow.

Georgian National Liberation Movements Meet

90US0763A Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian 23 Mar 90 pp 3, 8

[Article by E. Kakabadze: "The Opposition Gathers Force"]

[Text] The central event of the past week has undoubtedly been the extraordinary conference of the national liberation movement of Georgia which lasted for three days in the Large Concert Hall of the Tbilisi State Philharmonic. Interest in it was unusually great since this was the first conference on such a scale (unless one counts the university meeting of informal sociopolitical organizations that took place at the end of January of this year), which brought together almost all the opposing political forces existing in Georgia. Its initiators were the National Independence Party, the Monarchist Party, the St. Ilya Pravednyy Society, the Merab Kostav Society, and the Georgiy Pobedonostsev Society.

The conference agenda was intended to be fairly broad and included 10 issues, but during the work process the attention of the participants in the conference was automatically drawn to several important ones. Namely: the determination of a corporate body capable of expressing the will of the Georgian people; elections to the conference of the National Forum; conducting general direct democratic election of a transitional opposition coalition government; and their attitude toward the elections to the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet.

The conference was led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia (conference chairman), Irakliy Tsereteli, and Tengiz Sigua.

After the conference was opened Irakliy Tsereteli, chairman of the National Independence Party of Georgia, said:

Representatives of organizations with various directions and goals have gathered in this hall. And, naturally, we cannot avoid confrontations of positions and heated discussions. But I do not think this should keep us from earmarking the only true path that will lead to Georgian independence.

The discussions were indeed heated, which could be seen not only by those seated and standing in the conference hall but also by several thousand people who for three days listened to radio broadcasts of all that was taking place inside the philharmonic building.

But let us return to the main issue. What does the opposition political alliance offer the people and what is the path to achieving independence? Electing a National Forum, a kind of national parliament, and then a transitional coalition government which will begin negotiations with Moscow concerning the restoration of Georgian independence. It is the single legal body which, in the opinion of those who arranged the conference, can exercise the right to express the will and interests of the Georgian people.

"The situation in the republic is actually being controlled by the national liberation movement," Giya Chanturiya, chairman of the National Democratic Party, said in his speech. "There can be no two ways about it. Therefore we must give legal form to the situation that already exists de facto, that is, create our management organ, which should be the National Forum, and then the opposition coalition government."

The creation of a National Forum, a national parliament, would undoubtedly be a step forward in the development of the national liberation movement, and this was noted in the speeches by representatives of many informal sociopolitical organizations. Judging from everything, they managed to get through the initial stage of the movement, which was characterized basically by nihilism, destructiveness, and general criticism of everything in existence. It is now the time for constructiveness, the time to present the new to replace the old, to take practical steps on the path to independence. But this is not so much a matter of decisiveness, as Irakliy Batiashvili, chairman of the St. Ilya Pravednyy Society, said, but of consideration and verification of this step, for no matter what we say the fate of the people depends on it.

The more proponents of the creation of the National Forum and the opposition government came to the podium—and they were the overwhelming majority in the hall—the more questions arose. Who should be included in this forum and on what basis? What should be the basis for electing the forum? What functions should it perform? In which cases should it have legal authority, and so forth, and so on.

Various and sometimes mutually contradictory answers were given to this questions.

It is not without interest to know who would be included in the forum since their opinions diverged as well: Some thought that it should include representatives of all political forces (the minority) while others thought it should include only those organizations that have shown themselves to be true patriots and fighters for independence. True, it was not indicated what criteria would form the basis of the assessment and who should be the arbitrator (the majority). And the candidates for election to the forum should have been through the "purgatory" of four points: not to be a member of the CPSU or the Social Democratic Party; not to be a deputy or candidate deputy; to fully support the platform developed by the conference; and to define their attitude toward demographic expansion. Later demographic expansion was replaced with the introduction of the status of "persona non grata" regarding those who through their actions oppose the national liberation movement.

In the end the forum included three representatives of seven political organizations included in the main committee for national salvation, which declared its self-elimination immediately after that. They are the Helsinki Union, the National Liberation Party, the National Democratic Party, the St. Ilya Pravednyy Society, the Democratic Party, and the Christian Democratic Union. The forum also included three representatives of informal organizations from Abkhazia, three representatives of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, and one each from certain other parties and associations, several creative unions, and the church. Cast "overboard" from the parliament were such influential and large organizations and the People's Front of Georgia, the Green Party, and a number of others...

After the turbulent elections Irakliy Tsereteli addressed the hall but now on behalf of the elected forum.

"The main functions of the forum," he said, "are to convene the national congress, to create an opposition coalition government, and to coordinate the activity of the national liberation movement in order to avoid chaos. Of course we shall try to destabilize the political situation and to develop and deepen destructive processes within the state, but this does not mean that we shall put up with the anarchistic phenomena that take place in the national liberation movement. Therefore from now on all organizations included in the forum must coordinate all of their more or less significant actions. Autonomous activity can no longer be tolerated.

Let us return to the idea of creating an opposition government, whose proponents consider it the "only true path" to the achievement of independence. Is this indeed the only true path and will it lead to independence? It is probably not without interest to learn the diametrically opposed position expressed at the conference, particularly by Roman Gotsiridze (Rustaveli Society):

The majority here today has spoken about the fact that they do not recognize the Soviet structure as legitimate and therefore are boycotting the elections. I think this is an erroneous position, and history will not forgive us for passing up a real chance to create a truly democratic parliament. Today the parliamentary path is the only one that is moral and legally correct in all respects. The proclamation of independence by means of soviet elections would be recognized as legal. As concerns the creation of the National Forum and the opposition government through the kinds of methods being suggested here, this path will lead nowhere for both the forum and the government will be declared illegal, and we should not be deceived into thinking that they will be recognized by the world community. What do I suggest? Today we need to reach a consensus, agree among ourselves, and participate in the current elections, and if they are postponed fight for independence by methods that are acceptable under the current conditions. It would be possible to elect an alternative national soviet which, along with the parliament, would determine two directions that really exist. Today it is extremely important to make certain concessions and certain compromises in order to reach a consensus.

A stormy reaction from the audience was evoked not only by Roman Gotsiridze's speech and before this by Nodar Natadze, chairman of the board of the People's Front of Georgia, and Guram Muchaidze, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Georgia, but also by the statement of the Ilya Chavchavadze Society. In particular it said: "The Ilya Chavchavadze Society thinks that the unification of the forces of the national liberation movement is necessary, but not exclusively on the basis of the creation of a temporary opposition coalition government but in order to search for future paths to the achievement of our common goal. We think that under the conditions of incomplete democracy and under the conditions of occupation, holding general direct democratic elections in the form proposed by the initiators of the conference is impossible in practice. We think that it is possible to hold democratic elections only in a free Georgia, when there will be equal conditions for all existing political forces to participate in the election campaign. An illegal government chosen by a nondemocratic process, regardless of who it may be, will create a precedent when a second illegal institution is created along with the Supreme Soviet..."

The conference clearly revealed the opposition to the opposition, and there is hardly any point in dramatizing this circumstance if we recall that nobody is insured against mistakes. Only a conflict of opinions, a balancing of the scales between "for" and "against," and a search for the truth and the course that is most tested and balanced in all respects, and not monopoly and infallibility, can insure us against undesirable consequences and another political crisis.

But, alas, there was an obstruction to the opposition, and even the advice of Giya Chanturiya to look not for that which separates us but for that which unites us, which is wise in all respects, remained a voice howling in the desert. And somehow or other only people who thought alike were included in the National Forum.

At the conference they adopted a decree and a resolution concerning the withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops from the republic, the creation of a Georgian national military school, demographic expansion, and the disbanding of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League. The documents were published in the republic press.

Georgian Informals View Consititutional Amendments

90US0768C Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 23 Mar 90 p 3

[Statements on amendments to the Georgian SSR Constitution by Nodar Notadze, chairman of the People's Front of Georgia; Vladimir Lomsadze, deputy secretary of the party bureau of the republic committee of the Trade Union of Agroindustrial Complex Employees; Zaza Pataridze, member of the leadership of the National-Democratic Party; Zurab Maysuradze, member of the Directorate of the Republican-Federal Party of Georgia, and Parnaoz Mgeladze, head of the All-Georgian Charitable Society "Savaneta": "Decisions Have Been Made. What Is the Response?"]

[Text] **On 20 March a session of the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet adopted the Law on Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Main Law) of the Georgian SSR. Actually, a multiparty system has been adopted in the republic through legislation. This means that we have made substantive progress toward democratization. However, as has always been the case recently, the complex political life of the republic has caused the most diverse responses to this event. This is why the editorial office of the newspaper ZARYA VOSTOKA approached representatives of political parties and public organizations with a request to share their first impressions and opinions on the amendments made to the republic constitution.**

Nodar Notadze, chairman of the People's Front of Georgia:

Until recently Georgia could not abandon the uncivilized phenomenon of the one-party system of elections to the organs of representative power. Why? We should say frankly: Because repressions would have been in store for Georgia under the existing conditions had we resolved to introduce a multiparty system on our own. Following the amendment of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, we got an opportunity to bring the constitution of our republic also into conformity with our convictions. I want to stress the following circumstance: There actually were no people in the Supreme Soviet of the republic who would have objected to repealing the one-party monopoly of power set forth in the constitution. Both "the right" and "the left" were unanimous in adopting the decision. Naturally, now that Article 6 of the Constitution of Georgia has been repealed, it has become necessary to use the principle of a multiparty system in the practice of elections. Their new date gives the parties an opportunity to go through a period of organization and to approach the new election day with clearly delineated platforms and party slates of candidates. The People's Front does not consider itself a party but will take part in the elections in keeping with general guidelines, just as it was prepared to participate today. However, we are sacrificing our candidates now in the name of the multiparty system and democracy. I believe that by the fall we will maintain the same principle of candidate selection—based on the personal traits of the contenders rather than the narrow attribute of party affiliation.

Vladimir Lomsadze, deputy secretary of the party bureau of the republic committee of the Trade Union of Agroindustrial Complex Employees

To be sure, the adoption of a multiparty system in Georgia is a gratifying fact, but... Indeed, there were "buts." So, why did we wait for permission from Moscow? Having done that, we are surprised to see that, supposedly, the Communist Party is losing the authority it enjoyed among the people. After all, we carried out in an urgent, emergency manner what could have been done two or three years ago, and on top of that we assumed an attitude of benefactors. In light of this it is hardly surprising that virtually nobody is involved in a dialogue with the Communist Party.

I have never been involved in forecasting in my life, but at present I am certain that the Communist Party of Georgia will not achieve desired success in the elections in October and November of this year, even if members of the National Forum take no part in them. Its indecision, inability to talk to its people, confusion and passivity in the face of rallies and demonstrations are the reasons. This is our problem.

One more thing. All amendments and changes to the Constitution of Georgia have been copied virtually word for word from the Union Constitution. Is this one more confirmation of our independence?

Zaza Pataridze, member of the leadership of the National-Democratic Party:

Unfortunately the decision made by the Supreme Soviet of the republic is such that it cannot influence our attitude toward the elections to the Soviet parliament.

The position of the National-Democratic Party [NDP] and the parties holding similar views remains the same. Despite "the democratic carrot," we do not recognize the legality of Soviet power in Georgia because it was established forcibly. This is why the slogan "Boycott Soviet elections!" stands. The events in Lithuania are hardening our attitude toward these elections still more. Over there, they attempted to attain sovereignty within the framework of the USSR Constitution. As soon as the multiparty parliament adopted a declaration on restoring the state sovereignty of Lithuania, the central government immediately proclaimed all the decisions of the Lithuanian parliament to be illegal. Therefore, even under the multiparty system only what the supreme leaders in Moscow like is "legal." The Supreme Soviet, a representative of the authorities which appeared as a result of foreign intervention, is at present trying in Georgia to legitimize itself in the eyes of the people, and to make itself look democratic. However, can legitimacy be built on such a foundation? This is why we advocate the self-dissolution of the Supreme Soviet and the convocation of the People's Duma.

Zuran Maysuradze, member of the Directorate of the Republican-Federal Party of Georgia:

Our party, the DAS, the National-Liberal Union, and the "Green" Party took part in developing a draft which was to be adopted at a session of the republic Supreme Soviet. To be sure, our demands were somewhat different: They included eliminating the adopted law on elections dated 18 November 1989, abandoning the holding of these elections, setting up the main electoral commission on the basis of parity representation of political organizations to conduct the registration of various parties. A new election law based on a multiparty system should also be adopted, which would proceed from the temporarily suspended legislation of the government of the Georgian Democratic Republic dated 17 March 1921, because that government did not sign an act of surrender but merely temporarily suspended the effect of its constitution. The main electoral commission should set an election date within three months and elect the representatives to the organ of power. We also proposed to amend Articles 6, 7, and 49 of the Constitution of Georgia, but our wording was not accepted by the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Now about our attitude toward the resolutions adopted by the session on 20 March. It is notable that "other political parties," on top of the Communist Party, are included in Article 6 of the Constitution of Georgia: We believe that it is unacceptable to give the right to participate in the elections on an equal footing not only to the political organizations but also to the youth, trade union, and public organizations, for the reason that they should be essentially apolitical.

The elections have been postponed but not eliminated. They have been rescheduled for October and November which, in our opinion, will provide an opportunity to sign a new Union treaty within the framework of the Soviet Union, which we categorically oppose.

Parnaoz Mgeladze, head of the All-Georgian Charitable Society "Savaneta"

I believe that the participation of public organizations from now on in developing the policy of the state and in managing state and public affairs on an equal footing with political parties in keeping with the revisions made to Article 6 of the Constitution of the republic is highly significant. I believe that there is not a single party or organization—looking from the overall human, general humane point of view—which does not consider as its main goal the prosperity of the people residing in a particular country, regardless of their religion, ethnic affiliation, or political convictions. Moreover, all of these parties and organizations unwittingly complement each other, differences among them notwithstanding. It is particularly important that the principle of a multiparty system is being asserted in life. After all, nobody is in a position to say that the parties now existing in Georgia are not proceeding toward the same goal, all of them in their own ways, while many of their positions differ. The main point is that all of them are in favor of the propitious future of Georgia.

One thing is bad. The form of packaging of the amendments to Article 6 is absolutely unacceptable. Judge for yourselves. Previously it referred to the leading role of the Communist Party of Georgia in political life, whereas now "the Communist Party of Georgia and other political parties... participate on an equal footing in developing the policy of the state..." If we are talking about an equal footing why still emphasize the Communist Party?

One more remark for the future. It is not important which party will come to power and whether we will have a coalition government. The most important point is not to allow sabotage or frustrate the operation of any state organization if most of its collective belongs to one party and the leadership to another. It should not be forgotten that all political ambitions should yield to what is most significant—the prosperity, welfare, and felicitous future of the peoples of Georgia. Only love unifies. Love is God. Let us love each other.

Frankly speaking, this is the first presentation in which our organization has touched on politics. However, the very fact of allowing a multiparty system has been awaited for so long that hopefully our professional politicians will forgive us.

Abkhazian Anti-Georgian Violence Detailed

90US0762A Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian 23 Mar 90 pp 4-5

[Article by N. Mgaloblishvili, Deputy of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet: "Laying the Blame at Somebody Else's Door..."]

[Text] **Recently the newspaper BZYB has become even more active in trying to misinform the people and, more importantly, to exert pressure on the investigating and law enforcing organs. After they printed the anonymous "Open Letter" and the speech by USSR People's Deputy T. Shamba that he had not read in public, we became exposed to still another publication, obviously aimed at heightening the tensions in Abkhazia. I mean the Open Letter from the "Aidgylara"—Abkhazian People's Forum department in Gudauta—to Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Procurator V. Razmadze. This was the reason that moved me to remind our people of some well-known and several less-known facts about the disturbing events in Abkhazia.**

On 23 January the newspaper BZYB, the organ of the Georgian Communist Party Gudauta raykom [rayon committee], published the speech by USSR People's Deputy T.M. Shamba at the USSR People's Deputies Second Congress, which he had not read in public. He intentionally distorted the events that had taken place in Abkhazia on 15 and 16 July and, therefore, misinformed the people of multi- ethnic Abkhazia, thus helping to stir up interethnic feuding among its people. In this publication, as well as in many others printed by the Abkhazian mass media and sometimes by the central press, the events of 1 April and 15-16 July are presented as an "interethnic conflict" or "a confrontation on an interethnic basis," which is not true. The tragic events in Abkhazia on 1 April and 15-16 July were instigated by certain circles at the top, but T.M. Shamba tries to persuade the readers that "an interethnic conflict broke out in Abkhazia in July when armed gangs of Georgian extremists started a massacre... As a result 18 people were killed and several hundred were wounded..." He is obviously trying to shift the blame to people of Georgian origin. Using his own words, he is trying "to lay the blame at somebody else's door." "The Georgian lobbying is so strong that no truth can get out. The Stalin and Beriya methods of work that are rooted so deeply in the Georgian law enforcement organs provide realistic conditions for bigotry, partiality, and violations..." continues the USSR people's deputy. But he does not cite a single fact or reason, though he claims to have "lots of them."

Over the last few decades the Abkhazian separatist movement got no response—you can look at the press on both sides to see that. Anti-Georgian persecution and distortion of historical facts became a normal occurrence; a certain part of Abkhazians with hostile feelings toward Georgians made a practice of citing their alleged problems to the authorities and demanding the autonomous republic's secession from the Georgian SSR.

After they failed to achieve this, on 1 April 1989 the Abkhazian extremists first threatened Georgians who were holding a meeting in the village of Leselidze, and then they became violent. They twice attacked and stoned busses on the territory of Gudauta and the village of Novy Afon. The first shots were fired at the same place; as a result six Georgians received pellet wounds, and other people had various bodily injuries.

Besides this, the Abkhazians committed pogroms and numerous attacks on Georgians. Here are some of the facts:

—During the night of 3 April two Georgian builders, Ananiashvili and Okruashvili, were attacked in the building of the Bzyb Management of Industrial and Technological Deliveries where they had arrived on business; during the attack shots were fired at the door of the room in which they took cover;

—at the instigation of the separatists an Abkhazian, Sanguliya, tore down the Georgian SSR state flag from a building where it was hung bearing a mourning band to mark a natural disaster in Adzharia, on 23 April in the city of Gagra; he desecrated the flag by stomping on it.

Apart from these illegal actions, they started to distribute provocative leaflets in the name of the Georgian people. Leaflets like the "Oath of Young Georgians" serve to instigate interethnic hatred and, therefore, to increase tensions even more. It was discovered that the leaflets had been published by the Sukhumi botanical gardens.

The rector's office of the Abkhazian state university became a hotbed of the anti-Georgian movement. Instead of bringing the relations into order and providing normal conditions for life and work, the rector's office turned to confrontation. They started to ignore Georgians or to threaten them, which resulted in the breakaway and creation of a branch of Tbilisi State University.

Because the Abkhazian extremists could not find other reasons, they used this one to commit numerous lawless actions:

—On 27 May 1989 they used threats of violence and destruction to have a memorial plaque moved; the plaque had been installed by the students of Ochamchira First Georgian school to commemorate those who died in Tbilisi on 9 April 1989;

—on 12 July 1989 about 400 extremists learned that the newspaper SABCHOTA ABKHAZETI intended to publish a commentary on the article "Position" in APSNY KAPSH dealing with the abovementioned event. The extremists raided the printing house and destroyed the typesetting equipment; due to this the newspaper could not be printed for three days;

—on the night of 13 July a group of Abkhazians increased tensions further by damaging the memorial to the victims of 9 April in the city of Sukhumi.

On 14 July Abkhazian extremists blockaded the building of the First Georgian school in Sukhumi used as a temporary location by the Tbilisi State University branch. They demanded that the entrance examinations be canceled. By 2 pm people from various Abkhazian regions—Pachuliya, Kaslandziya, Gindiya, Tsuzhba, etc.—got inside the school and demanded that they stop accepting applications. They threatened violence if their demands were not complied with.

The Abkhazian ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] received information about the coming attack on the school at 6 pm. They called a meeting of MVD leaders to plan how to "guard" the school building. But on the morning of 15 July the school telephones were disconnected and the water turned off, even though 11 members of the enrollment commission were in the building. Transportation was provided for the terrorists from the city of Tkvarcheli and from Gudautskiy and Ochamchirskiy rayons, just as happened on 1 April. By noon there were more than 10,000 people surrounding the school and occupying the nearby streets. Many of them were armed. At the same time, the "second Fergana" was mentioned at the union of writers meeting.

At about 1 pm some of the extremists around the school beat police officers who were trying to bring food and water to the employees of the Tbilisi State University branch. The commander of the Sukhumi city department of internal affairs, D.D. Rapava, called the extremists to order and was also beaten up in response. Then the first attempt was made to attack the university applicants and their relatives who had gathered there, but they wanted to avoid a confrontation and by about 3 pm retreated to Sh. Rustaveli park. There were about 400 Georgians there.

By the evening those who had gathered in Rustaveli park, as well as the employees of Tbilisi State University branch in the building of the First School, were exposed to real brutality. The group of Abkhazians who broke into the school building considerably outnumbered the Tbilisi University officials. They seized and destroyed official papers; they mercilessly beat the university employees who were in the building, using metal rods and various heavy objects for the attack. They destroyed the MVD cars and ambulances that came to help the victims.

At the same time another crowd of Abkhazians, armed with nail-studded clubs, rocks, metal rods and other objects that had been prepared in advance to hurt the innocent, attacked the unarmed Georgians. As the result of this about 40 people were wounded in the park, most of them Georgians. A certain V.V. Vekua was mortally wounded in the head there and died in hospital three days later. At the intersection of Chavchavadze and Lenin Street a truck carrying Georgians rushing to the people's aid was blown up. On Chavchavadze Street a Georgian, S.A. Dzhvareliya, was killed with a knife and a hard blunt object. More than 300 Abkhazians armed themselves with shotguns, knives, and specially prepared objects, and broke into the building of Government House. They rampaged through the offices of Georgian officials, tore down the state flag of the Georgian SSR and replaced it with a flag bearing the letters SSSRA.

The extremists occupied the Government House for two days.

Since 10 pm on 15 July they were shooting at the building of the Sukhumi First City Hospital where most of the wounded Georgians were brought. They would not allow the ambulances carrying victims to get in.

From Sh. Rustaveli park the Georgians went to the Apsny movie theater. At about 10 pm a bus arrived there carrying 15 Abkhazians armed with shotguns from the village of Kutol, Ochamchirskiy rayon. When the Georgians tried to check whether the bus passengers had guns, they were shot at from the bus and six of them were wounded. In the course of their counteractions B. and T. Lasuriya were stabbed to death.

On 16 July on Chochua street some Abkhazians—MVD officers and residents of Gudautskiy rayon—started shooting at the platform of the central railway station from a truck. This resulted in the death of R.V. Mgebrishvili. Abkhazian B.R. Chkotua was killed when he tried to stop the bandits.

The events quickly spread from Sukhumi to the rest of the autonomous republic. Various types of arms were seized on both sides, including automatic guns. Terrorist groups and residents seized arms from the Gudauta, Ochamchira, and Gali rayon department of internal affairs, the Sukhumskiy rayon dynamo club shooting grounds, and also from hunting equipment stores. On some occasions the guns were given out with the knowledge or participation of local authorities and law enforcement officials. Here I should mention again the incident that became known in the entire republic—the raid on the state bank, which had about 2000 units of smoothbore weapons. The extremists were led by the Ochamchira city department of internal affairs security guard commander, Police Major D. Shlarba, acting under the orders of the Ochamchirskiy rayon procurator. He was also the person behind the idea to seize ammunition from the Ochamchira hunting store; he also organized the so-called "defense" during which four Georgians were killed and over 100 wounded. Not a single murder has been solved so far.

Georgians from Galskiy rayon and western Georgia got worried about the fate of their relations and loved ones. On the morning of 16 July they set off in their cars toward Sukhumi but were stopped on the territory of Ochamchirskiy rayon, by the bridge across the Galidzga river. The people who stopped them were police officers, with the addition of armed Abkhazians. However, at the same time thousands of Abkhazians could come into Sukhumi from Gudautskiy and Ochamchirskiy rayons with no problem at all.

These actions by the Abkhazian extremists that are so hostile toward Georgians, their bloody acts and the Georgians' counteractions, did not cease later either.

On 16 July in the village of Psyrtskha, Gudautskiy rayon, G.A. Lobzhanidze was shot to death as he was driving home in his car.

On 17 July at Sukhumi airport, A.G. Kogoniya was killed while resisting arrest by a police officer.

On 18 July in the village of Primorskoye, Gudautskiy rayon, Georgian traffic police officer R. Chochiya was shot in his car from a car that was speeding past him.

On 21 July in the village of Otap, Ochamchirskiy rayon, Abkhazian V. Inapshba shot to death USSR MVD Officers V. Novikov and V. Akopov.

In Sukhumi these events led to the death of two Georgian children: 10-year-old L.G. Sartaniya and 12-year-old I.Z. Sanaia died when some explosives blew up.

In all the illegal actions instigated by Abkhazian separatists caused the deaths of 18 people; of these 11 were Georgian, five Abkhazian, one Russian, and one Armenian. Of the Georgians R. Mgebrishvili, B. Chkhotua, O. Shengeliya, R. Ekhvaya, N. Shamatava, V. Basilaya, G. Lobzhanidze, and R. Chochiya died from gunshot wounds inflicted by Abkhazians.

V. Vekua was brutally assassinated.

Abkhazian A. Kogoniya died from a gunshot wound which he received while resisting arrest by a police officer.

Abkhazian B. Chkotua was killed by Sukhumi railroad police officers as they were trying to stop the Abkhazians shooting from a truck.

During the shooting at the hospital, A. Kobakhiya was shot to death and B. and T. Lasuriyas were stabbed to death.

We want to inform the people's deputy that 495 people came to hospitals for help; of them 342 were Georgians, 135 Abkhazians, 11 Russians, four Armenians, two Greeks, and one Azeri.

Deputy T. Shamba is possibly unaware of the fact that on 16 July 1989 the Tkvarcheli city department of internal affairs issued to Abkhazian extremists 206 hunting rifles and 14 small caliber rifles, as well as explosives, according to their list.

For some reason T. Shamba was not upset by the immediate cooperation of high-ranking party and law enforcement officials of Gudautskiy and Ochamchirskiy rayons which they extended to help transport crowds of Abkhazians from Gudauta to Ochamchira. They were taken there on boats and armed with knives and guns, including automatic combat weapons.

Because the plans of attacking Georgians were well-designed, out of 190 people wounded before 10 am on 16 July, 139 were Georgians and only 22 were Abkhazian; out of the 62 people with gunshot wounds, 49 were Georgian and 11 Abkhazian.

I must comment that the abovementioned facts and an analysis of the causes and conditions of the Abkhazians' deaths unequivocally exclude any premeditation for them. B. Chkotua, B. Lasuriya, and T. Lasuriya were killed in the course of their own criminal actions; A. Kobakhiya was killed as Abkhazians were shooting at the hospital; A. Kogoniya died from an accidental shot when he was trying to take away a police officer's gun. But Georgians Vekua, Dzhvareliya, Mgebrishvili, Shamatava, Shengeliya, Basilaya, Ekhvaya, Lobzhanidze, and Chochiya were killed when their actions did not present any danger for anyone.

What is the purpose of Deputy T. Shamba's statement when he insists that "the armed bands of Georgian extremists set up a massacre"?

By hiding the facts, he is trying to deceive the participants of the Second Congress of USSR people's deputies as well as the people of all the republics. He aims to keep the persons who were obviously mixed in the tragic events in their high positions, where they are still "working" now. Apart from that he wants to make non-Georgian citizens feel resentful toward Georgians. In this way he is trying to provoke the Abkhazian extremists to bolder actions against Georgians.

After all that has been said, can one doubt that People's Deputy T. Shamba, a doctor of jurisprudence, does not know the truth about the events in Abkhazia, or that he finds it difficult to sort out the tragic incidents known to millions today? No, one cannot!

Deputy T. Shamba and the BZYB newspaper intentionally misinform their readers. Why are they doing that? There is only one answer to this question: They are pursuing their selfish interests, trying at all costs to preserve the tensions in Abkhazia, to enhance the Abkhazians' hatred for the Georgians and to encourage them to take a fatal step. In this they sacrilegiously ignore the vital interests of their own people.

We consider it necessary for the competent organs to provide a proper judicial evaluation of the actions of T. Shamba and the employees of the BZYB newspaper.

Georgian Party Prepares for Republic Congress

90YS0784A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 31 Mar 90 pp 1-2

[Unattributed report on the 18th Plenum of the Communist Party of Georgia Central Committee: "Toward New Goals of Qualitative Renewal"]

[Text] Perestroyka, democratization, and glasnost have imparted an extremely dynamic character to the development of events. Customary ideas and approaches are being actively reevaluated and new thinking is coming to the fore.

All this requires serious interpretation and the corresponding conclusions and the formation of a unified, clearcut position. We must act rapidly and without mistakes, develop our tactics and strategy and interpret them in a new way, get rid of unimaginative forms of work and, in conjunction with communists and individual party organizations, discuss the most crucial, essential problems extensively and publicly, and look jointly for ways of solving them. This is especially necessary today, on the threshold of the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia.

The plenum noted that under the conditions of political pluralism it is especially necessary for us to present correct civic and human positions, to responsibly approach the solutions to today's and tomorrow's problems, to show tact and a sense of measure, to respect and trust one another, and to objectively evaluate the mistakes of the past. In various auditoriums, on the pages of the press, and on the television, one sometimes hears words about the inevitability of having victims.

Today, when the Communist Party, our people, and the entire society have recognized the primacy of universal human values and their priority and thus have joined in the achievements of world civilization, when broad possibilities have been opened up for cooperation and political pluralism, such challenges are completely unacceptable. Is there really any need to prove that the only correct position is the one that has the goal of peace, consolidation, unification, and community of the efforts of all the people. At the same time life and the processes of renewal of our society convince us of the truth that if the party will not accept, share, and hold close to its heart the national pain, the national problems that are bothering the people, it will not have the right to work and act on behalf of the people.

The republic Communist Party has recently taken certain steps in this direction. A concept of national development has been worked out. Drafts of a number of legislative acts for strengthening national sovereignty have been or are being prepared. Thus the party is expressing its national position and the desire of Georgians, Abkhazes, Ossetians, Russians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and representatives of all nationalities living in Georgia to work together to build the future of our republic and our society. This is the position that corresponds to the centuries-old traditions of the Georgian people and their interests, and nobody has any reason to doubt this.

A heated polemic flared up regarding the activation of local party organizations, their qualitative renewal, and the mastery of new forms and methods of work. It was said that we have a very difficult and complex situation and it has become difficult to work. We were unprepared for the party's rejection of a constitutional monopoly and further deepening of the processes of democratization. In the opinion of several of the secretaries of party organizations who spoke, this situation was brought about by the fact that they were cast to the whim of fate, nobody is defending their interests, and the administrative organs are not taking any measures to maintain law and order or prevent illegal actions.

It was emphasized at the plenum that the leaders of party organizations are called upon to fight to increase the party's authority through their concrete deeds and personal example, to maintain regular communications with communists, and in conjunction with them to develop a common position and a concrete program of action. At the same time they must not shrink from expressing their position and defending it through the mass media. To this end they should actively take advantage of various gatherings and meetings... Incidentally, it was also noted that in today's situation not everyone has the opportunity to express his opinion, especially at rallies and gatherings involving a lot of people. It is no secret that some people do everything they can to put the party and the people in opposition to one another and use slander and libel to undermine the authority of party workers, accusing them of a lack of patriotism and national self-awareness. To state the issue this way, of course, is fundamentally wrong. In the Communist Party of Georgia there are many people who are honest and devoted to the common cause of the people, who embody the intellectual potential of the people. It is true that among us there are also bureaucrats and corrupt people. But this is our common ill—after all, a considerable part of the society is infected with various vices. And we must treat this disease through our joint efforts.

Perestroyka and political pluralism keenly raise before us the question of providing for the unity of the party and the people. Regardless of anything else we must eliminate the breech that has appeared in the relations between the party and the people. This requires that we develop and implement effective measures. Above all, with the widespread participation of the aktiv, in the near future we must determine the status of the Communist Party of Georgia and develop and ratify the main points of the program and regulations of the republic Communist Party.

It will be indispensable to achieve mutual understanding and consolidation of all healthy forces of society and their unification on a statewide and nationwide basis. Only this will save us from a split, a separation, and mutual hostility that could lead to extremely grave consequences or even catastrophe.

In the leading ranks of the struggle for the unification of forces should be party workers and leaders of party organizations. The passivity and indifference of the majority of them is simply incomprehensible. Things have reached a point where certain party organizations have altogether laid down their arms, departed into the shadows, and abandoned the battlefield without a fight. And some people, real party functionaries, are saving their skins by fleeing—they are going to cooperatives, they prefer to sit in some "quiet harbor" or sometimes they like to desert to some questionable organization or other. Certain of them, having forgotten both about their convictions and about their position, have abandoned the party ranks altogether and started to abuse former like-thinkers and the party as a whole, even more energetically than their opponents do.

On the one hand, possibly, this process could be to our advantage since the time has come to speak of the purity of the party ranks and, moreover, the party itself should raise its voice and drive out any cheats, careerists, wheeler-dealers, bribe takers, bureaucrats and anyone else who has entered the party out of selfish motives. The sooner this takes place the greater the authority of the party and the bolder each communist will be.

At the same time we have quite a few other people who exaggerate the difficulties that have been created and spread rumors about some alleged mass withdrawal of communists from the party. Last year and this year about 1,500 of the 400,500 communists in the republic left the party ranks, while last year alone more than 7,200 were accepted into the party.

It never pays to give in to panic. What is needed is to work in a new way under the new conditions, adapt to the new circumstances, and determine one's place in the new situation. Otherwise nothing will work. It must be said directly that there are forces to whom civil peace is not advantageous, who are striving to destabilize the situation in the republic.

It was also emphasized at the plenum that frequently the passivity is brought about by the lack of a unified, firm, and clearcut position. Not everyone knows how to act in one or another extraordinary situation, how to evaluate one event or another, or what position to take. Many have not rid themselves of harmful habits of placing their hopes in others. Frequently the leaders of local party organizations refuse to make a decision on one concrete issue or another and wait for instructions from the center. Such an approach cannot stand up under criticism. Under the current complicated conditions when the situation is changing at lightning speed, it is generally impossible to use prepared formulas that are suitable for all occasions, although this certainly does not mean that the party Central Committee does not have a developed unified position regarding strategic issues. Today's plenum of the Central Committee was convened precisely to develop such a course. We must clarify our political views regarding the most important problems facing Georgia today. We must tell the people how we view the Communist Party of Georgia and the republic in general, and we must reach an agreement on what tactics to use and what measures to adopt. We must familiarize every party organization with these considerations and revise them with the direct participation of each communist. Only with decisions adopted this way can we go before the next congress of the Communist Party of Georgia.

It was noted at the plenum that political pluralism requires making active use of the forms and methods of political activity and one must master the art of compromise and political dialogue. We must learn to speak not only with political rivals with sharply opposing views but also frequently with politically untrained people so as not to forfeit positions and not to betray our ideals. This is the only way to reach a kind of compromise when there is the threat of danger to our people and the peaceful life of our youth. Any other attitude would be fatal for Georgia from the standpoint of both the present and the future. We are not afraid of rallies and other activities, they said at the plenum, we are bothered most of all by the fate of our children.

Perestroyka requires that we correctly evaluate the changes that are taking place and draw the corresponding conclusions, and perfect our tactics accordingly. The attitude of the party Central Committee to the postponement of the elections to the Georgian Supreme Soviet and the local soviets is an expression of precisely this approach. There is no justification for seeing in this an abandonment of positions, weakness, or a lack of confidence in victory.

From an organizational standpoint the election campaign proceeded at the proper level. But because of the constitutionally legitimized multiparty system in the republic the political situation changed significantly. The communist party and government of Georgia had no moral right not to allow the political groupings and movements actually existing in the republic the opportunity to take advantage of the qualitatively new situation. If that had been the case the elections would have been undemocratic and unjustified and, moreover, immoral and quite inadmissible.

Therefore, in spite of the fact that we are faced with a difficult struggle in the forthcoming elections, we must in all ways contribute to the creation of an atmosphere whereby specialists, real professionals, and the best representatives of our creative intelligentsia, science, and the broad public participate actively in the struggle for parliamentary mandates along with various parties and social organizations.

As was noted at the plenum, Georgia can gain no benefit from a parliament in which talent does not prevail. Only honest, democratic people who are gifted, educated, and true to the common cause should be represented in the parliament.

What we need most of all now is not unanimity but unity, and opinions can differ and be critical of one another. This is not where the danger is. The main thing is for them not to lack objectivity, constructiveness, and benevolence, and not to have sensationalism as their goal. Today the Communist Party is operating in a new political situation but this certainly does not give us reason for confusion, fear, or hopelessness. Anyone who is overcome by such feelings should step to the side. The only people who should be in the party ranks are those who believe in the correctness of the course that has been taken and who enjoy authority and the confidence of the people.

At the plenum there was a lively discussion of questions related to convening the congress directly. It was noted at the congress that there are two variants defining the position of the future congress and the norm of representation in it. According to the first variant the regular congress, like preceding forums, could be conducted in the Large Hall of the Georgian Philharmonic. It is a large hall and it is also more convenient for conducting such things. It will make it possible to elect more delegates and create the appropriate conditions for their work.

At the two preceding congresses there were more than 1,400 delegates. Additionally, an average of 200 guests and service personnel attended these congresses. The delegates and the others who were invited completely filled the pit and the amphitheater, which hold only 1,600. The balcony remained empty since it was impossible to create good conditions for the work of the delegates there.

If we basically retain this scheme the norm for representation at the congress should be as follows: 280 party members for one delegate. In this case the overall number of delegates will be approximately 1,420-1,430.

According to the second variant the congress could be conducted in the Large Meeting Hall of the Communist Party of Georgia Central Committee. There would be considerably fewer delegates and the representation of party members would be considerably lower. If we establish a norm of 560 party members per delegate, the number of delegates would be 700-710. Of course there would also be less possibility of inviting guests.

The second variant was chosen by a majority of votes. At the same time it was stated that in the future the Large Hall of the Georgian Philharmonic should be used exclusively for its intended purpose.

It was noted at the plenum that when determining the dates of the plenum one should be guided primarily by the extent to which the remaining time will allow for high-quality preparation of the corresponding materials and documents and the consideration of a correct approach to the problems under consideration. It is also necessary to pay attention to the fact that the congress must be preceded by meetings with communists and discussions of urgent problems of party and state construction; it will be necessary to conduct sociological research, and there should be concern for the formation of public opinion in the desirable direction and so forth. A certain amount of time will also be needed for full-fledged democratic elections of delegates. They should include our most respected, worthy, and sober-minded people, those who are capable of making serious and thoroughly considered decisions.

Of course it is possible to push harder to accelerate preparations for the congress. This would help to avoid reproaches from certain communists about the idea that we are dragging our feet and not staying in touch with reality. But it would be wrong to be in too much of a hurry. This would undoubtedly have a negative effect on the quality of the work of the congress, although the decisive word in this matter should be up to the plenum participants themselves.

By a majority of votes the plenum decided to convene the 28th Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia on 15 May.

At the plenum a heated discussion developed around the question of whether or not to organize prior to the congress reports and elections at the lower party levels, the rayon, city, and oblast organizations, where and what to call them, and based on this how and where to elect the congress deputies.

Of course it would undoubtedly be correct for the city and rayon committees to solve these problems for themselves and it was stated at the plenum that this approach would correspond fully to the demands of democratization and the need to increase the role, initiative, and originality of the most important units of the party structure. But one extremely significant circumstance should be taken into account. If reports and elections are organized in the full amount, that is if we take the traditional path, the report and election campaign will have to be conducted in extremely short periods of time: Beginning on 26 March and before 15 April it will be necessary to complete the report and election meetings in the local and shop party organizations, and in the next 15 days it will be necessary to conduct city and oblast conferences, that is in a month it will be necessary to do what used to take four-five months.

There are positive and negative aspects to conducting reports and elections before the congress. A positive aspect is the fact that in the lower party structures the elected management organs will be elected democratically and will have the confidence of communists. This, in turn, will have a positive effect on the formation of republic party structures; it is also noteworthy that holding reports and elections will make it possible to comprehensively take into account the remarks and suggestions made by communists during the course of the report and election campaign, and immediately upon completion of the congress it will be possible to undertake extensive practical work to act on them. The negative side is the fact that hastily conducted reports and elections can bring about superficial, ill-considered, and pro forma decisions. And in the future this will undoubtedly have an influence on party work.

Participants in the plenum said that if the reports and elections are not conducted before the plenum it would be possible to find several more or less correct ways of electing delegates.

First. At meetings of the party organization it would be possible to elect delegates only to the rayon and city party conferences, and at the party conferences—delegates to the congress. And in this case the candidate delegates to the congress should be named by the lower party units. This will make it possible to solve the earmarked problem with less effort, and completely in keeping with the regulation requirements.

Second. Congress delegates from the aforementioned lower party units will be elected at expanded plenums of rayon, city, and oblast party committees and secretaries of local and large shop organizations will be participating in their work. In large organizations where the number of communists exceeds the representation norm, they can decide to elect delegates at general party conferences, in the shop organizations, or at the party conference for the entire organization. The elections of delegates from small organizations can be conducted at joint meetings of these organizations according to the territorial or branch principle within a city, rayon, or population point.

It is possible to elect delegates in city and rayon party organizations through universal secret voting. In this case the candidate delegates would preliminarily be nominated and considered in the lower party units. Some of the candidates could be elected directly by the higher party organs. The list of candidates whose number is greater than the number of mandates allotted for the rayon and city party organizations will be voted on at the same time in all party organizations of the rayon or city.

In the local areas it will be necessary to comprehensively take into account and weigh both the positive and negative aspects of both of the aforementioned possible decisions and make a choice only after that. At the same time there are mandatory requirements that must be met in any case.

First. There should be a great deal of concern about the qualitative composition of the congress delegates. The successful work of the congress and its results depend primarily on this. The composition of the delegates should reflect the opinions and attitudes of communists to the greatest extent possible, enjoy their full confidence and authority, and be capable of participating actively in the development of party policy.

Second. The elections of the delegates should be organized on a competitive basis. We must provide for an objective, principled evaluation of the business qualities, program views, and positions of the candidates. It is mandatory to become familiar with their positions concerning the main areas of modern policy and the practical activity of the party.

Third. The rights of the rayon and city party conferences and plenums of party committees to express their considerations concerning the candidates who have been nominated and give the local party organizations substantiated advice and recommendations concerning them should not be restricted in any way.

At the plenum there was also extensive discussion of the procedure for nominating candidates to the higher elective organs of the Communist Party of Georgia. It was stated that both the meetings of local party organizations and city and rayon conferences should be granted the right to nominate their own candidates for these organs. Each candidacy should be comprehensively studied and considered. We should constantly experience a feeling of moderation, realism, and an unwillingness to make long lists, for it will be very difficult to choose the most worthy candidate. For example, it is quite sufficient if four of the worthiest candidates are nominated from each region. Of course it is necessary to convincingly substantiate the reason for the nomination of each candidate to the elective organ. At the same time, neither the congress nor the preliminary conference of representatives of delegations that has already been established in practice should be deprived of the right to nominate candidates.

Only the commission for preparing for the 28th Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia is in a position to encompass the entire complex of diverse issues that should be studied, prepared, and resolved during the process of preparing for the congress. Therefore, it was noted at the congress, it is necessary to instruct the Communist Party of Georgia Central Committee Bureau to create work groups that will include members of the Central Committee and representatives of our party aktiv, scientific and creative intelligentsia, and the broad public. The tasks of this group will be:

preparing the report of the Communist Party of Georgia Central Committee to the 28th Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia and the drafts of the congress decrees;

organizing discussion before the congress, the study of public opinion, sociological research, publicizing the precongress campaign in the party press, and analysis of the results of the materials obtained as a result;

developing proposals for restructuring the system of party control and inspection work;

preparing proposals for forming and expending the party budget, the procedure for paying membership dues, and the table of distribution of the party apparatus.

The agenda approved by the preceding congress envisions the determination of the structure of the Communist Party of Georgia. Based on this, it was stated at the plenum, it is necessary to develop the corresponding normative documents. This pertains above all to the theses of the program and regulations of the Communist Party of Georgia. To this end it is suggested that a broad representative commission be created.

It was emphasized at the plenum that the forthcoming 28th Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia should be a special event not only for the life of the Communist Party of Georgia and each communist but also for all of our people and all people living in Georgia. It actually should mark a qualitatively new stage in this history of the Communist Party of Georgia—laying a basis for the transformation of the state-appropriated political organization into a true political party whose primary and only goal will be to protect the interests of our people in the political, economic, and spiritual spheres: The future of Georgia and the nature of its sociopolitical development will depend largely on how deeply, radically, and well the Communist Party of Georgia is renewed and transformed into a modern civilized, democratic force.

The multiparty system, political pluralism, democratization, and glasnost place an entirely new understanding on the role and position of the Communist Party in the structure of state and political institutions. We simply reject outright monopolization of power and privileged positions. We do not think we have the ultimate truth. Under conditions of equal rights with other political parties and social movements we intend to fight to maintain active positions in society and, naturally, we expect the same approach from our opponents, no matter how irreconcilable our positions may be.

Democracy and political pluralism are impossible without law and order and legality. The plenum made a severe assessment of the timid, inefficient work of the administrative organs, as a result of which they weakened their fight against crime and some of the population felt that they could do whatever they wanted to with impunity.

In all truly democratic countries of the world the law is held in great respect and nobody is given the right to evade its requirements. But in our country the law frequently is not really in effect. Under the guise of democratization, perestroyka, and the national movement, this is skillfully used by all kinds of criminals and forces behind them that are constantly expanding the field of their activity and creating uncontrollable situations and an atmosphere of permissiveness, thus discrediting the progressive changes taking place in the republic and the national movement itself. This creates a threat to the processes of democratization and renewal.

All of them—the organs of power, political parties, social movements and associations, as well as all of society—should recognize the supremacy of the law, be concerned about the observance of law and order, and feel responsible for the peace of each ethnic group and the creation of normal conditions for life and labor.

Central Asia

Earthquake Registered in Kazakhstan 3 May

LD0305173690 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh 1400 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] Today at 1702 [1002 GMT] Alma-Ata Central Seismology Station has registered an earthquake. According to the preliminary data the epicenter was

35km south-west of the capital of the republic, in the north Tien-Shen mountains. The tremor in Alma-Ata was four points, and at the epicenter it was five points.

Tajik Deputies Appeal for Republican Harmony

LD2604220390 Moscow TASS in English 1545 GMT 26 Apr 90

[Text] Dushanbe April 26 (TAJIKTA-TASS)—Deputies to the newly elected Tajik parliament called on fellow countrymen to consolidate friendship between all people living in the republic, irrespective of their race or language.

The appeal by the republican parliament was broadcast and printed by the mass media today.

"Denouncing actions by extremists who tried to destablise the situation in Dushanbe last February and to incite young people to pogroms and assassinations. We resolutely declare: The Tajik people are no accomplice in these shameful events and denounce them," the appeal says.

The call for fellow (?countrymen) was motivated by the social and political situation in Tajikistan, which was aggravated by the February events, and by the continued outflow of non-indigenous population.

Over 6,000 people recently left the republic. They are mostly skilled personnel, which negatively influences the republican economy.

"But we are worried not so much by the economic factor as by the moral aspect," Nurullo Khuvaidullayev, chairman of the Tajik Supreme Soviet Standing Commission on Legislation, Rights and Applications of Citizens, told TASS.

"We want to convince our Russian-speaking brothers and sisters that 'the February syndrome' is not characteristic of the Tajik people. They have never participated in ethnic strife and wars."

In February-April the Tajik Supreme Soviet and Government adopted a package of legislative acts to protect constitutional rights of citizens, irrespective of their nationality or religion, as well as a decision on some privileges for refugees who want to return to the republic.

The Supreme Soviet adopted the law on repsonsibility for destablising the situation in the republic, providing for criminal responsibiilty for fanning up ethnic strife and discrimination of people by nationality or language.

Tajik Official Registered as People's Deputy

PM0105095190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "At the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of USSR People's Deputies"]

[Text] On the basis of a report from the district electoral commission for elections of USSR people's deputies and in accordance with Articles 57 and 62 of the Election Law the Central Electoral Commission has registered Valeriy Azizovich Yakubov, deputy chairman of the Tajik SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] State Committee for Construction and Architecture, CPSU member, and resident of the city of Dushanbe, who was elected 22 April 1990 by Dushanbinskiy-Frunzenskiy Electoral District No. 355, Tajik SSR, as a USSR people's deputy.

Tajikistan Shaken by Tremor 4 May

LD0405072190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0700 GMT 4 May 90

[Text] Dushanbe, 4 May (TASS)—An earthquake took place in the Tajik SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] at 0522 hours Moscow time [0122 GMT] today. Its epicenter is situated 45 km northwest of the republican capital. The underground tremor in the epicenter measured five points. There are no casualties or damage.

Uzbek City 'Ravaged' by Soccer Hoodlums

LD0305160590 Moscow TASS in English 1542 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 3 TASS—More than a hundred buildings, including a regional Communist Party hedquarters, were ravaged in an Uzbek city by soccer hooligans, frustrated by the cancellation of a game, on Wednesday [2 May].

The mass disorders in the city of Andizhan started, a spokesman for the Interior Ministry's press centre told TASS, when the scheduled game between the local club Spartak and Pakhtakor Tashkent was called off due to the visitors' default.

Mobs of angry fans, many of them intoxicated, trooped into the streets, burning down or vandalising 127 buildings, including the city public prosecutor's offices, 79 stores, kiosks and workshops, and 36 private homes.

The hoodlums set fire to the ground floor of the building housing the Andizhan regional committee of the Uzbek Communist Party. They also damaged 14 cars, five of them police vehicles.

The police kept an enviably cool head, refraining from the use of weapons, and there was no loss of life. But 13 Interior Ministry troops, ten policemen and 11 civilians, according to a preliminary count, were injured when efforts were taken to restore order.

An investigtion is under way to identify those who provoked the outrages.